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CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America I is at once baffling and re-
markable. The Supreme Court's surprising 1987 decision upholding the
constitutionality of an Indiana antitakeover statute has produced a caval-
cade of criticism. It has been argued that the Court misconceived the
protectionist motives of state antitakeover statutes in general and the In-
diana statute in particular,2 that it disregarded the efficiency of a robust
market in corporate control,' and that it rigidly conceptualized the cor-
poration as a creature of the law of its chartering state.'
Decided on preemption and dormant commerce clause grounds, CTS
rejected arguments that Indiana's control share statute unduly favored
incumbent managers and that it imposed on bidders unwarranted delays,
uncertainty, and costs while shareholders collectively decided a bid's
fate.5 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, resorted to the rhetoric of
1. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
2. Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 101 HARV. L. REv. 96, 116-17 (1987) [hereinafter
Langevoort, A Comment on CTS] (criticizing Court's lack of candor); Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover
Statute: Of Chills, Pills, Standstills and Who Gets Iced, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 937-39 (1988)
[hereinafter Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute]; Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dy-
namics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (11) Extraterritorial State Leg-
islation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1865, 1871 (1987) [hereinafter Regan, Siamese Essays]. See also CTS,
481 U.S. at 100 (White, J., dissenting).
3. Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Market for Corporate Charters,
1988 Wis. L. REv. 365, 380 [hereinafter Butler, Corporation-Specific Statutes]; Fischel, From MITE
to CTS: State Anti-takeover Statutes, the Williams Act, the Commerce Clause and Insider Trading,
1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 47, 85 (1988) [hereinafter Fischel, From MITE to CTS]; Langevoort, A Comment
on CTS, supra note 2, at 109-10; Macey, State Anti-takeover Legislation and the National Economy,
1988 Wis. L. REV. 467 [hereinafter Macey, State Legislation]. See also CTS, 481 U.S. at 98 (White,
J., dissenting) (noting that takeover bids often serve a useful function).
4. Butler & Ribstein, State Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Contract Clause, 57 U. CIN. L.
REV. 611, 653 (1988) [hereinafter Butler & Ribstein, State Anti-Takeover Statutes]; Millon, State
Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Corporation Law, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 903 (1988).
5. The statute, which applies only to firms incorporated in Indiana with significant Indiana
operational and shareholding contacts, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4(a) (Burns 1990), requires that
disinterested shareholders (excluding the bidder and management) approve voting rights for any
bidder that seeks to acquire a controlling interest in the corporation. Id. at § 23-1-42-9. A bidder
becomes subject to this rite of initiation when its total shareholdings exceed one of three specified
thresholds-20%, 33-1/3% or 50%. Id. at § 23-1-42-1. The bidder must give notice and the board
must set a date for a shareholders' meeting, no later than at the next special or annual shareholders
meeting, to decide the bid's fate. Id. at §§ 23-1-42-6, 23-1-42-7.
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shareholder protection:
[T]he statute now before the Court protects the independent shareholder
against both of the contending parties.... It does this by affording share-
holders, when a takeover offer is made, an opportunity to decide collec-
tively whether the resulting change in voting control of the corporation, as
they perceive it, would be desirable.6
Taken at face value, the decision merely addresses whether a chartering
state can regulate one aspect of corporate law's many concerns: the vot-
ing and transfer rights of shareholders. The case ostensibly concerned
little more than the power of a chartering state to protect its corpora-
tions' shareholders from coercive bids for their shares.
Although a few commentators have accepted CTS on its terms, most
have questioned the Court's alertness and motives. The commentary on
CTS is voluminous and disparate. It has both decried and extolled
CTS's effect to protect non-shareholder constituents, to underwrite cor-
porate managers' preference for stasis, and to return corporate govern-
ance to the states. Commentators have argued extensively whether these
effects are good or bad.
What explains CTS? A prevalent answer is that the Court sought to
ensure that takeovers would be regulated from some quarter. The
Court's fractured 1982 decision in Edgar v. MITE7 invalidated an Illi-
nois antitakeover statute for unconstitutionally interfering with the inter-
state market for corporate control. MITE disempowered the states and
left a regulatory gap; CTS abandons MITE.
Another explanation, only partially developed in the literature, is that
the Court awoke to the implications of MITE, whose latent potential to
federalize shareholder free-trading rights had only vaguely been appreci-
ated. The primacy given in MITE to the control market threatened not
only the standing of state antitakeover statutes, but also generic corpo-
rate codes that authorize firm-specific interference with shareholder
transfer and control rights. Invalidation of the Indiana control-share
statute would have intruded even further on traditional state prerogatives
over corporate chartering and corporate law.
Both views are deficient. CTS is remarkable because it and corporate
chartering are about much more. Presented as a case of federalism,8
CTS is best understood in that light. The Court faced the choice of ac-
6. CTS, 481 U.S. at 82, 91.
7. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
8. The appellant CTS, invoking "settled principles of Federalism," Brief for Appellant CTS
[Vol. 69:445
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tively mediating the state and federal roles or passively withdrawing. It
chose the posture of a diffident gatekeeper. By disregarding the protec-
tionist effects and motives of antitakeover statutes, the Court drew a
straight-forward and undemanding blueprint for a state antitakeover re-
gime. States have accepted the CTS invitation, and today more than
eighty percent of all U.S. corporate assets are under the umbrella of state
antitakeover legislation. Further, CTS constitutionalizes the internal af-
fairs doctrine and thus the chartering state's status. By doing this, CTS
avoids a regulatory patchwork and significantly deflates pressure for fed-
eral judicial, administrative, or legislative intervention. Despite many
calls for a greater federal role, little indicates the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) or Congress will intervene.
Perhaps most remarkable, CTS's corporate federalism, unlike other
federal-state allocations of commercial regulatory power, does not abdi-
cate regulatory power to the states. State corporate law is largely facilita-
tive-only weakly regulatory. Managers of publicly-held firms control
where the firm is incorporated and have significant political influence at
the state level. If dissatisfied with one state's chartering package, they
can reincorporate in another. Nonetheless, manager-buyers and state-
sellers face a variety of constraints that mold the terms of the chartering
product. Each state operates in a national market for corporate charters.
Regardless of its merits, the only regulatory risk is federal intervention.
CTS minimizes the risk by setting clear and simple parameters for an
incorporation-based ordering. This Article advances the thesis that CTS
legitimizes and catalyzes this corporate law process.
The Court, however, reserves a modest gatekeeping role in the law
process. Its preemption analysis under the Williams Act suggests that a
state antitakeover statute's effects still have some bearing on whether it
interferes with or undermines the assumptions of federal tender offer reg-
ulation. CTS leaves the seeds for judicial federalizing of base-level share-
holder voting/control rights. Furthermore, the Court's blind rejection of
Corporation at 10, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (No. 86-71) [here-
inafter CTS Brief], framed the issue as follows:
[T]he two controlling questions presented by this case involve not economics but Federal-
ism. First, did the Congress, in enacting the Williams Act, make a political decision to bar
the States from developing their generic corporation laws ... ? Second, if the Congress
made no such decision, should the "dormant" Commerce Clause nonetheless be construed
to impose that same result as a matter of constitutional law?
Id. at 12. CTS never defined precisely what were the settled principles, treating them as tenets of
constitutional faith. "Patently, .... State law-not Federal law-governs the scheduling of and
voting rights at shareholder meetings of the State's domestic corporations." Id. at 18.
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the Indiana statute's discriminatory and protectionist motives, for which
the Court found no record evidence, does not preclude some supervision
of the state political process in the future to assure full representation. In
view of current congressional inertia on takeovers, the result of a political
stalemate between competing management and shareholder interest
groups, these limited gatekeeping possibilities emerge as consistent with
the Court's gambit to stanch the federalization of corporate law.
CTS sets into motion a process of state-based private ordering over
which the Court has assumed continuing, albeit limited, responsibility.
This Article sets out a federalism perspective on CTS and explores the
wisdom of the Court's federalism gambit, comparing the current incor-
poration-based antitakeover regime with the likely product of a federal
response.
Part I considers the regulatory, market, and political landscape of cor-
porate law and state antitakeover statutes. It explores the facilitative na-
ture of state corporate law and its unique federalism implications, of
which the relevant federal and state players have been acutely aware.
Part II summarizes the CTS preemption and dormant commerce
clause analysis, highlighting the Court's analytical and doctrinal foibles.
It criticizes the Court's refusal to inquire meaningfully into the Indiana
statute's political genesis or its effects, which the Court downplays in its
preemption analysis and virtually disregards under the dormant com-
merce clause. This part asserts that CTS constitutionalizes the internal
affairs doctrine-the state choice of law rule that the manager-share-
holder relationship is governed by the law of the chartering state-and
considers the extent to which the Court reserves a federalism gatekeeping
role.
Part III considers and rejects a variety of suggested hypotheses that
explain CTS's blindness and its curious doctrinal results. In addition to
exploring how the Court sought to preserve incorporation-based private
ordering of corporate governance, it discusses the Court's attempts to
minimize the possibility of any federal response.
Part IV summarizes the current state of corporate federalism, in par-
ticular the response following CTS by the relevant players. It reaches
some conclusions about the legality of the current and evolving antitake-
over regime, conclusions that readily flow from a federalism perspective
of CTS.
Part V evaluates the forces that constrain antitakeover statutes at the
state level and considers the wisdom of CTS, comparing the corporate
[Vol. 69:445
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political economy at the federal and state levels. It concludes that far
more forces than recognized constrain state antitakeover statutes-for
example, the threat of federal intervention (always looming in the vings)
and the rhetoric of populism. It then considers the political stalemate
that broad-based representation at the federal level has produced and, in
the face of congressional paralysis, the Court's role as a catalyst for en-
suring a legitimate federalism.
I. CORPORATE FEDERALISM'S LANDSCAPE
State corporate law is a venerated tenet of our federalism. It is a deep-
rooted tradition that the ordering of the relationship between managers
and shareholders-corporate law9 -rests primarily with the states. 10 Ex-
cept for federal disclosure regulation and specific programs regulating
financial firms such as broker-dealers, banks, and mutual funds, the re-
sponsibilities that managers owe shareholders and the relationships be-
tween shareholders find their origins in state statutory and common law.
Like property and contract rights, corporate rights are state-based.
The tradition has not been without its rough moments. Flirting with a
9. In the chimeral world of the "corporation," nominalizations and metaphor hold significant
power. To avoid the conceptual pitfalls of confusing the actors and their actions, I make a concerted
effort to follow certain conventions of style and meaning:
(1) State statutes that discourage takeovers are "antitakeover" statutes, not bland and
deceptive "takeover" laws. Their purpose and effect is anti-takeover.
(2) "Corporate regulation" should be used with great caution. State corporate law is
more facilitative than regulatory. More descriptive are "rules of corporate governance,"
which connote corporation law's essentially private character.
(3) The "corporation," in this light, merely personifies the union of shareholders
(equity investors) and managers. It should be distinguished from the "incorporated firm,"
the aggregation of all the constituencies that contribute to the business.
Speaking of the corporation, without identifying the corporate actor, is to invite a muddle.
Although it might be possible to draw other participants into the fold, the American tradition has
been shareholder wealth maximization. See Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of
Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REv. 865, 873-78 (1990) [hereinafter Johnson, The
Delaware Judiciary]. The legal relationship of creditors, employees, tax collectors and communities
are defined for the most part by other sets of rules: contract law, labor law, tax law, environmental
law. Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1198-99 (1984). The personified "cor-
poration" acts as an intermediary between the shareholder-management union and others with a
stake in the firm.
10. The Supreme Court's expression of this tenet is far more frequent than any attempt to
explain it. For example, in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975), the Court rejected that shareholders
have an implied federal cause of action against corporate directors who approve criminal political
contributions, stating that a corporation's internal affairs are presumptively governed by state law.
It gave a "chicken-and-egg explanation: "[I]nvestors commit their funds to corporate directors on
[this] understanding." Id. at 84.
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federal law of corporations is a common reaction whenever the state
marriage turns sour.11 There are dramatic instances of federal interven-
tion. The failure of state law to deal with the interstate phenomenon of
monopolizing trusts justified the Sherman Act, 2 and its failure to control
stock market excesses justified the federal New Deal securities laws. 13
But the tradition of state corporate law has proved resilient. Proposals
for encompassing federal regulation of the corporation have fared
poorly. 14  For example, during the progressive era that produced the
Sherman Act, Congress seriously considered a federal corporate code.15
Likewise, early proposals to deal with the perceived causes of the Depres-
sion contemplated broad federal regulation of the shareholder-manager
relationship. 16  But the progressive-era antitrust laws, as now under-
11. Some have advocated federal incorporation because of state law's failure to regulate corpo-
rate managers' imposition of externalities on non-shareholder constituents. See, e.g., R. NADER, M.
GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR THE FED-
ERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS 84 (1976) (arguing that "the case for federal charter-
ing [is]... compelling [and] our current economic crisis and corporate crime wave underscore the
failure of the old corporate law system"); Schwartz, Towards New Corporate Goals: Co-existence
with Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 57, 104 (1971) (advocating federal incorporation to "harmonize our eco-
nomic activity with society's idea of general welfare"); Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation in
the Progressive Era, 26 AM. J. LEG. HIsT. 160 (1982) (noting that despite widespread support, fed-
eral incorporation laws failed because of disagreements on specifies) [hereinafter Urofsky, Federal
Incorporation]; Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations: A Proposal, 61 GEo. L.J. 89, 95 (1972)
(arguing that states "abdicated their responsibility to govern in an attempt to attract 'corporate'
business [and] are now overpowered by their creations").
Others, recently including SEC Chairman Breeden, have worried about state law's failure to pro-
tect shareholders and capital markets. Breeden Calls for Unified Market to Meet Overseas Competi-
tive Challenge, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 351 (Mar. 9, 1990) (reporting Breeden's comments
calling for unitary regulation of the U.S. capital markets at Practicing Law Institute's "SEC Speaks
in 1990") [hereinafter Breeden Calls for United Market]; Boyer, Federalism and Corporation Law:
Drawing the Line in State Takeover Regulation, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1041-56 (1986) [hereinafter
Boyer, Drawing the Line]; Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974) [hereinafter Cary, Reflections] (advocating federal standards of corporate re-
sponsibility); Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 552-56 (1984).
12. State laws had prohibited corporate ownership of stock, and thus interstate holding compa-
nies, but did not prohibit non-corporate trust ownership. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
LAW (1978).
13. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 25-35 (1988).
14. For a brief history of the influence of federal incorporation, see L. Loss, supra note 13, at
29-38; Boyer, Drawing the Line, supra note 11, at 1041-56 (stating it is "remarkable" that no federal
incorporation emerged by the end of the New Deal); Urofsky, Federal Incorporation, supra note 11.
15. Boyer, Drawing the Line, supra note 11, at 1048-50 (summarizing progressive-era initiatives
to create a federal corporate code); Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23
U. CHI. L. REV. 221 (1956).
16. See Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN.
L. REv. 385 (1990) (arguing that the restrictive understanding of § 10(b) was policy-oriented, not
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stood, dealt only with impact on markets, not concentrations of wealth. 17
The federal securities acts, insofar as they regulate nonfinancial firms,
have been understood to require only honesty, not fairness, in the share-
holder-manager relationship.
1 8
Not surprisingly, the takeover phenomenon of the last two decades
and the perceived deficiencies of the state response have led many again
to flirt with federal corporate law. To appreciate modem corporate fed-
eralism in the takeover context-and hence the meaning of CTS-com-
pels a look first at the state chartering market, the evolution of the
market for corporate control, and the roles assumed by the principal reg-
ulators of those markets. It is against this backdrop that CTS and the
state antitakeover regime it legitimizes must be seen.
A. The Nature of State Corporate Law
1. Increasingly facilitative, not regulatory
State corporate law has become more facilitative than regulatory.
Although a century ago corporate law shared many characteristics of
traditional governmental regulation-prescribing the kinds of business,
ownership activities, capital structures and governance rules available to
incorporated firms-today it is largely enabling and facilitative.19 Cor-
based on any empiricism of congressional purposes or intent; the Court's two limits of "only know-
ing and intentional conduct" and "conduct involving deception" are not supported by the original
congressional understanding).
17. See, e-g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 501 (1974) (market ef-
fects, not size); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (competition, not
competitors).
18. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985) (refusing to imply under the
broad "manipulative" language of § 14(e) of the Williams Act a private action to challenge unfair
management takeover defenses); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (refusing to imply
under § 10(b) a private action to challenge fully-disclosed, but assertedly unfair price in squeeze-out
merger). See Anderson, The Meaning of Federalism: Interpreting the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 70 VA. L. REV. 813 (1984) (questioning the Court's refusal to imply federal protection of
shareholders governance rights under the federal securities laws).
Even the federal securities rules that are not disclosure-based strain to fit a disclosure mold. For
example, proxy rules prescribing the form of the proxy and mandating shareholder access to the
proxy machinery are rooted in notions of shareholder democracy, not disclosure. See L. Loss, supra
note 13, at 868. Substantive insider-trading regulation, nominally disclosure-based, is anchored in
notions of corporate fiduciary duties. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983) (holding that an
insider's disclosure duty "arises rather from the existence of a fiduciary relationship"); Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (premising insider-trading liability on "a duty to disclose
arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction" and the duty of
corporate insiders "to place the shareholder's welfare before their own").
19. See, e.g., Cary, Reflections, supra note 11, at 664 (describing the removal of size and power
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porate statutes, much like contract and property law, enable by recogniz-
ing the rights and powers of the corporate participants and the
corporation's legal personality. They facilitate by specifying default
structures and provisions, which the parties have broad discretion to
adopt and modify. Mandatory and prohibitory provisions are the
exception.
In this light, modem corporate law appears as a state-provided service
that offers those seeking to structure their business relationship a rela-
tively standardized, off-the-rack package consisting of a governance
structure, legal personality, delineation of ownership rights, and limited
liability for the corporate participants.2 ° The package is roughly analo-
gous to a state-written form partnership agreement, with state-provided
immunity from participant liability.
Only a small set of rules remains mandatory, and their scope is dimin-
ishing: the ultra vires doctrine has become an historical curio;21 capital
structure rules have been and continue to be relaxed;22 the corporate
"equal dignity" rule accepts that even if some paths to a goal are prohib-
ited, other permissible paths can nonetheless be taken;23 recent statutes
permit charter amendments limiting director liability for fiduciary
breaches;24 others dilute judicial fiduciary scrutiny if internal procedures
are followed;25 and recent case law permits managers to sidestep rules
prohibiting subsidiaries from owning the parent company's stock
through management-controlled employee stock ownership plans. 26
limits); Millon, supra note 4 (describing corporate law's change from a regulatory to facilitative
model).
20. See generally R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 2 (1986).
21. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l Co., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (upholding flip-over
poison pill plan that creates obligations in any acquiring firm that triggers the plan's purchase
provisions).
22. See B. MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL 84-90 (2d ed. 1985).
23. Branson, Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate
Law, 43 VAND. L. REv. 85, 96-97 (1990) [hereinafter Branson, Indeterminacy] (describing Dela-
ware's "equal dignity" rule, which permits a "circuitous statutory path to evade a shareholder pro-
tection or requirement of a more direct route").
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988). See also Gelb, Director Due Care Liabil-
ity: An Assessment of the New Statutes, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 13 (1988).
25. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT Subchapter F, reprinted in 44 Bus. LAW. 1307
(1989) [hereinafter RMBCA]. See also Branson, Assault on Another Citadek Attempts to Curtail the
Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (1988)
[hereinafter Branson, Another Citadel] (arguing that allowing corporations to opt out of directors'
duty of loyalty would remove the "bedrock" under and "brackets" around corporate private
ordering).
26. Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 262 (Del. Ch. 1989) (upholding
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss2/5
1991] STANCHING THE FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE LAW 455
Even the few remaining mandatory rules-in particular, fiduciary du-
ties-might not be seen as truly regulatory, but instead as facilitative.
Because most of them represent what managers or shareholders, or both,
would have demanded had they fully negotiated their relationship, they
function to save the parties the expense of negotiating and verifying what
they would have included anyway.27 The proliferation of statutes and
cases that allow opting out from previously mandatory rules confirms
this.
If one state's rules become too oppressive or unwieldy, managers can
reincorporate in a state having a more facilitating and reassuring corpo-
rate law environment. 21 Under the well-established internal affairs doc-
employee stock ownership plan's purchase of target's stock "to introduce a note of stability at this
time of increasing corporate takeover activity [sic]"). The strategy reduces the amount of publicly-
traded stock available to a bidder, which in Delaware increases the difficulty of surpassing the 85%
threshold required to avoid Delaware's antitakeover statute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 203 (1990)
(prohibiting business combinations with 15% acquirers for a three-year period after the acquisition,
unless (among other things) the acquirer buys 85% of the firm's stock). Interest in such strategies
seems to be growing. See Bernstein, How to Keep Raiders at Bay-On the Cheap, Bus. WEEK, Jan.
29, 1990, at 59 (reporting that management of potential targets have been adding stock to existing
pension and savings plans, on the general assumption that employees tend to favor current
management).
27. Although a debate has begun on whether any rules should be mandatory, even current
mandatory rules-such as the prohibition of subsidiaries owning the voting stock of parent compa-
nies-can be seen as rules out of which shareholders in only unusual circumstances would choose to
opt. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1416, 1444-45 (1989)
(arguing that corporate law "fills in the blanks... with the terms that people would have bargained
for" if the need had been foreseen). Mandatory corporate rules thus allow shareholders to purchase
stock without undertaking the expense either to verify that these base-level rules are in place or to
negotiate their installation. See Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1549, 1597 (1989) (arguing that shareholders rely on mandatory rules, which protect against
"informational defects" in the bargaining process).
28. Much of the literature on the chartering market assumes that managers control this deci-
sion. See, eg., Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65
TEX. L. REv. 469, 485 (1987) (stating Delaware caters to managers "[bjecause managers make the
decision about where to incorporate"); Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of
the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 252 (1977) [hereinafter Winter, Theory of the Corporation]
(arguing "the decision as to which state to incorporate in is in almost all cases a managerial deci-
sion"). In one sense, this is true. Because in most states the firms must initiate and approve mergers
and other fundamental organic changes--the tools for reincorporation-managers control initiation
of the process. Once the reincorporation process is initiated, however, it is not a foregone conclu-
sion, since nearly all state statutes also require that shareholders approve the change.
Historically, shareholder approval is readily obtainable, both because of shareholder passivity and
perhaps perceived interest. See, eg., Gordon, supra note 27, at 27. Powerful evidence exists that
reincorporation in Delaware tends to result in supra-normal gains for shareholders. Romano, Law
as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 265-73 (1985)
[hereinafter Romano, Law as a Product] (finding that on average, reincorporation in Delaware from
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trine, corporate rules of the incorporating state exclusively govern the
shareholder-manager relationship.29 Without moving assets, people, or
political allegiances, it is possible for corporate managers to choose a dif-
ferent regulatory regime for the shareholder-manager relationship, sub-
ject only to easily obtained shareholder approval. 30 Although according
to traditional (and discredited) doctrine the original state and any other
state in which the incorporated firm does business have continuing regu-
latory power over the foreign corporation, states have shown great re-
straint in exercising this power.31 In fact, some suggest that a state
1960-1983 was accompanied by abnormal positive returns of 4.1% during a period extending 99
days before and after the announcement). The certainty that shareholders, particularly where there
is significant institutional ownership, will approve reincorporation in a state offering an aggressively
protective antitakeover regime today seems questionable.
29. See DeMott, Perspectives on Choice ofLaw for Corporate Internal Affairs, 48 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBs. 161 (1985); Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DuKE LJ. 1, 17-18
[hereinafter Kozyris, Corporate Wars] (finding that over the last 25 years, "in all but a handful of
[potential conflicts cases involving corporations] the law of the state of incorporation was applied");
Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of Full
Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1124-25 & n.37 (stating general rule and collecting
cases). Exceptions to the doctrine are few and invariably involve foreign corporations whose domi-
nant business activities are outside the chartering state. See, e.g., In re Orfa Securities Litigation,
654 F. Supp. 1449 (D.N.J. 1987) (applying the law of the corporation's principal place of business
where officers' illegal stock trading occurred, rather than the law of the chartering state); Western
Airlines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).
The doctrine establishes a regime for private corporate ordering chosen by management and
shareholders. Its uniformity and stability promote certainty in structuring corporate relationships.
Application of the local law of the state of incorporation will usually be supported by those
choice-of-law factors favoring the needs of the interstate and international systems, cer-
tainty, predictability and uniformity of result, protection of the justified expectations of the
parties and ease in the application of the law to be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 comment e (1969).
30. Professor Romano estimated in 1985 that the cost of reincorporation for a large public
corporation is between $34 million, based on present costs of $1.1 million and an increase in annual
expenditures of between $100,000 and $200,000. Romano, Law as a Product, supra note 28, at 249.
31. State power over foreign corporations derives from the Supreme Court's mid-nineteenth
century interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV:
The corporation being the mere creation of local law, can have no legal existence beyond
the limits of the sovereignty where created.... The recognition of its existence even by
other States, and the enforcement of its contracts made therein, depend purely upon the
comity of those States - a comity which is never extended where the existence of the
corporation or the exercise of its powers are prejudicial to their interests or repugnant to
their policy .... [Sluch assent may be granted upon such terms and conditions as those
States may think proper to impose.
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 181 (1868). This "creature of law" conception generates
enormous opportunities for state governmental abuse of firms conducted in the corporate form. See
Epstein, The Supreme Court 1987 Term: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of
Consent, 102 HARV. L. REv. 5, 32 (1988). Nonetheless, most state statutes specifically disempower
the state and its courts from regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations. See RMBCA
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should have no constitutional power to interfere with corporate relation-
ships of foreign corporations.32 Professor Macey's argument that the
"proper role of [the corporate] legal system is to facilitate the intra-firm
contracting process" is coming of age. 3
But the analogy of corporate chartering to a state-provided service has
its limits. State corporate law still prohibits some shareholder-manager
agreements and retains a regulatory flavor-for the protection of share-
holders, for the benefit of those who deal with the corporation, and for
the appearance that chartering states are marketing something more than
special-interest private law.34 For example, although the rules on share-
holder approval of mergers have been significantly relaxed-moving
from a requirement of unanimity, to two-thirds, to majority rule-the
requirement is still intact; it cannot be sidestepped by amending the arti-
cles.3 5 Likewise, managers of a public corporation cannot do away with
§ 15.05(c) ("This Act does not authorize this state to regulate the organization or internal affairs of a
foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this state."); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 106 [hereinafter MBCA] ("[N]othing in this Act contained shall be construed to authorize this
State to regulate the organization or the internal affairs of such [foreign] corporation."). See also
DeMott, supra note 29, at 163 (noting that half the states have provisions based on sec. 106).
Further, the Supreme Court has made clear the Paul v. Virginia conditioning power is not limit-
less. See Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 656-68
(1981) (accepting unconstitutional conditions doctrine); Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Ent.,
Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988) (holding that Ohio cannot toll its statute of limitations while foreign corpo-
ration has not appointed an in-state agent, when the burden on out-of-state corporations exposed to
general jurisdiction outweighs the State's interests in applying its tolling rules only to foreign
corporations).
32. See Epstein, supra, note 31, at 31-32; Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional
Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REa. 321 (1935) (while state can exclude, it cannot burden their entry into
state commerce); Kozyris, Some Observations on State Regulation of Multistate Takeovers--Control-
ling Choice of Law Through the Commerce Clause, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 524-25 (1989) [herein-
after Kozyris, Some Observations]; Reese & Kaufman, supra note 29, at 1139.
33. Macey, supra note 3.
34. See Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L.
REv. 1, 71-72 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Strain in the Web] (pointing out that corporate limited
liability casts states in the role of an insurer, forcing the corporation's voluntary and involuntary
creditors to bear the risk of corporate failures); Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary, supra note 9
(arguing that Delaware takeover fiduciary cases take into account non-shareholder constituents);
Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REv. 846, 855
(1989) [hereinafter Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point] (arguing that a significant rethinking is
underway of the question for whom corporate law operates). A regulatory philosophy is stronger in
some states than others. See Demott, supra note 29, at 179 (describing such states as New York and
California as having a more regulatory approach, a "counterculture" of corporate law).
35. See, eg, RMBCA § 11.02, Official Comment. Some have argued against the contract
model with respect to publicly-held firms with dispersed shareholders. See, e.g, Brudney, Corporate
Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985).
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the board of directors, whose modern legitimacy hinges in part on the
appearance that outside directors represent non-shareholder interests.
3 6
Recent antitakeover statutes, passed amid the rhetoric of saving local
jobs and communities, make clear the corporation is still a regulated
form.
3 7
Even if its regulatory qualities have declined, corporate chartering in
the United States has been uniquely governmental: private incorporation
is not available. 38 Not only is this deeply rooted in history, it is readily
explained by corporate limited liability. Privately provided liability lim-
its would be exorbitant. Although corporate managers could conceiva-
bly negotiate limited liability with voluntary creditors, only states
through their regulatory power can force contract and tort creditors to
assume the risks of business failure-a subsidy for management and
shareholder participation in the firm. To foist this subsidy on private
parties solely in the name of private ordering would seem, at the least,
politically unpalatable.
2. Market for corporate charters
Corporate chartering does not exist in a competitive vacuum. Each
state participates to varying degrees in a national market for corporate
charters. For many states, the principal customers are managers of local
businesses; for others, it is a mix of local and national businesses;3 9 for
36. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982). Recent Delaware takeover cases have ex-
panded fiduciary duties to encompass non-shareholder interests. Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary,
supra note 9, at 923 (pointing out that courts take into account non-shareholder constituencies by
framing directors' fiduciary duties "by reference to the vague and unknowable long run"; arguing the
legal community "screen[s] and translate[s] widely held social norms into legal doctrine").
37. See, e.g., Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 111 (1987)
[hereinafter Romano, Political Economy] (describing the enactment in Connecticut of a second-gen-
eration statute). In fact, SEC Chairman Breeden recently suggested that this state-based regulation
creates a fragmentation that "may need to be re-evaluated" if U.S. financial markets are to compete
with Japan and a unified Europe. Because foreign issuers often exclude U.S. investors from their
offerings, Breeden called for unitary U.S. regulation of capital markets to overcome the "internal
[state] barriers that reduce liquidity and increase costs without compelling justification." Breeden
Calls for Unified Market, supra note 11 (reporting Breeden's comments at Practicing Law Institute's
"SEC Speaks in 1990").
38. The precursor of the modem corporation, deeds of settlement, was privately-drafted. The
form, however, did not offer limited liability, a nineteenth century innovation. See L. SOLOMON, D.
SCHWARTZ & J. BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS, LAW AND POLICY 4 (2d ed. 1988).
39. Some of these states provide two kinds of chartering packages: close corporation statutes
and generic corporate codes. See, eg., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 158, 300-303; (Deering Supp. 1990);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-356 (1983) (special provisions for electing closely-held corporations).
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Delaware, the principal customers are managers of national businesses.
In each case, the reasons for state participation in the chartering market
vary: to provide a favorable climate for local enterprise and capital for-
mation; to attract direct revenues in the form of franchise and incorpora-
tion fees; and to promote the local corporate community, which offers
accessory legal and paper-handling services.
The notion of a chartering market is not new. In 1934 Justice Bran-
deis summarized Delaware's turn-of-the-century ascendancy as a "race
of laxity" for corporate charters.' Professor Cary in 1974 confirmed
that little had changed as the modern corporation evolved from one of
corporate managerialism to finance corporatism." Cary's empirical ar-
gument that Delaware had won a chartering race for large public corpo-
rations-a race he pejoratively characterized "for the bottom"-is not
seriously debated. Few doubt the existence of a chartering market or the
identity of its dominant supplier, Delaware.
Instead, the debate has evolved into one on the desirability of virtually
unregulated state competition for chartering business, compared to an
unarticulated, ideal chartering regime. Most commentators have focused
on tiny, visible Delaware-the most successful facilitator. A majority of
the Fortune 500 companies and nearly forty-five percent of those listed
on the New York Stock Exchange are incorporated in the state.42 More
than eighty percent of recent incorporations and reincorporations by
public firms have been in Delaware.43 Managers choose Delaware be-
cause of its reassuring corporate law environment: a facilitative statute, a
sophisticated and experienced corporate bar, a competent and non-parti-
san corporate judiciary, a responsive (but sober) state legislature, and a
large body of caselaw. 4 Three current theories explaining the chartering
40. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559-61 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describ-
ing corporate law's transition from regulation to facilitation and the turn-of-the century competition
between New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland for corporate charters).
41. Cary, Reflections, supra note 1I, at 668-70. During the last 50 years the modem public
corporation has evolved from one of professional managerialism to finance corporatism. See Lipton,
Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 4-6 (1987).
42. See Geylein & Koenig, Pension Funds Plot Against Takeover Law, Wall St. J., Apr. 5, 1989,
at C l, cols. 5-6 (reporting that 56% of Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware); Kalet-
sky, Delaware Makes Its Mark on Corporate America, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 8, 1988, at 24.
43. Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" Versus
Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259, 263 (1980) (finding that 90% of sample firms reincorporating
between 1927 and 1977 do so in Delaware); Romano, Law as a Product, supra note 28, at 244
(finding 81% between 1961 and 1983).
44. Macey & Miller, supra note 28, at 484; Romano, Law as Product, supra note 28, at 280.
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market address why Delaware law is as it is, and whether this is good or
bad.
a. Reformists
The pro-regulatory view, championed first and foremost by Cary,
posits that Delaware's chartering product aims only to maximize Dela-
ware revenues, from chartering and franchise fees45 and Delaware-based
corporate services, advice and litigation. Because the principal, if not
exclusive, customers for chartering services are business managers, the
reformists argue that Delaware's statute panders only to them.46 The
final legislative product does not reflect the interests of shareholders and
other non-manager constituents, neither of whom are meaningfully rep-
resented in Delaware's political process.
The reformists also argue that Delaware's judiciary acts as an accom-
plice in this revenue-enhancing charade. Whether witting or not, Dela-
ware judges are said to fill in the gaps of the statute to accomplish
Delaware's sordid revenue-enhancing purposes. The judiciary has strong
ties to the Delaware corporate bar, and the revolving door between the
bench and bar motivates judges to rule in such a way as to maximize the
bar's advice and litigation revenues. The reformists point to Delaware's
statutory changes and court decisions that seem to provide significant
advantages to managers, to the detriment of shareholders. The reform-
ists propose federal intervention, in a variety of forms.
b. Free-marketers
Over the last decade, a free-market explanation for the chartering mar-
ket and Delaware's dominant position challenged the reformists' views.47
45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 391 (Supp. 1988) (setting incorporation and other filing fees); Id.
at tit. 8, § 502 (imposing annual franchise tax). Delaware's rates are higher than in other states.
Romano, Law as Product, supra note 28, at 242.
46. My use of the "reformist" label is not an innovation. See Macey & Miller, supra note 28
(adopting the labels "reformist," "corporate federalist," and "public choice theorist" for the three
groups who have sought to explain the corporate chartering market).
47. The free-marketers, most of whom are associated with the law and economics movement,
argue that managers will have strong market-based incentives to make incorporation choices that
optimize shareholder wealth. See Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913 (1982) [hereinafter Fisehel,
The Race Revisited]; Winter, Theory of the Corporation, supra note 28. See also R. POSNER, ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 389-92 (3d ed. 1986); R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORA-
TION, 7-11, 28-42 (1978); Baysinger & Butler, Race for the Bottom v. Climb to the Top: The ALI
Project and Uniformity in Corporate Law, 10 J. CORP. L. 431, 456 (1985) [hereinafter Baysinger &
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The free-marketers agree with many of the empirical observations of the
reformists, but see only a market functioning optimally.4" They wonder
only why every manager has not already chosen Delaware and why other
states have not been successful in challenging Delaware. The free-mar-
keters, most prominently Judge Winter and Professor Fischel, argue that
opportunistic managers are not unconstrained in their choice of where to
incorporate. If they incorporate in a state whose rules allow them too
much opportunity for shirking or outright diversion, the firm's equity
securities will become unattractive;49 if the firm cannot efficiently raise
capital, its performance in its product and service markets will suffer;
ultimately, the firm will go bankrupt or (perhaps sooner) become a take-
over target. This pressure keeps managers from incorporating oppor-
tunistically. As proof, stock prices of Delaware corporations seem to
perform as well as prices of firms incorporated elsewhere, if not better.5°
Other states can try to outperform Delaware, and there have been a
variety of attempts-Nevada and Pennsylvania to name a couple. In
fact, states other than Delaware collectively continue to hold an edge in
retaining firms in the chartering market. Most large national firms are
Butler, The ALI Project]; Baysinger & Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Finn,
28 J.L. & ECON. 179 (1985) [hereinafter Baysinger & Butler, Role of Corporate Law]; Dodd &
Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" Versus Federal Regulation,
53 J. Bus. 259, 282 (1980); Fischel, From MITE to CTS, supra note 3, at 47. Some free-marketers
are simply pro-management, preferring state chartering because of a trust in state, as opposed to
federal, politics. Lipton, supra note 41, at 46-47.
48. See, e.g., Winter, The "Race for the Top"Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM.
L REV. 1526 (1989).
49. The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis posits that a firm's stock trading price will reflect
information about its prospects. See Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984) [hereinafter Coffee, Market Failure] (describing the
Hypothesis, the way public information is transformed by securities analysts into stock prices, and
the reasons for a mandatory, as opposed to voluntary, disclosure system). A suboptimally-incorpo-
rated firm's debt securities and access to debt markets also may suffer. Creditors free-ride, to a
certain extent, on the profit-maximization incentives forced on managers by equity-based con-
straints, such as fiduciary duties and disciplining from markets for corporate control.
50. See Romano, Law as a Product, supra note 28, at 265-73 (finding that reincorporation in
Delaware coincided with supra-normal returns of 4.1% during a period extending 99 days before
and 99 days after the reincorporation announcement; attributing much of the favorable effect to
perceived lower costs to firms undertaking operational or organization changes, such as an initial
public offering or acquisition activity); Dodd & Leftwich, supra note 43, at 275 (finding that share-
holders of firms reincorporating in Delaware earn positive abnormal returns of 30.25% over the 25-
month period before and including the month of reincorporation). Cf. Weiss & White, Of
Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study of Investors' Reactions to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75
CALIF. L. REV. 551, 602 (1988) (concluding that shareholders' reaction to corporate law changes
may reflect little more than indeterminacy about the changes' meaning).
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incorporated outside Delaware, as are most of the hundreds of thousands
of middle- and small-sized firms, most of which are incorporated locally.
The free-marketers' emphasis is on horizontal federalism-the rela-
tionship among the states. In the scheme, they largely ignore the vertical
federal-state relationship, except as an object of fear. Free-marketers
cringe at the thought of federal intervention, the only source of corporate
regulation in a true sense. They assume any regulated regime would cre-
ate and allocate chartering products less efficiently than a decentralized
open market.
c. Public-choice theorists
Proceeding from the assumption that law is a product of special-inter-
est politics, public-choice theorists take a little from each of the reform-
ists and the free-marketers, expanding on both their points. Led by
Professors Romano and Macey, they argue that a state's chartering prod-
uct predictably will reflect the interests of those who wield political
power-that is, cohesive, legitimate, and well-funded special interest
groups.5 1 In most states, including Delaware, this means that corporate
statutes and caselaw can be expected to reflect the interests of the corpo-
rate bar-the most cohesive, influential, informed, and ostensibly legiti-
mate of the state's corporate special interest groups. Not surprisingly,
members of the state corporate bar in Delaware and elsewhere tend to
draft corporate legislation and influence, if not decide, corporate law
cases.
Although shareholders are not well represented at the state level,52 this
does not necessarily mean that state corporate law will be pro-manage-
ment. Instead, the bar will predictably want to keep a fine balance be-
tween incorporation-enhancing and litigation-enhancing rules. Although
incorporation produces general state revenues, which members of the bar
51. Branson, Indeterminacy, supra note 23; Coffee, The Future of Corporate Federalism: State
Competition and the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L.
REv. 759 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, Corporate Federalism]; Macey & Miller, supra note 28; Ro-
mano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 457
(1988) [hereinafter Romano, Future of Hostile Takeovers].
52. See, e g., Davis, Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role of the States, 1988
WIs. L. REv. 491, 502 (noting that not even the Wisconsin Investment Board, the state agency
responsible for investing state pension moneys, participated in the adoption of Wisconsin's antitake-
over statute); Romano, Political Economy, supra note 37, at 12041 (noting that only business lob-
bied in Connecticut, while business and labor lobby in many other states).
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share proportionally with the rest of the state, incorporation is of special
importance to the bar because it produces prospective clients.
Once incorporation occurs, the bar has an interest in maximizing its
revenues. To do this, managers who have chosen Delaware, for example,
must be made to believe that they are getting better corporate governance
rules than they would had they incorporated elsewhere. Litigation,
which produces caselaw and the appearance of predictable constraints on
manager opportunism, is consistent with manager expectations. A state
political process that fails to balance effectively the incorporation-en-
hancing and litigation-enhancing mix will lose to other states that do it
better; Delaware currently seems to do it best. 3
To make their point, the public-choice theorists ask what would hap-
pen if Delaware adopted, as Professor Cary charged it had, a rule that
"shareholders never win." Shareholder plaintiffs and their lawyers
would be terribly discouraged and would vanish; defense lawyers, part of
the same sustenance chain, would become extinct; the rich body of cases
for which Delaware is famous would petrify; giving legal advice, though
extraordinarily easy, would no longer be lucrative; the decision to charter
in Delaware would become problematic as a practical matter, as skepti-
cal investors might well choose not to invest in Delaware-incorporated
firms and worried shareholders might not approve reincorporation in
Delaware.
Public-choice theory only purports to explain legislation, not to justify
it. According to the theory, the likelihood of federal intervention in the
chartering market depends not on an analysis of how well the state polit-
ical structure had mixed its franchise- and litigation-enhancing rules ac-
cording to some measure of economic efficiency or distributive justice,
but instead on the dynamics of federal politics.
3. Justifications for regulating the chartering market
A principal theoretical justification for government regulation is the
failure of markets to allocate products efficiently or fairly, producing
either externalities or suboptimal production because of free-riding con-
sumption of public goods.54 In the context of the chartering market, fed-
eral intervention might be justified if we concluded that managers
53. Macey & Miller, supra note 28; Macey, State Legislation, supra note 3, at 487.
54. Epstein, supra note 31, at 14 (arguing that the legal system should "enforce bargains when
and only when" they create joint gains for the contracting parties and respect non-party interests);
Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Informa-
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unilaterally set the terms of the manager-shareholder bargain (state cor-
porate law) and that collective action problems prevented shareholders
from organizing to negotiate a better deal. Likewise, federal regulation
might be justified if state chartering were viewed as a public good (like a
dammed lake) in which (1) one firm's use of a state's chartering service
does not reduce the amount available to other firms and (2) exclusion is
difficult or impossible.55 If managers who consume the service (power
boaters on the dammed lake) are left to run amuck by the chartering
state (the dam provider), without paying fully for their special access
rights and at the expense of shareholders (placid canoeists), regulation of
the chartering market provides the only way to assure optimal availabil-
ity and use of the public good. Likewise, federal intervention would be
justified if managers' consumption of the chartering product imposes ex-
ternalities on other corporate constituents (water-starved farmers
downstream).
The underlying tenet of the corporate reformists is that the chartering
market panders to managers-the consumers of its products-and as a
result imposes externalities on non-customer shareholders and other con-
stituents. As to these non-manager constituents, corporate law rules that
might protect their interests are public goods in suboptimal supply.
Proof of the failure of the chartering market to internalize these external
costs, according to the reformists, is found in state rules and cases detri-
mental to shareholder and constituent interests. Further proof is found
in the market's oligopolistic character. State chartering lacks significant
product differentiation; generic state corporate codes follow relatively
tion, 1981 Sup. CT. RFv. 309, 349 (arguing that government regulation is appropriate to "control
cases of externalities and monopoly").
55. Professor Romano made this observation about corporate chartering, which like a classic
public good, is "characterized by nonrivalry and nonexeludability [where] one individual's consump-
tion of such a good does not reduce the amount of the good available to others, and it is impossible
or extremely expensive to exclude any individual from consuming or using the good." Romano,
Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 465. One firm's and its shareholders' consumption of
a state's corporate law does not deplete the amount available to others, and excluding firms from
using a state's chartering service may be impossible or impractical.
Romano also argues that "[e]orporate codes governing the relation between shareholders and
managers share many of the characteristics of local public goods... whose externalities fall com-
pletely within [the chartering state's] borders .... " Id. at 466. For publicly-traded firms, this seems
wrong. Later she concludes, properly, that antitakeover statutes produce benefits that "are concen-
trated on local citizens-managers and, arguably, locally-employed workers of targets, and local
businesses and charities with relations to targets-but the costs are dispersed among shareholder and
bidding firms who typically do not reside in the legislating state." Id. at 467.
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consistent patterns. 6 One is hard-pressed to identify rules of different
states that have made or might make an outcome-determinative differ-
ence under a modified internal affairs doctrine-that is, inconsistent rules
that could not be complied with at the same time.57 Delaware, the mar-
ket's dominant participant, sets the tone for the market.58
The free-marketers respond to the assertion of shareholder externali-
ties by arguing that the interaction of other interrelated markets reduces
the ability of Delaware and other chartering states to offer a suboptimal
product 9.5  The free-market thesis, however, makes significant and tenu-
ous assumptions about the functioning of these other markets. There are
numerous weak links in the free-marketers' causal chain. For example, if
capital markets fail to recognize a suboptimal incorporation decision, it
will not affect the firm's efforts to raise capital-reincorporation will
never be compelled.' If the firm is mature and has few needs for equity
56. Adoption of the MBCA was widespread; 34 states had adopted it as of 1984. As of 1989,
23 states have adopted or are in the process of adopting the 1984 RMBCA. 44 Bus. LAW. 559
(1989). Some significant states, in terms of incorporation, have not followed the model corporate
codes, among them Delaware, Pennsylvania, New York, and California. Others have copied the
Delaware statute, even seeking to clone Delaware's caselaw by calling on their courts to follow it. In
addition, the recent RMBCA adopts many aspects of the Delaware statute, including the indemnifi-
cation and merger procedures.
57. Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doctrine in Corpora-
tion Law, 75 CALM. L. REV. 29, 37-38 (1987) (identifying only cumulative versus ordinary voting as
creating a regulatory dilemma); Kozyris, Some Observations, supra note 32 (same). Moreover,
although there are a variety of schemes, for example, on amending articles and approving mergers, it
would be possible to comply with any two simply by following the more exacting standard.
58. Romano, Law as Product, supra note 28, at 233-40 (finding that Delaware led the way in
changes (1) elaborating director and officer indemnification, (2) relaxing voting requirements for
mergers, and (3) eliminating appraisal rights for publicly-traded shares). To illustrate, despite the
great significance given the supposed crisis in director liability, most states followed Delaware's lead
and adopted statutory provisions authorizing corporate charter amendments to excuse directors
from liability for breaching their duty of care. Hanks, Recent State Legislation on Director and
Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207 (1988) (reporting that 40 lim-
ited-liability statutes have been enacted); Weiss, The Effect of Director Liability Statutes on Corporate
Law and Policy, 14 J. CORP. L. 637, 646.47 (1989) (reporting that most states have enacted enabling
liability-limitation statutes, though a handful has enacted self-executing versions).
59. The free-marketers pursue this argument on the assumption that shareholder wealth max-
imization supplies the appropriate referent; they do not address externalities on other constituents,
assuming they can protect themselves contractually or find protection outside corporate law.
60. See Romano, State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 712
(1987) [hereinafter Romano, State Competition Debate]. In fact, the failure of capital markets to
appreciate good management has been the principal argument for antitakeover statutes and defenses.
See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). Cf. Kraakman,
Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 936-38 (1988) (stating that takeovers occur because of "trading dynamics
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capital, suboptimal incorporation may not hurt its competitiveness.61 If
the firm is a monopolist, such as a regulated utility, or one that operates
in an oligopolistic market, difficulty in raising capital may not affect the
firm's performance in its product and service markets. Even if a firm's
stock price falls because of suboptimal incorporation, a poorly-function-
ing control market may undermine management disciplining. Failures in
the control market may be due to market factors, such as the unavailabil-
ity of junk bond financing, or to intrusive legal rules, such as corporate
law rules that empower managers to pursue opportunistic antitakeover
strategies. Short of the specter of bankruptcy or discipline from a weak
market in managerial talent, many managers may never feel the reper-
cussions of the firm's suboptimal incorporation. That managers of firms
with dispersed shareholders tend to incorporate in less regulatory states
suggests that shareholders most in need of regulatory chartering are least
likely to obtain it.62 Shareholders may tolerate more than they might
desire.
Even if managers are faithful surrogates for shareholder interests, fed-
eral intervention might be justified if the public-good chartering service
offered by states is suboptimal from the perspective of managers. Profes-
sor Romano has suggested the possibility.63 Any one firm's use of the
service does not reduce the amount available to others, and a state may
find it difficult to prevent free-riding by excluding such use. Hence, Ro-
mano suggests that the chartering market may not produce optimal char-
tering products. States will have no incentive to produce an optimal
chartering service because free-riding firms will not fully compensate
them for the effort. Even if some exclusion were possible, optimal char-
tering would still be doubtful since each additional incorporation has a
marginal cost near zero, making any market pricing system inefficient.
in the securities market" without regard to management or finances or assets of the target). Further,
there may be a significant lag between the time of a poor incorporation decision and the market's
awakening, such as when a perceptive observer notices that state courts have been applying a "share-
holders-almost-always-lose" rule.
61. See, e-g., Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock The Relevance of Substitutes, 73
VA. L. REV. 807, 824 (1987) (arguing that mature companies, compared to growing companies with
high-risk capital needs, have higher agency costs).
62. Baysinger & Butler, Role of Corporate Law, supra note 47 (suggesting that firms with dif-
fuse shareholders tend to incorporate in Delaware, while firms with concentrated shareholder pat-
terns incorporate in more regulatory states). This is consistent with the prediction that managers of
firms with widely-dispersed shareholders will behave more opportunistically than when shareholders
are more concentrated.
63. Romano, Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 465.
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Romano's argument, at least insofar as it is directed at suboptimality
from the perspective of managers, fails. Not only does the hue and cry
on behalf of managers ring hollow, but the public-good analogy may not
be apt when applied to managers. Free-riding by incorporated firms does
not seem to be a significant problem: states can and do charge incorpora-
tion and annual franchise fees for the chartering service.64 Free-riding
occurs only in the unusual case when a specific firm initiates and lobbies
for corporate reform, as happens when an antitakeover statute is enacted.
While this may suggest that the state may want to pass these costs on to
free-riding firms, for example, by charging a fee for opting into an an-
titakeover regime, this hardly justifies federal intervention. Further, that
providing the chartering service (including the preparation, interpreta-
tion, and revision of corporate statutes) is not costless is not a problem:
most, if not all, of the cost is borne directly through chartering and
franchise fees and indirectly when the corporate bar passes its costs
through to firms using the state's chartering regime. Finally, that the
marginal cost of the chartering service is zero is not a problem: the mul-
tistate chartering market serves much the same function as would fifty-
one telephone companies offering marginal-costless telephone service.
Because mobility costs (the cost of reincorporation) are relatively low
and the internal affairs doctrine pervasive, no state has a natural charter-
ing monopoly. The state chartering market would seem to count ade-
quately the costs and benefits to managers of the chartering product.
There is no reason for federal intervention on their behalf.6
But whether the public-good chartering product takes into account the
externalities it may impose on shareholders (and non-shareholder con-
stituents) better than would a federalized product, returns us to the ques-
tion of whether manager opportunism is limited by the market forces
that constrain incorporation decisions and the political forces that pro-
duce corporate law. The question sets the stage for CTS and my less
ambitious inquiry into whether the current chartering market-with
64. Romano argues that the free-rider problem, though it can be avoided by exclusion at the
time of chartering, cannot be amended later when there are code reforms or judicial interpretations.
Romano, Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 466-67 n.23. This argument fails to take
into account exclusion through annual franchise taxes, which Delaware and 30 other states impose.
See Romano, Law as Product, supra note 28, at 255.
65. As Professor Romano correctly points out, where the chartering service creates in-state or
out-of-state externalities on constituencies beyond the shareholder-manager relationship, they can be
dealt with more effectively by other regulatory regimes, such as environmental protection and anti-
trust statutes. See Romano, Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 467.
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polyglot Delaware the dominant supplier-produces a better antitake-
over regime than would the federal government.
B. The 1980s Market for Corporate Control
CTS was argued on March 2 and decided on April 21, 1987.66 By
then it had become clear that corporate takeovers had created one of the
highest stakes games in American economic history. At stake were po-
tentially hundreds of billions of dollars in wealth creation.'
The fabric of modem economic life was, as is still true, being subjected
to great forces of change. The takeover phenomenon seemed to be in an
early developmental stage; an early, largely impressionistic debate on the
merits of takeovers had taken form.68  The old corporate guard-
66. I purposefully cite to the literature referred to in the briefs submitted to the Court-the
data from which the Court drew its antitakeover blueprint-noting where it may have been
incomplete.
67. In 1985 alone, control transactions exceeding $500,000 resulted in an aggregate purchase
price of $179.6 billion. Brief for Appellee Dynamics Corp. of America, at 16 n.15, CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (Nos. 86-71 & 86-97) (1987) [hereinafter Dynamics Brief]
(citing 3 Corporate ControlAlert 1, 8 (Apr. 1986)). Estimates of shareholder premiums for takeovers
during the 1980s are equally impressive. See Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2
J. ECON. PERSP. 21 (1988) (estimating that premiums paid in takeovers and restructurings during
1977-86 total $346 billion); Black & Grundfest, Shareholder Gains from Takeovers and Restructur-
ings Between 1981 and 1986: $162 Billion is a Lot of Money, I J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 5, 15 (1988)
(estimating the gains from takeovers between 1981 and 1986 were $162 billion). These premiums do
not necessarily represent wealth creation. Much debate has arisen over whether they were coming
from taxpayers, bondholders or other creditors, customers or suppliers, employees, or the sharehold-
ers of acquiring firms. See Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597 (1989)
(summarizing the various hypotheses on takeover premiums); Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really
Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1274 (1990) (arguing
that takeover premiums do not tell us whether takeovers are good or bad for society, or target
shareholders in particular).
68. The Indiana Chamber of Commerce argued in CTS that '"[t]he debate has not gone on
long enough for definitive solutions to a problem we are only beginning to understand. The empiric
data is inadequate, and most important, there is no consensus on the goals we are trying to reach.'"
See Joint Brief of the Indiana Chamber of Commerce and Indiana Legal Foundation, Inc. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Appellants CTS Corporation and the State of Indiana at 19, CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (Nos. 86-71, 86-97) (1987) [hereinafter Ind. Chamber of
Commerce Brief] (quoting Subak, Takeovers: Where Are We? Where Do We Go?, 41 Bus. LAW.
1255, 1256 (1986)). The debate was presented to the Court as follows:
Compare Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981) (no resistance to tender offers by incum-
bent management can be justified), with Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Take-
overs: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 249 (1983) (the advantages possessed
by tender offerors under the current regulatory environment justify at least some obstruc-
tive tactics on the part of the incumbent board), and Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice
and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (1985) (neither
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss2/5
1991] STANCHING THE FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE LAW 469
America's great aristocracy-was challenged by a brash, well-funded
new breed.6 9 Whether government, federal or state, should have a role
and what it should be were relatively nascent, though contentious,
questions.
1. Market correction
In the mid-1980s the relatively young market for corporate control
was in its heyday. There were more tender offers, friendly and contested,
than there had been during any other period.70 The targets of corporate
acquisitions and of reorganizations spurred by the threat of acquisition
generally fell into one of two broad categories: (1) firms whose managers
during the 1960s and 1970s had pursued inefficient policies of conglomer-
ation;7 and (2) firms whose managers had reacted too slowly to the de-
regulation of the late 1970s and 1980s.72 The market for corporate
control was correcting itself.
According to the romanticized portraiture of the control market, a
firm was targeted for a takeover or reorganization when its asset value
exceeded the sum of its stock trading price plus the costs (including a
control premium and transaction expenses) required to amass quickly a
unrestrained tender offers nor defensive tactics by management serve the best interests of
corporate shareholders). Compare Ginsburg & Robinson, The Case Against Federal Inter-
vention in the Market for Corporate Control, BROOKINGS REVIEW (Winter Spring 1986) at
9 (the theory that the threat of tender offers forces management into a short-sighted strat-
egy of maximizing current profits is incorrect), with Scherer, Takeovers: Present and Fu-
ture Dangers, BROOKINGS REVIEW (Winter Spring 1986) at 15 (takeovers have not
resulted in improved post-takeover performance by acquired corporations).
Ind. Chamber of Commerce Brief, supra, at 19 n.10. See also CTS Brief, supra note 8, at 9 (citing
Easterbrook & Fischel and Bebchuk).
69. Gilson, Just Say No to Whom?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 121 (1990) (commenting that if
the corporation is perceived as the nation's "'collective soul'.., the question of who runs such an
important social institution transcends shareholder interest in the price of their stock") (quoting, A.
BERLE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 148 (1954)).
70. Romano, Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 460 (table 1).
71. See Coffee, Strain in the Web. supra note 34, at 8 (explaining the recent internal restructur-
ing in American corporations as the correction of long-standing managerial bias for corporate
growth and inefficient size-maximization); Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Fi-
nance, and Takeovers, 76 AMER. ECON. REV. 323, 324 (1986) (explaining takeovers and recapitali-
zations as redirecting excess cash flow from unprofitable investments and projects to shareholders);
Porter, From Competitive Advantage to Corporate Strategy, 87 HARV. BUS. REV. 43 (May-June
1987) (in a sample of 33 large U.S. companies, finding that 75% of pre-1975 acquisitions in unrelated
lines of business were subsequently divested, sometimes after hostile takeovers).
72. Jensen, supra note 67, at 24-25 (reporting that from 1981 to 1984, 46% of all mergers and
acquisitions occurred in recently deregulated industries, such as airlines, transportation, oil and gas,
financial services, broadcasting); Coffee, Strain in the Web, supra note 34, at 31-35 (similar).
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control block.73 A weak stock price reflected equity investors' collective
view that managers were not diversifying better than investors could
themselves or were not maximally exploiting the firm's assets, or both.
Busting-up the assets into many new hands or placing them into more
aggressive hands was the solution.74
2. Huge premiums
No one disputed that shareholders of target firms were garnering ex-
traordinary premiums, on average thirty percent above pre-announce-
ment prices.7 5 It was (and still is) unclear whether the premiums were
coming from the prospects of increased value created by displacing ineffi-
cient management, from customers or suppliers forced to bear noncom-
petitive prices, from bondholders and workers who seemed inevitably to
lose after takeovers, from taxpayers forced to bear a proportionally
greater tax burden as corporate equity was converted into debt, or from
acquiring firms and their shareholders.76
3. Takeover techniques
Rapid and dramatic innovation also characterized the takeover mar-
ket. In the early 1980s, hostile takeovers were generally half-brothers of
mergers. The acquiring firm was generally larger, with enough cash to
provide an equity base or with sufficient financial capacity to absorb new
73. The efficiency of the control market was a principal assumption of Justice White's plurality
opinion in MITE. 457 U.S. at 643.
74. Upon more careful examination, this portraiture contains numerous flaws, the most signifi-
cant of which is that acquiring firms seemed to perform more poorly as a result of the acquisition.
See Black, supra note 67 (describing and evaluating a bidder overpayment hypothesis). The take-
over market of the 1980s had not put an end to managers' "empire building," but merely redirected
it.
75. Bradley, Desai & Kim, Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and the Diversion Be-
tween the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 31 (1988) (estimating the
premiums paid in takeovers between 1963 and 1984 at 31.8%); Jarrell & Poulsen, The Returns to
Acquiring Firms in Tender Offers: Evidence from Three Decades, 18 FIN. MGMT. 12 (1989) (estimat-
ing premiums paid to target shareholders between 1963 and 1986 at 29.0%, though finding that the
size of premiums increased during the 1970s and again in the 1980s).
76. Black, supra note 67; Netter, The Empirical Evidence on Takeovers, Restrictions an Take.
overs, and Restrictions on Deductibility of Interest, 15 J. CORP. L. 219 (1990) (providing an excellent
review of the empirical data on the various explanations for the source of takeover premiums); Stout,
supra note 67, at 1260-61 (summarizing theories for takeover premiums). Professor Stout argues
persuasively that the premiums may simply reflect that different shareholders value the same stock
differently, forcing any buyer to pay increasingly higher prices to obtain enough shares for control.
See Stout, supra note 67.
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debt. As it became clear, particularly in a bust-up merger, that the key
was control rather than long-term ownership, bidders made partial or
front-end loaded bids."
Such bids were structurally coercive. For a rational shareholder faced
with a partial or two-tier bid, her decision to tender was compelled. To
be assured a portion of the front-end premium and to minimize the loss
of being stuck with minority shares for which there would be no control
premium, the rational choice was to tender." The coercion of such bids
justified strong defensive reactions by target managers, ostensibly on be-
half of dispersed shareholders who individually were compelled to do
what collectively they would not.
But by 1987, the control market-whose major events during this pe-
riod were measured in weeks and months rather than years-had moved
to any-and-all cash bids, making structurally coercive bids largely a thing
of the past. Junk bond financing, which proved its viability in 1985,
avoided the need for partial or two-tier bidding. A bidder could raise
cash to fund an offer for all the target's shares by borrowing against the
target's assets and future cash flow.
4. Wrenching side-effects
Perhaps the most politically charged aspect of the takeover phenome-
non has been the stories of uprooted employees, plant closings, precipi-
tous drops in targets' bond prices after a takeover, forced concessions
from suppliers, and pension plan terminations and withdrawals.79
Although these events may have resulted equally from changing eco-
nomic conditions in the country, 0 takeovers (particularly hostile ones)
77. In a partial bid, the bidder offers a takeover premium only for the shares purchased; he
makes no promise as to unpurchased shares. In a two-tier bid, the bidder typically offers cash for
51% of the target's stock, promising to buy out the remaining shares in a squeeze-out merger for
debt or other consideration at a discount compared to the front-end cash. See, eg., Booth, The
Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L. Rav. 1635 (1988) [hereinafter Booth, Promise of
Takeover Statutes].
78. A rich body of literature developed in the mid-1980s on the coercion of such bids. Justice
Powell cited to some of it in CTS. 481 U.S. at 83. See, eg., Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing and Non-
Tender Offer Purchase Programs, Exchange Act Release No. 21079, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,637, at 86,916 (June 21, 1984); Lowenstein, supra note 68, at 307-09.
79. See Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point, supra note 34, at 848 (1989) (arguing that "state
legislators perceive that hostile takeovers cause lost jobs, destruction of established supplier and
customer relationships, and loss of tax revenues and charitable contributions"). Some have argued
that wage concessions from employees and price concessions from suppliers serve as a significant
source for financing takeovers.
80. For example, empirical studies suggest that takeovers may not be the primary cause of
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became the object of public animosity.
C. The Corporate Federalism Players
CTS was not decided in isolation. The market for corporate control is
subject to a dizzying patchwork of federal and state statutory, adminis-
trative, and judicial law. Yet by 1987, there were clear patterns in the
ways the principal takeover regulators were playing their hands.
1. A paralyzed Congress
As of 1987, Congress was for the most part sitting out the game of
regulating takeovers. Although takeover bills and hearings during the
1980s were common fare, demonstrably little had emerged. In fact, of
the sixty-two bills introduced between 1982 and 1987 relating generally
to tender offers, only one was reported out of committee81
In 1968, in response to management pressure to regulate so-called
"Saturday night special" cash tender offers, Congress enacted the Wil-
liams Act to mandate early warning signals of prospective takeovers, to
require disclosure so shareholders and the markets could evaluate tender
offers, and to regulate the structure of such offers so shareholders would
not be stampeded into tendering.8 2 By rule, the SEC required that tender
offers remain open for at least twenty business days.8" The Williams Act
had been a hard-fought compromise, which in the end took a relatively
recent labor dislocations. One study indicates that of 286 plant closings (from 1980 to 1984) only 40
were by firms that had been taken over, and of these only 22 were hostile takeovers. Blackwell, Marr
& Spivey, Plant Closings: Shareholders' Wealth, Advance Notice and Takeover Activity, cited in Net-
ter, supra note 76, at 35 n.100.
81. See Romano, Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 471 (describing the post-MITE
activity in Congress). The only bill reported out of committee came soon after MITE, but the bill
was never taken up by the whole House. H.R. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (The Equity in
Foreign and Domestic Credit Act of 1984); H. REP. No. 1028, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
82. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(d), 14(d), 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), n(d)-(e) (1990).
The Act plugged a regulatory gap. Federal proxy rules required disclosure of negotiated takeovers
requiring shareholder approval, and the 1933 Act's prospectus disclosure rules applied if any securi-
ties were exchanged in a tender offer. But no federal securities law regulated the buying of a control
block for cash, whether through open-market purchases or a tender offer. See Johnson & Millon,
Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862, 1894 (1989).
83. Rule 14e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1990). In implementing an explicit waiting period
under its rule-making authority, the SEC rejected extending the waiting requirement to 30 days as
upsetting the Act's policy of neutrality. Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 16,384, (1979-
1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 5 82,373, at 82,595-96 (Nov. 29, 1979) [hereinafter
Rule 14e-l Adopting Release] (finding persuasive the view that a minimum period of 30 business
days is "unnecessarily long"; "tender offers which do not stay open for a reasonable length of time
increase the likelihood of hasty, ill-considered decision-making").
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non-committal stance toward the merits of takeovers and the control
market.84 Early bills, ultimately rejected, would have significantly
strengthened the hand of managers.85 As the Supreme Court would
make clear in CTS and other cases, the Williams Act was not compre-
hensive takeover legislation. 86
Aside from correcting amendments to the Williams Act in 1970, Con-
gress had remained largely passive in the takeover area. In 1976, it
passed the Hart-Scott-Rodino antitrust amendments to ensure greater
opportunities for antitrust review by federal agencies of business acquisi-
tions.8 7 In 1984, Congress denied corporate tax deductibility for golden
parachute payments following a change of control if they exceed three
times the executive's average annual comfensation over the preceding
five years.8 Not really designed to generate federal tax revenues, the
golden parachute legislation operates in tandem with state corporate fi-
duciary law to create a bright-line (and perhaps generous) ceiling that
corporate boards will be reluctant to exceed for fear of liability under a
theory of corporate waste.89
More telling, as of 1987, was what Congress had not done. The 1980s
flurry of takeover hearings-twenty-one during the period from 1982 to
1987-showcased the takeover actors, revealing the absence of anything
close to a political consensus on what, if anything, should be done.9° The
84. See, e-g, Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 82, at 1913.
85. The Supreme Court found the original bill to be "avowedly pro-management." Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 30 (1977); Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 9
n.8 (1985). Congress rejected this approach, adopting instead a disclosure scheme. The charge re-
mains, however, that managers essentially won the fight. The early-warning system of the Act and
its disclosure requirements provide managers potent weapons for delay, litigation, and the mounting
of defensive reactions. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 262 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (stating the Williams Act's "effect" is that of an antitakeover statute).
86. Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 82.
87. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (1988). See
H. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
2637.
88. 26 U.S.C. § 280G (1988). In addition, any executive who receives excess parachute pay-
ments is subject to a 20% excise tax. 26 U.S.C. § 4999 (1988).
89. See Coffee, Strain in the Web, supra note 34, at 78.
90. See, eg., Oversight Hearings on Mergers and Acquisitions Before the Subcomm. on Economic
Stabilization of the House Comm. on Banking. Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1987) (statement of Rep. Markey, chairman of the committee) (stating "[w]e are faced with a classic
question of how to strike the balance between sufficient market freedom... and sufficient regulation
to curb abuses which threaten to hold our entire economic future hostage"); H.R. REP. No. 1028,
98th Cong., 2d Sess 5 (1984) (stating "[c]orporate takeovers may serve to bring innovation and new
capital to existing businesses, to help companies achieve economies of size and, in some instances,
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sixty-two bills offered a variety of solutions: restricting defensive tactics;
validating state antitakeover legislation; preempting it; and tightening re-
porting and waiting-period requirements under the Williams Act.91 The
bills went nowhere, in part because of an ambivalence about takeover
regulation in federal hands.92
2. A cautious SEC
The SEC, cautious of far-reaching federal intrusion into corporate gov-
ernance, had been playing a weak hand favoring market solutions. The
SEC had largely acquiesced in the Supreme Court's view that the Wil-
liams Act was intended to regulate only disclosure in the takeover
context.93
During the 1980s, the SEC tinkered with the Williams Act rules to
streamline the tender offer process.94 But the changes, giving sharehold-
ers broader withdrawal rights and assuring them equal treatment in a
provide a mechanism to remove ineffective management [but] may also result in the loss of jobs,
cause management to focus upon short term stock performance instead of long-term prospects, and
reduce the amount of credit available for product purposes"). Congress was politically unable to
find the balance.
91. Romano, Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 471 (describing the post-MITE
activity in Congress). See, eg., H.R. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (requiring foreign acquirors
to comply with U.S. margin requirements; requiring disclosure of 5% holdings within 24 hours;
requiring aequirers to file community impact statements with local government; mandating that
tender offers stay open for 40 business days; and prohibiting golden parachutes, defensive stock
issuances and buy-backs).
92. See, ag, Impact of Corporate Takeovers Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate CommL on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 893 (1985) (statement
of Alexander B. Trowbridge, president of the National Association of Manufacturers) (stating that
"[i]t would be wrong to replace longstanding State laws and court decisions with a new Federal
corporation law as a result of the activities of corporate raiders whose effect on the economy is at
best suspect"). In fact, the principal concern of the business community seemed to be federal disclo-
sure and insider trading law, governance matters which had fallen into federal hands. See, e.g.,
Hostile Takeovers Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 128 (1987) (statements of 16 Fortune 200 executives, each decrying insider
trading and the power of Wall Street).
93. See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding that § 14(e) did not
authorize a private action challenging unfair management takeover defenses).
94. Besides requiring disclosure by the bidder, the SEC tender offer rules seek to ensure an
opportunity for shareholders to reflect on the bid. Many of the SEC rules expand the minima speci-
fied in the Williams Act:
(1) Open for minimum 20-day period. The tender offer must be left open a minimum of 20
business days. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 14e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1990). And
if there is any change in the offered price or the percentage of shares being sought, the offer must be
left open for an additional 10 days after the change.
(2) Shareholder withdrawal at any time. Shareholders can withdraw their shares (revoke their
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tender offer, stuck close to the "stop, look and listen" disclosure philoso-
phy of the Williams Act.95
Proposals for direct intrusion into corporate governance fared poorly.
Controversial proposed going-private rules, which would have required
that a firm's restructuring to eliminate public ownership be fair, were
withdrawn. 96 Concept releases proposing to regulate such matters as
tenders) at any time while the tender offer is open. Id. at Rule 14d-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1990).
(3) All-holders rule. The tender offer must be open to all shareholders of the same class, and not
exclude any shareholders from tendering. Id. at Rule 14d-10(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(1)
(1990).
(4) Best-price rule. Each shareholder must be paid the best price paid to any other shareholder.
Id. at Rule 14d-10(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(2) (1990). If different consideration alternatives
are provided (cash or debentures, for example), each shareholder can choose. Id. at Rule 14a-10(c),
17 C.F.R. § 240.14.10(c) (1990).
(5) Pro rata purchase if tender offer oversubscribed. When the bidder seeks only a portion of all
the shares (a partial tender offer) and more shares are tendered than are sought, the bidder must
purchase on a pro rata basis. Id. at § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1988). For example, if the
offer is for 50% of a target's stock and 75% of the shares are tendered, the bidder must purchase
two-thirds (50/75) of each tendering shareholder's shares (disregarding fractions) and return the
unpurchased shares. Id. at Rule 14d-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1990).
(6) No outside purchases. The bidder cannot make purchases outside the tender offer while it is
pending. Id. at Rule lOb-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1990). See also Kozyris, Some Observations,
supra note 32.
95. It has been argued that the equal-treatment and best-price rules go beyond disclosure, in-
truding into the governance of shareholder transfer rights. Oesterle, The Rise and Fall of Street
Sweep Takeovers, 1989 DUKE L.J. 202. Both rules prohibit bidders from offering increasingly lower
prices, a practice that coerces early tenders. In this context, they easily fall into a disclosure-protec-
tion mold. Shareholders should make their sell decision on the basis of price, not structural coer-
cion. The rules also prohibit denying to early tenderers ultimately higher prices, and the equal-
treatment rule prohibits categorizing shareholders. Although this would seem simply to ensure fair-
ness to shareholders-traditionally a state law prerogative-a disclosure purpose can also be dis-
cerned. The rules ensure risk arbitrage in the tender offer process, and thus a market price that
efficiently reflects information about the tender offer. If arbs could not be sure that they would be
paid the ultimately highest price-either because they were excluded from participating or they were
denied last-minute price spikes-they would be unwilling to buy based on their assessment of that
price. Without these rules, the market price will not reflect the arb-driven market's perception of
what the bidder will ultimately bid. Shareholders could be deceived into tendering or not tendering.
96. In 1975, the SEC proposed to regulate going-private transactions to assure fairness to share-
holders under the authority of § 13(e)(1) of the 1934 Act, which prohibits issuer repurchases unless
they comply with SEC rules. See Notice of Public Fact-Finding Investigation and Rulemaking Pro-
ceeding in the Matter of "Going Private" Transactions by Public Companies and Their Affiliates,
Exchange Act Release No. 5567, [1974-1976, Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,104
(Feb. 12, 1975). The going-private rules, when adopted in 1979, did not contain a fairness require-
ment. Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, Exchange Act Release
No. 6100, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,166 (Aug. 15, 1979). The agency
later withdrew the rule and explained "issuer repurchase programs are seldom undertaken with
improper intent [and] may frequently be of substantial benefit to investors," and the proposed rule
would have been "overly intrusive." Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer, Exchange
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poison pills, greenmail, and golden parachutes died from indifference.97
The SEC ultimately capitulated in its attempt to have market sweeps
regulated and thus prohibited as tender offers, persuaded by arguments
that open-market purchase programs can be an efficient mechanism in a
market for corporate control.98 In fact, the SEC saw its own role as
antiregulatory, at one point floating the idea that shareholders should be
allowed to opt out of certain Williams Act provisions.99
While the SEC hesitated to take a regulatory role in corporate govern-
ance, it was an outspoken advocate in Congress and in state legislatures
for an unregulated market for corporate control."° In both CTS and
MITE, the SEC filed amicus briefs arguing against the constitutionality
of antitakeover statutes, although in CTS on rather narrow grounds."1
Act Release No. 19,244, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 83,276 (1982). See
generally I HAZEN, SECURMEs REGULATION § 11.17 (2d. ed. 1990).
97. Concept Release on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control: Advance Notice of Possi-
ble Commission Actions, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,018, at 88,203-
06 (July 30, 1986).
98. For nearly 20 years the takeover bar and the courts had urged the SEC to define "tender
offer," which the Williams Act does not define. In 1979 the SEC proposed a definition, but never
adopted it. See Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 16385,
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,374 (Dec. 19, 1979); Excerpts from Final
Report ofSECAdvisory Committee on Tender Offers, 15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 28 at 1375
(July 15, 1983). In litigation, the agency took the position that market sweeps should be regulated as
tender offers, effectively killing them, but the court resolved the issue against the SEC. See Hanson
Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that five privately-negotiated
purchases and one open-market purchase totaling 25% of target's stock did not constitute a tender
offer, even though the purchases came on the heels of a withdrawn tender offer). The agency seemed
afraid to be conclusive. See Oesterle, The Rise and Fall, supra note 95, at 220 n.81 (suggesting that
the SEC is afraid that its rules will be followed). Shareholders gain by selling to arbs, who provide
an outlet where the buyer is unwilling to pay the premium induced by the tender offer rules, but
stock has been accumulated. See Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 153, 175-77 (1986).
99. Concept Release on Takeovers and Contests: Advance Notice of Possible Commission Actions
for Corporate Control, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,018 (July 30,
1986).
100. See, eg, Tender Offer Tactics and Corporate Director Responsibilities: Hearings on S. 2448
and S. 2797 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking. Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
72 (1984) (statement of SEC Chairman Shad) (questioning whether shareholders ought to be de-
prived of two-tier tender offers, on the theory that some offers may be better than none); Oesterle,
Delaware's Takeover Statute, supra note 2, at 904 n.99, 905 n.103 (summarizing letters by SEC
Commissioners to Delaware's corporate drafting group urging that firms be allowed to fend for
themselves against two-tier bids).
101. In CTS, the SEC only challenged the Indiana statute on the narrow ground that on balance
it imposed more costs on the national control market than it produced benefits for shareholders; it
agreed the Williams Act did not preempt the statute. In its balancing argument, the SEC sought to
distinguish the Indiana statute from other state corporate rules on the ground that the statute regu-
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In state court, the SEC took amicus positions against poison pills.1 2
3. A wilting federal judiciary
During the takeover binge of the 1980s, lower federal courts and the
Supreme Court for the most part cut their losses. Federal courts had
adopted an attitude of disentanglement that mirrored that of Congress.
Both in their interpretation of federal securities laws and state fiduciary
law, federal courts, with only the short-lived MITE exception, mostly
avoided becoming enmeshed in corporate governance issues.
In a series of decisions stretching from 1975 to 1985, the Supreme
Court pared back the reach of rule lOb-5 and the comparable section
14(e) of the Williams Act. The Court stated emphatically that federal
securities law focused on disclosure and foreswore any desire to "federal-
ize . . . the law of corporations."1 °3 But where state regulation was
spotty, such as in the case of insider trading, federal courts and the
Supreme Court showed few misgivings about federalizing and even
criminalizing this significant aspect of corporate governance.1 °4
Nothing compelled the Court's operating assumption that the federal
securities laws were meant only to regulate corporate disclosure. The
legislative history of section 10(b) indicates a much broader congres-
sional concern than about securities fraud in its traditional forms. 10 5
lated only shareholders and third parties, not such things as mergers or acquisitions that go to the
"'the very structure of the corporation." Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
United States as Amici Curiae at 25-26 & n.28, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S.
69 (1987) (Nos. 86-71 and 86-97) [hereinafter SEC Brief]. The SEC's arguments in MITE, where
the corporate federalism stakes were perceived as far less weighty, were more strident than in CTS.
102. See Moran v. Household Int'l Co., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
103. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (refusing minority shareholder's chal-
lenge to a fully-disclosed, but assertedly unfair price in a squeeze-out merger):
Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substan-
tial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly
where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.
104. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (holding Wall Street Journal writer crimi-
nally liable under mail and wire fraud statutes for tipping information on upcoming stories);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (holding composer at financial printer not liable since
he had no fiduciary duty to the firms in whose stock he traded). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (holding various insiders liable
for trading on and tipping non-public confidential information). Courts have also interpreted rule
lOb-5 to require corporate disclosure of material information, even when neither managers nor the
corporation trade on inside information. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 228 (1988). The disclo-
sure duty arises when a federal court determines that wealth-maximizing shareholders would prefer
disclosure to secrecy.
105. See Thel, supra note 16, at 385.
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Further, the Williams Act's broad-brushed section 14(e) offered strong
textual and policy support for greater federal activism in regulating man-
agement behavior in the tender offer context. 10 6 But the Court did not
bite.
The Court also circumscribed enforcement of the Williams Act's dis-
closure rules to avoid federal encroachment into corporate governance.
Unsuccessful bidders were denied damages arising from deceptive or un-
fair defensive tactics undertaken by managers, leaving them to their state
remedies."0 It made little difference to the Court that such remedies
traditionally had been illusory.10 8
Edgar v. MITE proved the only real exception to this passivity.'0 9 A
bare majority, with Justice Powell joining the opinion on the narrow is-
sue of balancing under the dormant commerce clause, held that Illinois's
first-generation antitakeover statute unconstitutionally interfered with
the interstate market for publicly-traded shares. This intervention had
enormous (though not immediately apparent) potential to realign corpo-
rate federalism, based as it was on the federalization of shareholders'
transfer/control rights.
4. Torrid state legislatures
State legislatures showed none of the paralysis of Congress. Despite
the MITE setback, they played their hands with vigor. Although before
CTS state antitakeover statutes fared poorly in court,"t their aim was
106. See Booth, The Problem with Federal Tender Offer Law, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 707, 750 (1989)
[hereinafter Booth, Tender Offer Law] (arguing that "since garden-variety market manipulation was
already prohibited under Section 9 of the Exchange Act, Congress presumably intended to reach
different conduct when it passed the Williams Act"); Steinberg, Tender Offer Regulation: The Need
for Reform, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 19-22 (1988) (arguing that the legislative history of § 14(e)
suggests more than a disclosure purpose).
107. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1977) (holding that an unsuccessful
bidder cannot recover damages under § 14(e) of the Williams Act for deception by the target's man-
agement and suggesting that unsuccessful bidder should look to state law to seek damages for having
been wrongfully denied a 'fair opportunity' to compete for control of another corporation").
108. See, eg., Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (upholding target's use
of self-tender to increase its debt, while excluding hostile bidder from tendering its shares).
109. White leaped into the takeover fray in MITE with seeming relish, stating in connection
with the preemption analysis: "Congress . . .left the determination whether the Illinois statute
conflicts with the Williams Act to the courts." 457 U.S. at 631.
110. Lower courts uniformly invalidated second-generation statutes as unconstitutional. See
Kozyris, Some Observations, supra note 32, at 501 n.6 (collecting cases invalidating first-generation
statutes on preemption and commerce clause grounds).
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straightforward: to insulate local managers from the control market and
as a by-product to protect the state's business status quo.
Before MITE, during the decade following the unsatisfying compro-
mise of the Williams Act, most state legislatures passed antitakeover stat-
utes that significantly regulated takeover bids. These statutes, ostensibly
extensions of state blue sky regulation, required pre-offer waiting periods,
disclosure, and opportunities for open-ended administrative hearings into
the fairness of a tender offer.' 1 ' Like state blue sky regulation, they
based jurisdiction on the target's contacts with the state and applied if
the target had local shareholders or in-state business operations (particu-
larly corporate headquarters), regardless of where the larger was
incorporated.
The first-generation statutes focused only on hostile takeovers. Broad
opt-out provisions allowed management to choose whether the relevant
antitakeover scheme applied to the corporation and, if chosen, which bid-
ders would be regulated. The statutes thus allowed management to in-
crease prohibitively the costs to unwanted bidders, while exempting
management-approved transactions.
After MITE, state legislatures enacted a second generation of antitake-
over statutes. The new statutes sought to overcome the Illinois statute's
deficiencies identified in Justice White's plurality opinion. The second-
generation statutes' provisions were made consistent with the Williams
Act's disclosure and timing requirements; jurisdiction was generally lim-
ited to corporations chartered in the state, sometimes with the additional
requirement of specified local operational and shareholding contacts; and
their provisions were grafted onto existing shareholder voting or ap-
praisal rights. " 2 By adding delays, increasing the price to the bidder, or
limiting a successful bidder's flexibility to manage the business and thus
finance the bid, the statutes discouraged takeovers.
At the time of CTS, twenty-four states had adopted some version (or
combination) of a control-share, fair-price, moratorium, forced redemp-
tion or non-shareholder constituency statute.' 13 Like the first generation
and in line with the facilitative character of corporate law, the statutes
111. See Note, A Failed Experiment: State Takeover Regulation After Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 457; Note, The Constitutionality of Second Generation Takeover Statutes, 73
VA. L. REv. 203, 207 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Second Generation].
112. See Note, Second Generation, supra note 11I, at 208.
113. Brief Amicus Curiae of United Shareholders Ass'n at 6 n. 11, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (Nos. 86-71 & 86-97) [hereinafter United Shareholders Ass'n Brief]
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generally had broad opt-in and -out provisions and exemptions, many of
them in the hands of management. 114 In CTS both parties were clear
about the optional, private nature of the Indiana statute.115
(counting eight states with control share statutes and sixteen with a combination of fair-price or
moratorium statutes). The varieties can be summarized:
Control share statutes. An example is the Indiana statute upheld in C73'. Control share statutes
allow the body of shareholders (but excluding the bidder and management) to decide on the bidder's
fate. Under some statutes, the bidder can acquire "control shares" only if other shareholders ap-
prove. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01, 1701.831 (Baldwin 1985). Under others, the bidder
can acquire voting rights for these shares only if the other shareholders approve. A bidder becomes
subject to this rite of initiation when its total shareholdings exceed one of three specified thresholds
(usually 20%, 33% and 50%). Under the statutes, the bidder must give notice and the board must
set a date for a shareholders meeting (usually no more than 50 days after the notice) to decide on
whether the control shares will be enfranchised. Control share statutes are ostensibly meant to pro-
tect against coercive tender offers by authorizing collective shareholder action.
Business combination (or moratorium) statutes. Under these statutes, a bidder who acquires a
triggering position (often 15%) is prohibited for a moratorium period (such as 3 or 5 years) from
entering into a back-end transaction with the corporation. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1600-1613
(McKinney 1986). The statutes provide a variety of means to lift or avoid the moratorium: (1) the
board and a supermajority (such as two-thirds) of the other shareholders approve the transaction, (2)
the transaction is for a fair-price, according to a statutory formula, (3) the bidder acquired control in
a tender offer for a significant majority of the stock (such as 85%), or (4) the original board of
directors approved the bidder's buying control. The statutes prevent squeeze-out mergers, and thus
financing based on the target's assets, unless they comply with the statutory exemptions. The stat-
utes give the board enhanced negotiating leverage and shareholders greater opportunity to share in
the control premium.
Fair price statutes. These statutes, predecessors of the business combination statutes, prohibit
back-end transactions with a bidder who triggers the statute, unless the bidder pays a fair price or
the transaction is approved by one of the methods described above. MD. CORP. & Assoc. CODE
ANN. § 3-202 (1985). Price fairness is usually defined by a formula that assures shareholders a price
at least equal to that paid in the front-end acquisition of control. Fair price statutes are meant to
prevent front-end loaded bids.
Redemption (or appraisal) statutes. Appraisal statutes go one step beyond the fair-price statutes.
They give shareholders a right to force any bidder that acquires a triggering block to redeem their
shares for cash at a formula price specified in the statute, usually equal to the highest acquisition
price the bidder paid. The redemption right exists whether or not the bidder plans a takeover. The
statutes in essence force a bidder to acquire control only by any any-and-all tender offer.
Non-shareholder constituency statutes. These statutes, which were not widespread in the second
generation, allow and even mandate directors to consider the effect of a takeover bid on non-share-
holder stakeholders, such as "employees, suppliers, creditors and customers, the economy of the
state, region and nation, community and societal considerations."
For an exhaustive review of the operation of these second-generation statutes, see Hank, Mary-
land-Type Takeover Statutes: Are They "Fair Price" or Foul Ball?, 8 Nat'l L.J., Sept. 8, 1986, at 32.
114. For example, in the takeover battle between CTS and Dynamics, CTS had to opt into the
Indiana control share statute. 794 F.2d at 251.
115. Appellee Dynamics argued that the Indiana control share statute
(1) [v]ests management with discretion to invoke the Chapter;... (3) [s]ubjects the share-
holder's decision to sell securities to an effective veto by management and at least two
groups of shareholder guardians; (4) [p]ermits management to redeem tendered shares pur-
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The manner in which the second-generation statutes were enacted
sparked as much interest as their substance. Professor Romano, in her
seminal work on the political economy of the second generation, de-
scribed an oft-repeated pattern: local managers fearful of a specific take-
over threat approached the state legislature; the company's lawyers
drafted a statute; the statute sped through the statehouse without notice
or debate; and the governor signed the new law, sometimes at corporate
headquarters and usually with grand pronouncements about protecting
"'our local companies."116 Most remarkable was the speed of the process,
varying from a couple of weeks to a few days.117 Neither shareholders,
their representative groups, nor non-shareholder constituents-such as
employees, suppliers, communities-participated.
Nonetheless, local non-shareholder constituents' silent presence con-
stituted part of the legislative enthusiasm for protecting local employ-
suant to its own procedures; ... (6) [g]ives management complete control over the Chap-
ter's enforcement mechanism.
Dynamics Brief, supra note 67, at 37. Appellant CTS analogized the statute to an optional state-
drafted charter provision on voting rights and argued "the Indiana statute simply permits Indiana
corporations to adopt or reject charter provisions governing the voting rights of shares." Reply Brief
of Appellant CTS Corp. at 30-32, 32, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987)
(No. 86-71) [hereinafter CTS Reply Brief].
116. Romano, Political Economy, supra note 37, at 122-41. Empirical analysis and legislative
behavior in other states have borne out Professor Romano's anecdotal account of the history and
politics of Connecticut's second-generation statute. See, eg., Davis, supra note 52, at 495-97
(describing process by which Wisconsin's statute was enacted, including governor's statement in
Wisconsin decrying the takeover of Wisconsin firms by out-of-state firms); Garfield, State Compe-
tence to Regulate Corporate Takeovers: Lessons from State Takeover Statutes, 17 HoFs'rRA L. REv.
535, 560-62 (1989) ("our companies"). The list of antitakeover statutes, the beleaguered firms for
which they were enacted, and the out-of-state bidders provides graphic proof of the politics of an-
titakeover statutes: Arizona for Greyhound; Connecticut for Aetna; Florida for Harcourt, Brace,
Jovanovich (hostile bid by Revlon Group); Indiana for Arvin Industries (anticipated bid by Belzberg
brothers); Kentucky for Ashland Oil (bid by Belzberg brothers); Massachusetts for Gillette (bid by
Revlon Group); Minnesota for Dayton Hudson (bid by Dart Group); Missouri for TWA (bid by Carl
Icahn); New York for CBS (bid by Turner Communications); North Carolina for Burlington Indus-
tries (bid by Asher Edelman and Dominion Textile); Ohio for first Goodyear (bid by Sir James
Goldsmith) and then for Federated Department Stores (bid by Campeau); Pennsylvania for Scott
Paper (bid by Brascan Ltd.); Washington for Boeing (possible bid by T. Boone Pickens); Wisconsin
for G. Heileman Brewing (bid by Bond Holdings). See Butler, Corporation-Specific Statutes, supra
note 3, at 374-76; Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute, supra note 2, at 930 n. 198; Romano, Future
of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 461 & n. 11.
117. Charming stories exist of how corporate counsel in their rush to get a bill to the legislature
inadvertently failed to cover the client target or extended the statute to non-hostile takeovers. Just
as quickly the legislature corrected the mistakes. See, eg., Hank, supra note 113, at 38 (describing
Maryland legislature's revision of bill vetoed by the governor that would have extended fair-price
rules to significant shareholders who had acquired their holdings in non-hostile transactions).
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ment, the local tax base, and corporate political and social
philanthropy."' 8 In the rush to enactment during the second generation,
there seemed little concern that too much state reaction would invite a
federal response. Many assumed that the second-generation statutes
were invalid under MITE, and their enactment did little more than to
buy management a lawsuit, some time, and some costly uncertainty.
Nonetheless, where a state consensus on the benefits of takeovers was less
clear, as in those states with significant shareholder or securities industry
interests, the state antitakeover legislation assumed a different character.
Delaware, for example, never enacted a second-generation statute; a New
York fair-price bill, vetoed for being "inordinately protectionist," gave
way to a much milder version.11 9
Whatever constraints from the chartering markets and special interest
politics limit the states in enacting and interpreting their generic corpo-
rate codes, the sense of panic that the antitakeover statutes addressed
overwhelmed them. Drafted by the targets' corporate counsel, the stat-
utes became an exception to the rule that the state's corporate bar drafts
generic corporate law. 120 They also became an exception to the rule of
general uniformity of corporate law, with five basic forms and substantial
variance among them.' 2 '
For managers, the second-generation statutes, if valid, accomplished a
number of things. First, like firm-specific defenses, they were largely op-
tional methods to impose added costs on hostile bidders. 22 Second, they
118. See Coffee, The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakehold-
ers and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 435, 436-37 [hereinafter Coffee, Uncertain Case]; Davis, supra
note 52, at 496; Macey, State Legislation, supra note 3, at 475 (concluding "state legislators would
prefer to see a firm languish or die at home rather than thrive in some other state").
119. In New York the securities industry opposed antitakeover legislation, though labor favored
it. See Coffee, Corporate Federalism, supra note 51, 770. Governor Cuomo vetoed the first bill, a
fair-price statute, on the ground it was of "dubious constitutionality" and appeared "inordinately
protectionistic." N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1985, at DI, col. 3. What emerged was a relatively diluted
business combination statute that places a five-year moratorium on a bidder's entering into a back-
end transaction unless the board approved the transaction before the bidder acquired 20% or unless
a majority of disinterested shares opt out of the statute. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney
1986). See Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute, supra note 2, at 886-87.
120. Romano, Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 462.
121. See, eg., Hank, supra note 113, at 38 (describing the variations among Maryland's fair-
price statute and similar fair-price provisions in those of Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Wisconsin).
122. Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender
Offers, 23 J. L. & ECON. 371 (1980); Note, Second Generation, supra note 111, at 224, 226. A
prevalent assumption continues that antitakeover statutes make tender offers more risky and expen-
sive, even if the bid is conditioned on the statute not applying. By opting into the statute, manage-
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were less costly and more certain than firm-specific defenses. Under
many statutes, a firm need not opt into the antitakeover regime, and un-
like many firm-specific defenses, no shareholder approval is required.
Third, they were legally more certain than firm-specific defenses, whose
validity had become increasingly suspect. Courts had invalidated a
number of firm-specific defenses for exceeding the board's powers'23 or
breaching fiduciary duties, 2 4 and raised doubts about others. Fourth,
enforcement of the statutes was a matter of management choice. Finally,
the statutes took political heat off Congress to act, thus insulating the
state chartering market from regulation.
Perhaps most important, the second-generation statutes upped the fed-
eralism stakes. Rather than focusing on investor contacts to the state,
many were incorporation-based, reducing territorial spillover. Further,
the statutes replaced the first generation's scheme of administrative no-
tice and review with one based on shareholder disclosure and voting
rights, creating a facial resemblance to traditional state regulation of the
shareholder-manager relationship.'25 The statutes' formal regulation
only of shareholder rights, not the bidding process, forced the federalism
issue. They called the MITE bluff; their invalidation would have moved
ment pressures existing bidders to withdraw and chills other bids. See Netter, Shareholder Wealth
Effects of the Ohio Antitakeover Law, 4 J. L. Eco. & ORGANIZ. 373, 377-78 (1988) (describing Sir
James Goldsmith's withdrawal from a control contest for Goodyear after Ohio passed a poison-pill
validation statute and the decline in stock prices for other potential Ohio takeover targets);
Langevoort, supra note 2, at 104.
123. To ensure their dilutive effect, many poison pills deny the hostile acquirer the right to buy
stock at a discount after a back-end transaction. Courts have invalidated poison pills for violating
the statutory requirement that all shares of a class have equal rights. Bank of New York Co. v.
Irving Bank Corp., 528 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup.), aff'd, 533 N.Y.S.2d 411 (App. Div. 1988); Asarco, Inc.
v. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985) (New Jersey law); Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc.,
621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same).
124. See Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the Delaware Supreme
Court, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 117, 133-35 (1986); see also Gilson & Kraakman, What Triggers Rev-
lon?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 37 (1990) (discussing complex questions of when and whether
board can fend off unwanted bid or must act as auctioneer). In particular, the question of when
poison pill must be withdrawn has become a thorny, unpredictable, issue. See City Capital Associ-
ates Limited Partnership v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed as moot, 556
A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988) (requiring that board withdraw poison pill in response to all-cash hostile bid);
TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,334 (Del. Ch. 1989) (allowing target to leave in place poison pill in response to all-cash bid
conditioned on the board withdrawing the pill and consenting to a merger agreement). Many stat-
utes specifically absolve directors of any liability for opting into or out of the statutory antitakeover
scheme. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-9A-09 (1989).
125. In its brief, CTS described the Indiana act as "a comprehensive revision of the State's ge-
neric corporation code." CTS Brief, supra note 8, at 3.
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perilously close to realigning sacrosanct corporate federalism.1 26
5. Shrewd state courts
While state legislatures seemed clearly in the pocket of local managers,
state courts, particularly in Delaware, seemed to take an independent,
longer view. Thrust into a political hot seat, their role underwent a sig-
nificant metamorphosis. In a triumvirate of 1985 decisions, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court reshaped the corporate fiduciary landscape. The
court dramatically made clear that directors could be personally liable
for not diligently representing shareholder interests;1 27 it began to scruti-
nize takeover defenses under an avowedly nondeferential proportionality
test;128 and it forbade directors from preferring management-led bids
without offering to sell the company in an open, fair auction. 129
To fill the vacuum left by Congress and the federal judiciary and to
correct the deficiencies of the state legislative process, state courts as-
sumed the prominent role of balancing the competing interests of stabil-
ity and change forced in a takeover.130  Although some retrenchment
occurred after 1987,131 at the time of CTS, state courts emerged as the
principal regulators of the control market. 132
II. THE CTS GAMBIT AND ITS DEFICIENCIES
In CTS the Supreme Court played its federalism hand with subtlety.
Couching its gambit in the rhetoric of shareholder protection and states'
126. CTS made this the cornerstone of its argument to the Supreme Court. CTS Brief, supra
note 8, at 9 (arguing that "the heart of this case is whether Federal law bars the States from develop-
ing generic corporation laws"); CTS Reply Brief, supra note 115, at 42 (arguing that "Indiana has, in
enacting the Chapter, exercised its power to define and regulate corporate voting rights in a way that
differs from the pattern followed by most States .... ").
127. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
128. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
129. Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
130. In C7S, appellee Dynamics cited to Unocal to make its point that management and share-
holder have divergent interests in the control context, see Dynamics Brief, supra note 67, at 22 n.20,
unwittingly fueling the argument that federal intervention is unnecessary.
131. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987); Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1147 (Del. 1989).
132. Associate Justice Moore of the Delaware Supreme Court explained:
Congress has not done much-really has done nothing-in this area and perhaps with the
exception of the all holders rule, the SEC has not done much to relieve us of any pressure,
So Delaware is really the focus these days of the hard-fought battle, or battles, for corpo-
rate control.
State Competition: Panel Response, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 779, 779 (1987).
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traditional chartering power, the Court in a majority opinion by Justice
Powell upheld Indiana's unnoteworthy second-generation control share
statute. The Court articulated a tenuous justification for the statute and
at each turn avoided a meaningful analysis of the statute's impact on the
market for corporate control and the role of state chartering and an-
titakeover statutes in that market. This Part sets the stage for evaluating
different hypotheses for the Court's sophism and my conclusion that
CTS reaffirms an incorporation-based corporate federalism that essen-
tially defers to private ordering.
THE DEALT HAND-INDIANA'S STATUTE. The Indiana statute was a
less intrusive version of Ohio's control share statute.133 Like many other
second-generation statutes, local management had requested its enact-
ment in reaction to hostile out-of-state bids. 134 A couple weeks after en-
actment, CTS's management opted into the regime in response to an
unsolicited 27.5 percent tender offer by Dynamics, already the firm's
largest shareholder.
Like other second-generation statutes, Indiana's sought to overcome
MITE. 135 It applies only to public corporations incorporated in Indiana
with significant operational and shareholder contacts to the state. 136 A
bidder that passes a triggering share threshold (20%, 33-1/3% or 50%)
does not acquire voting rights for its "control shares" until a majority of
shareholders approve their enfranchisement. The shareholders' meeting
133. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01, 1701.831 (Baldwin 1985). The Ohio statute, the first
of the second-generation statutes, withdraws ownership rights from any acquirer that passes a 20%,
33-1/3% and 50% threshold, unless a majority of disinterested shares are voted to grant the bidder
such rights. See Note, Second Generation, supra note 111, at 208.
134. The briefs in CTS did not detail the statute's genesis. Dynamics stated only that the statute
"was passed after nonresidents made bids for two large Indiana corporations." Dynamics Brief,
supra note 67, at II n.13 (citing 3 Corporate Control Alert 1, 10-11 (Mar. 1986)) (appended to
Dynamics's brief). In fact, the chairman of Arvin Industries, a family-run business with deep Indi-
ana roots, had approached the president of the Indiana Senate, a long-time friend, after Arvin man-
agement had become worried about a takeover by the Belzberg family of Canada; AMOCO
management also joined in the request. Miller, How Indiana Shields a Firm and Challenges Take-
over Business, Wall. St. J., July 1, 1987, at 1, col. 6 (describing meeting between Arvin chairman and
president of Indiana senate, in which chairman sought protection from "wrenching change"); Ro-
mano, Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 461 n.l1.
135. The formula for escaping MITE's grasp had by the time of CTS become relatively stan-
dardized. Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover Legislation After MITE: Standing Pat, Blue Sky or
Corporation Law Concept?, 7 CORP. L. REv. 3, 4-15 (1984).
136. Specifically, the statute applies to Indiana corporations with 100 or more shareholders
which have (1) their principal offices or substantial assets in Indiana and (2) either 10% of share-
holders are Indiana residents, 10% of corporation's shares are held by Indiana residents, or at least
10,000 shareholders are Indiana residents. IND. CODE. § 23-1-42-1 (1989).
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to decide on enfranchising the bidder cannot be earlier than fifty days
after the bidder announces a "control share" bid. 137
This control share regime ostensibly protects shareholders from coer-
cive hostile bids, such as Dynamics's partial bid, by allowing dispersed
shareholders collectively to decide the bid's fate. The statute, however,
would not apply if CTS management had not opted in or had it chosen to
approve the Dynamics bid.
THE PREDICTABLE SEVENTH CIRCUIT REACTION. For Judge Posner
on the Seventh Circuit, the Indiana statute's unconstitutionality proved
an easy matter. 138 It failed on preemption grounds because of its effect of
moving the takeover balance in favor of management, in derogation of
the Act's philosophy that managers and bidders should play on a "level
playing field." Admitting that the statute had been "[c]leverly drafted,"
Posner nonetheless concluded that its fifty-day delay went well beyond
the twenty-eight-day minimum period imposed, on average, by the Wil-
liams Act regime. 139 The statute also failed under the dormant com-
merce clause. The mandated delay and the tactical opportunities it
provided managers at the expense of out-of-state bidders imposed dispa-
rate and significant burdens on stock trading by nonresidents in the inter-
state market for corporate control. The Seventh Circuit was not alone.
After MITE, no second-generation statute had withstood a constitu-
tional challenge."4
CTS was a surprise.1 41 Justice Powell's opinion for the CTS major-
137. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-7 (1989).
138. Dynamics Corp. ofAmerica v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69
(1987).
139. 794 F.2d at 261. The SEC's requirement of a 20-business-day waiting period, promulgated
pursuant to its authority under section 14(e) of the Act to prevent manipulative practices, consti-
tuted the federal accommodation of management's desire for delay and a bidder's for swiftness. See
supra note 83 (discussion of adoption of Rule 14e-1).
140. See Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated sub nora.
Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace Corp., 481 U.S. 1026 (1987) (same for Ohio statute), remanded, 848 F.2d
720 (1988); Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161, 165-68 (D. Haw. 1986) (preliminarily enjoining
Hawaii control share statute on commerce clause grounds); APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen
Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216, 1225 (D. Minn. 1985) (permanently enjoining a Minnesota control
share statute); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1421 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (enjoining Missouri control
share statute on preemption and commerce clause grounds). See also Langevoort, supra note 2, at
99 & n.19.
141. Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute, supra note 2, at 933 & n.203 (commenting that "no
one, nary a lower federal court nor a commentator, was even close to foreseeing the result in the
CTS case"); Coffee, Corporate Federalism, supra note 51, at 776.
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ity142 sparks as much interest for the tacks it takes as for those it does
not. It is a careful and tenuous weaving of regulatory thread and doctri-
nal fabric. It has become protocol to dissect the sentences and words of
the opinion, not believing what is said.14 3 The opinion's deficiencies are
many and not trivial; most of them argue for the statute's invalidity. In
the end, the opinion leaves a clear impression that the Court had an
unarticulated agenda and was sketching the design for a permissible state
antitakeover regime-a corporate federalism blueprint.
A. Preemption: Weak Federalization of Shareholder Control Rights
A state law that "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the purposes and objective of Congress" 1" undermines the
supremacy of federal law and is preempted. In areas of economic regula-
tion, the Supreme Court increasingly has become reluctant to preempt
concurrent state regulation absent explicit guidance from Congress.1 4 5
Powell adopted, without endorsement, the preemption framework of
the MITE plurality. That framework rested on three premises about the
Williams Act: (1) neither bidders nor managers should have an advan-
tage in the struggle for control; (2) the bidding process should not be
unreasonably delayed; and (3) shareholders should decide who wins the
control struggle. In effect, the MITE plurality assumed that shareholder
control rights had been federalized, the Williams Act fixing and assuring
their operation.
Under this framework, the prospects for the Indiana statute seemed
daunting. By imposing delays on unwanted bidders, the statute effec-
142. Justices Rehnquist, Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor joined Powell's opinion. Justice
Scalia flied a concurring opinion. 481 U.S. at 94. Justice White dissented and was joined by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens on only the commerce clause issue. Id. at 97.
143. See, eg., Langevoort, supra note 2, at 102, 111; Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute,
supra note 2, at 934; Regan, Siamese Essays, supra note 2, at 1870; Shipman, The Case for Reason-
able State Regulation of Corporate Takeovers: Some Observations Concerning the Ohio Experience,
57 U. CIN. L. REv. 507, 520-25 (1988). Courts have also reached into the minutiae of the opinion.
See, e-g., Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 850 (1st Cir. 1988) (focusing on note
7 of the opinion, which rejects that the Indiana statute's additional burdens reflect a preference for
management).
144. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
145. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981) (requiring
"unmistakabl[e]" congressional decision); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 147 (1963) (requiring "an unambiguous congressional mandate"). Congress, of late, has under-
stood this, frequently providing explicit preemptive guidance. See, eg., 134 CONG. REc. S8867
(daily ed., July 6, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Mitchell) (stating that states can continue to regulate plant
closings after the passage of the federal plant-closing statute). I.
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tively preferred target managers. By effectively mandating a waiting pe-
riod three weeks longer than the minimum established by the Williams
Act rules, the statute regulated the bidding process.1 46 By diluting the
efficacy of a hostile tender offer while exempting management-approved
mergers, the statute weakened shareholder control and undermined the
disciplining effect of a robust control market.
But Powell applied the MITE framework half-heartedly, raising seri-
ous questions about whether it had been abandoned. To Powell, the In-
diana statute's proffered and superficial purpose, not its broader effects,
were relevant. First, Powell disregarded White's view that the Williams
Act's balance was intended to "provide a check on entrenched but ineffi-
cient management," diluting (if not eliminating) the level-playing-field
principle as a preemptive guidepost. 47 Powell's opinion assumes the
statute was meant to protect shareholders from coercive bids. It fails to
appreciate the irony that Indiana's scheme for shareholder collective ac-
tion may well have chilled bids to the overall detriment of sharehold-
ers. 48 By approaching the preemption question from the perspective of
a shareholder presumably coerced into selling rather than a shareholder
frustrated in an attempt to sell, it is not difficult to assume that the Wil-
liams Act would 'countenance collectivization.
This marked a departure from the MITE plurality, which had taken
lengthy notice of the economic effects of delay on a tender offer.' 49 CTS
presented the same opportunity. The briefs of the parties and amicus in
146. The relevant federal period-the SEC rule's 20-business-day minimum-was established
after much debate about whether it unduly favored managers. Anything beyond 20 days, the SEC
had concluded, would be inconsistent with the Williams Act's even-playing-field philosophy. See
supra note 83.
147. CTS, 481 U.S. at 82 (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 30 (1977)).
148. The irony was the principal reason for White's dissent and the heart of Dynamics's argu-
ment. See Dynamics Brief, supra note 67, at 32 (arguing that the Indiana statute "deprives individ-
ual shareholders of the free choice guaranteed them" by the Williams Act). See Johnson & Millon,
Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 82, at 1873 (concluding Powell "fastidiously avoided any
serious analysis of purpose or effect").
149. White's MITE opinion accepted the view that "delay can seriously impede a tender offer",
relying on support from (1) the Williams Act's legislative history, S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4 (1967); (2) subsequent legislative history, H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976)
(legislative history of Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act) (discussing waiting period
under tender offer rules and effect of delay); (3) the SEC's brief at 10 n.8; (4) academic commentary;
Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation, Interests, Effects, and Political Competency, 62 COR-
NELL L. REv. 213, 238 (1977); and (5) practitioners, Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tac-
tics, 32 Bus. LAW. 1433, 1437-42 (1977).
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CTS, although lacking record support, 150 analyzed the significant added
costs the statute imposed on bidders.151
Second, Powell emphasized that the statute did not interfere with the
bidding process mandated by the Williams Act. A bidder could still con-
summate its offer on the twentieth business day, the earliest day permit-
ted under the Williams Act rules. Although acknowledging that a bidder
might be reluctant to do this without an assurance of voting rights, Pow-
ell focused narrowly on regulatory conflict, not effects.1 52 He glibly dis-
counted the cost of the mandated fifty-day delay, suggesting that a bid
could be conditioned on receiving voting rights and that shareholders
who tendered would in all likelihood be the ones voting to enfranchise
the bidder.15
Third, Powell cautioned that the Indiana statute's effect on sharehold-
ers' exercise of their control should not guide the preemption analysis.
Powell pointed out that invalidating the Indiana statute would jeopardize
the validity of other state regulation that gives management discretion to
delay or discourage a change in control.154 Powell assumed, without ex-
planation, that this realignment of corporate federalism could not be
countenanced.
150. In CTS, despite an expedited one-month discovery period, the one-day evidentiary hearing
before the trial court had not produced a record on the motives or effects of the Indiana statute. See
794 F.2d at 251; CTS Brief, supra note 8, at 27 n.13 (commenting no evidentiary record existed on
the question of the legislative motives). The state, which had not appeared at the trial court, inter-
vened on appeal.
151. Dynamics argued that the uncertainty created by management's prerogative to opt into the
statutory scheme, to redeem a bidder's shares that are not given voting rights, and to recommend
against enfranchisement "imposes heavy costs" on bidders. Dynamics Brief, supra note 67, at 14.
See also Amicus Curiae Brief of the Securities Industry Ass'n at 4, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (Nos. 86-71 & 86-97) (describing the costs of uncertainty in the tender
offer process).
152. To the extent Powell deals with the Indiana statute's principal effect-its 50-day delay-he
misconstrued the Williams Act. Powell asserted in the original version of the opinion that the Indi-
ana statute's 50-day period "is within the 60-day maximum period Congress established for tender
offers in 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)." 107 S. Ct. at 1637. The cited section neither sets a minimum nor
maximum for tender offers. It merely allows shareholders to withdraw tendered shares during the
first seven days of the offer or after the offer has been open for sixty days. A tender offer could
remain open for more than 60 days. This mistake in the opinion was corrected in the official re-
porter: "This period is within the 60-day period Congress established for reinstitution of withdrawal
rights in 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)." 481 U.S. at 85.
153. 481 U.S. at 73-74 n.2 (assuming vote would be largely in the hands of shareholders who had
tendered their shares, but who remained shareholders of record for purposes of voting); id. at 84
(suggesting that a bidder could condition its bid on receiving shareholder approval).
154. Id. at 85-86 (referring to staggered boards and cumulative voting as examples of delaying
tactics authorized by generic corporate codes).
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As White pointed out in dissent, the majority's coercion perspective
and its blindness to effects abandons MITE. In one fell swoop, Powell
trivializes the Indiana statute's regulatory burden and significantly re-
tracts the preemptive scope of the Williams Act. Although the level-
playing-field philosophy may guide interpretation of the Act, it no longer
has preemptive significance.' Under this restrictive view of CTS pre-
emption, the Williams Act neither federalizes shareholder control rights
nor adopts a comprehensive philosophy of takeover regulation; it nar-
rowly regulates only the tender offer process.' 56 Not surprisingly, the
SEC took the same position in its amicus brief, arguing that the Act only
preempted state law that conflicted with the mandated bidding pro-
cess,' 57 a position consistent with the view that federal law regulates only
disclosure, not the substance of the manager-shareholder relationship.
Powell's majority opinion, however, could have further departed from
MITE. Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act provides the seed for a conclusive
preemption analysis. Inserted in the original 1934 legislation to preserve
concurrent state blue sky jurisdiction, it safeguards the "jurisdiction of
the securities Commission... of any State" that does not conflict with
the federal act or rules. Arguably, a fortiorari, traditional state share-
holder-management regulation was also carved to the states."z 8 There-
fore, any additional state tender offer regulation could not offend the
Williams Act so long as concurrent compliance with the Act's regime
and the more stringent state rules were possible.'59
155. This seemingly inconsistent use of the level-playing-field philosophy is consistent as a feder-
alism matter. Not using it as a preemptive sword limits federal incursions into state antitakeover
statutes; using it as a regulatory shield limits federal expansion into state-based corporate
governance.
156. See Langevoort, supra note 2, at 112. Professors Johnson and Millon present a persuasive
and well-researched argument that the Williams Act was intended to do no more. From this they
argue that whatever the legislative assumptions about tender offers in 1968, as opposed to intentions,
they should have no preemptive effect. Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, supra note
82, at 1868, 1920. See also Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods, 877 F.2d 496, 503 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 366 (1989) (Easterbrook, J.) ("There is a big difference between what
Congress enacts and what it supposes will ensue").
157. SEC Brief, supra note 101. Curiously, the SEC seems to have reversed its preemption view,
and since CTS, the SEC staff has pursued a vigorous campaign in court against third-generation
statutes, arguing that they interfere with shareholder autonomy. Johnson & Millon, Misreading the
Williams Act, supra note 82, at 1882 (describing SEC's position in recent cases challenging Dela-
ware's and Wisconsin's antitakeover statutes).
158. This was CTS's principal preemption argument. See CTS Brief, supra note 8, at 14. Justice
Scalia accepted it in his concurrence. 481 U.S. at 96 (asserting that if any state laws were to survive
under the anti-preemption provision "surely the States' corporation codes are among them").
159. The Court could also have taken up Judge Posner's suggestion that a fair reading of the
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Moreover, the Indiana statute's essentially enabling and facilitative
character-much like a generic corporate code authorizing firm-specific
adoption of a control share regime-suggested that there was no state
action to preempt. While alluding to this argument, which CTS made in
connection with commerce clause balancing,"6 Powell nonetheless chose
to treat the statute as regulatory.161
By his inconclusiveness, Powell suggests that preemptive limits still
bound antitakeover statutes. Just because CTS abandons the Act's neu-
trality principle as a preemptive benchmark does not mean that there are
no basal federal standards.162 For example, a state statute that abolished
Williams Act indicated a congressional purpose to tilt the takeover playing field in favor of manage-
ment, and state antitakeover statutes that furthered this tilt would not be preempted. See 794 F.2d
at 262. See also Carney, Toward a More Perfect Market for Corporate Control, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L.
593, 597-609 (1984) (Williams Act leads to fewer bids); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the
Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1, 13
(1978); Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender
Offers, 23 J. L. & ECON. 371 (1980) (asserting that Williams Act increased the price a bidder must
pay in a takeover, citing an increase in shareholder returns from 22% to 40% with passage of the
Act, and a decline of bidder returns from 9% to 6%); Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares - A
Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DUKE L.J. 231 (arguing that an earlier version of the Williams Act
would impinge on the market for corporate control).
Such a tack would surely have dealt with the issue more honestly, but at a number of levels was
not viable. In other Williams Act cases the Supreme Court had already rejected this cynical reading
of the Act's legislative history. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1977) (finding that
Congress sought to provide a level playing field for the benefit of shareholders). Further, it would
have assumed congressional protectionism and captivity, inviting a congressional defense. Finally,
the analysis would have gutted any preemption limits, a federalism tool the CTS majority seemed
unprepared to discard.
160. 481 U.S. at 94 n.14 ("Because we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on other
grounds, we have no occasion to consider this argument.")
161. 481 U.S. at 82 n.7 (stating that "by regulating tender offers" the statute does alter the
balance between management and bidder significantly).
162. Others share this view. Pinto, The Constitution and the Market for Corporate Control:
State Takeover Statutes After CTS Corp., 29 WM & MARY L. REv. 699, 727, 778-79 (1988) [herein-
after Pinto, Takeover Laws After CTS] (concluding that a "strong showing that state regulation
interferes with investor protection will be required before that regulation will preempted"). It is not
necessarily inconsistent with Professor Johnson's and Millon's reading of the Williams Act legisla-
tive history, which indicates Congress intended only to regulate the bidding process, even while
assuming some things about shareholder control rights under state law. They argue that assump-
tions cannot control and corporate governance powers, including the power to protect non-share-
holder constituents at the expense of shareholders, were left to the states. Johnson & Millon,
Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 82, at 1887. In the end, the Johnson and Millon critique of
a broader understanding of CTS preemption is not that the Court necessarily misread the Williams
Act, but that it applied an overly encompassing standard for measuring a federal statute's preemp-
tive reach. Whether legislative assumptions carry preemptive force is not a question of statutory
reading, but one of federalism, a matter as to which the Court has shown great (and sometimes
confounding) flexibility.
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shareholder voting rights, though without interfering with the federally-
prescribed (though futile) process of tendering for voteless shares, would
seem problematic. 163  Significantly, CTS entertained the questions
whether the Indiana statute conceivably promoted shareholder voting
rights and whether bidders for Indiana targets realistically could bid de-
spite the statute. Built on a corporate federalism in which shareholder
control rights were ubiquitous and relatively uniform, the Williams Act
was meant to preserve the tender offer mechanism.' 64 Powell's preemp-
tion analysis still has some bite-the Williams Act assuming and protect-
ing some shareholder capacity in the control market. Given the Court's
overarching concern to preserve state corporate law, it seems unlikely
that it would tolerate a state of affairs begging for a federal legislative
solution. As a result, the Williams Act's assumptions about the rights
that drive a tender offer weakly federalize shareholder transfer and con-
trol rights. 165
Under the restructured CTS preemption framework, the antitakeover
blueprint starts to take shape: states need only avoid a regulatory con-
flict with the bidding process prescribed by the Williams Act; they
163. Judge Easterbrook might disagree. In his opinion in Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Univer-
sal Foods, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 366 (1989), he suggests that just as states
allow firms--such as hospitals, universities, and other charities with self-perpetuating boards-to
organize without traded shares, states could also adopt devices to make tender offers highly unat-
tractive or impossible. He points to such devices as dual-class stock, poison pills, and the previous
practice under which mergers required unanimous shareholder approval. Id. at 504. At two levels,
this seems overstated. First, the question is not whether the state can authorize the creation of such
devices, but whether share ownership carries with it certain inherent rights that the state cannot
alter. Although shareholders may have no power to compel others to make tender offers for their
shares, they do have rights arising from share ownership. Just as the Constitution places limits on
how far states can go in redefining contract and property rights under the due process clause, so it
may place limits on state redefinition of shareholder transfer/control rights. Second, if states could
go to the lengths Easterbrook suggests, it would mean either that chartering markets are wholly
dysfunctional-with which Easterbrook would probably disagree-or that CTS would tolerate a
state of affairs that would beg for a federal legislative solution. Both seem unlikely.
Instead, Easterbrook's opinion in Amanda should not be taken at face value. While it may seek to
highlight the emptiness of CTS, it also taunts the Supreme Court to at least assert some gatekeeping
role. The Court refused the dare, for now.
164. Kozyris, Corporate Wars, supra note 29 (citing to legislative history of the Williams Act; at
the time the Act was enacted, state antitakeover statutes were unknown).
165. Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 82, at 1873 (pointing out that
the Court seemed willing to evaluate "how shareholders fare under Indiana's law" and concluding
that "a statute significantly precluding the occurrence of takeover bids would run afoul of the Wil-
liams Act"). The Court thus rejected the SEC concession that "the chartering state is responsible for
the very existence of the corporation and its shares, and it may define the latter as it wishes notwith-
standing effects on their transferability." SEC Brief, supra note 101, at 10.
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should employ the rhetoric, as well as some substance, of shareholder
protection; 66 this protection should take the form and arise under the
aegis of corporate law. Evaluation of the shareholder effects is relevant
only in the most flagrant cases, when a statute calls into question the
existence of shareholder transfer and control rights. CTS's federalization
under the preemptive banner is temperate.
B. Dormant Commerce Clause: Constitutionalization of the Internal
Affairs Doctrine
The commerce clause provides virtually unlimited federal legislative
power over interstate commerce. 167 Nonetheless, when Congress fails to
legislate on a matter affecting the national economy, states retain signifi-
cant regulatory power. Only if state regulation either discriminates
against out-of-state interests or unduly burdens free trading in national
markets is this power restrained.1 68 To foster the efficiency and unifying
values of the commerce clause, the "dormant" commerce clause safe-
guards free trading in national markets and political representation by
out-of-state interests, even in the absence of an explicit congressional
166. Powell's opinion identifies four separate forms of shareholder protection that were arguably
reflected in the Indiana statute: (1) protection of dispersed shareholders "from the coercive aspects
of some tender offers," 481 U.S. at 83; (2) allowing "shareholders to evaluate the fairness of the offer
collectively... [thus not allowing] the state to interpose its view of fairness between willing buyers
and sellers of shares of the target company," id. at 83-84; (3) not giving "either management or the
offeror an advantage in communicating with the shareholders about the impending offer," id. at 83;
and (4) not imposing "unreasonable delay" upon the offeror. Id. at 85. Professor Oesterle suggested
that these might serve as guidelines for judging the sufficiency of other statutory schemes. Oesterle,
Delaware's Takeover Statute, supra note 2, at 950 n.256. See also Johnson & Millon, Misreading the
Williams Act, supra note 82, at 1882 (focusing on autonomy versus protection in the post-CTS
preemption cases). The argument assumes, however, that the Williams Act and the Supreme Court
have some specific notion of the extent and nature of shareholder control/transfer rights that create
an even playing field. It reads into the CTS preemption analysis far more judicial intrusion than the
Court's general deference to state corporate law allows.
167. This has been so since the early 1940s. See, eg., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). It extends today into matters with at best a tenuous
connection to what is generally conceived of as commerce. See, eg., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (upholding federal minimum wage regulation to state and local
public entities); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding federal regulation of local
restaurants). See generally I R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4.1-4.10 (Ist ed. 1986) [hereinafter 1 R. Ro-
TUNDA]. Little doubt exists that Congress could preempt or occupy the field of corporate law.
168. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (invalidating state statute that
prescribed packaging for native fruit sold outside state); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520
(1959) (invalidating state statute that specified type of rear fender mudguard for trucks moving
across state borders). See generally I R. ROTUNDA, supra note 167, at §§ 11.1-11.10.
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directive.
16 9
Powell built his dormant commerce clause analysis in CTS on much
the same foundation as the preemption analysis, though in some respects
it is more deferential and in others more demanding. Completely shun-
ning a meaningful analysis of the statute's effects or purposes, Powell
focused on the chartering state's asserted interest in shareholder protec-
tion and accepted on faith the traditional view that because corporations
arise under state law, the chartering state necessarily and constitutionally
has the power to define corporate rights and responsibilities.
1. Discrimination and protectionism: CTS sidesteps the quagmire
The commerce clause was meant to foster national free markets.'
70
169. Different explanations are given for the dormant commerce clause doctrine. Some com-
mentators argue that the dormant commerce clause "is concerned and should be concerned only
with preventing purposeful [state] protectionism." Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protection-
ism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1093 (1986) [herein-
after Regan, The Dormant Commerce Clause]. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 408-09 (2d ed. 1988); Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
487, 568-71 (1981). Others view it as a doctrine to accommodate competing national and local
interests. See, eg., Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CALIF. L. REV.
1203, 1206 (1986) (arguing that the Court consistently applies an amorphous balancing test). A few
maintain that the commerce clause offers no independent "dormant" protection, but dormant com-
merce clause jurisprudence merely interprets the will of Congress in those areas in which it has been
silent. See Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 262 (1987). Some
argue that the doctrine concerns not only protecting free trade, but also protecting nonresidents who
are not politically represented in the regulating state. L. TRIBE, supra, at 408-09; Eule, Laying the
Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 442-43 (1982); Levmore, Interstate Exploita-
tion and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REv. 563, 623-24 (1983) (maintaining that dormant com-
merce clause cases fall into two categories: state interference that can be remedied so long as the
political process is allowed to function and state exploitation of a monopoly position that can be
remedied only by judicial intervention).
Others argue that the doctrine should be abandoned. See Redish & Nugent, The Dormant Com-
merce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569. They point out
that resort to the dormant commerce clause effectively reverses the result of political inertia-a form
of majoritarian expression-and thus is antithetical to majoritarian government. Further, to the
extent protectionism undermines values of efficiency and national unity, they assert it can be covered
under an invigorated privileges and immunities clause. If so, protection of incorporated businesses
would require rethinking of Paul v. Virginia, which excludes corporations from the protection of the
privileges and immunities clause. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 176 (1868). See Carpinello, State Protective
Legislation and Nonresident Corporations: The Privileges and Immunities Clause as a Treaty of Non-
discrimination, 73 IowA L. REV. 351, 353 (1988) (arguing that the reasons for excluding corpora-
tions from protection under the privileges and immunities clause "were largely rooted in the political
and economic problems of the nineteenth century and that these reasons are no longer of any practi-
cal importance").
170. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978). It has also been suggested
that a unified nation-bound by commercial attachments-would be a more effective deterrent and
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Free trading in national markets detrimentally is eroded when states seek
to protect local interests by discriminating, explicitly or tacitly, against
out-of-state interests unrepresented in the local political process. 71  Dor-
mant commerce clause doctrine teaches that even in the face of congres-
sional silence, such discrimination intolerably interferes with the free
functioning of national markets and invites state retaliation. The dis-
crimination need not be overt. Facially neutral regulatory schemes that
discriminatorily impose unwarranted costs on out-of-state traders carry
the same risks and therefore have been invalidated. 172
Disregarding powerful extrinsic evidence of the Indiana statute's pro-
tectionist purpose, 17 1 Powell nonchalantly rejected the argument that the
statute was discriminatory. Because the statute on its face treated in-
state and out-of-state bidders identically, Powell refused to measure its
constitutionality according to its effects. The statute, however, ad-
vantaged in-state incumbent managers compared to out-of-state control
seekers, and protected the local tax and employment base from out-of-
state relocation.
The majority's blindness to the statute's purpose was hardly confused
force against outside aggression. See, eg., Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 43 (1988); Varat, supra note 169, at 518.
171. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 (invalidating New Jersey's explicit prohibition against
local landfills accepting out-of-state waste); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n,
432 U.S. 333 (1977) (invalidating North Carolina's labeling program which permitted producers in
the state to refer only to USDA grade in reference to quality, thus preventing Washington State
producers from using their state's distinctive and costly supplemental labeling).
172. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986)
(invalidating liquor price affirmation statute that, although applied evenhandedly, directly regulated
other liquor pricing in other states); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S.
333 (1977) (invalidating apple labeling statute on basis of discriminatory impact).
173. Dynamics cited to a statement by CTS's counsel of record:
When asked why Indiana had decided to adopt such a virulent statute, James Strain...
says, "We don't like having all our companies taken over by East Coast firms." On further
reflection, Strain says Midwestern and West Coast acquirors are no better.
Dynamics Brief, supra note 67, at 11 (quoting from 3 Corporate Control Alert 1, 10 (Mar. 1986)
(appended to Dynamics's brief). See also Garfield, supra note 116, at 572 n.208 (noting Justice
O'Connor's questioning of Strain at oral arguments); United Shareholders Ass'n Brief, supra note
113, at 14-15 (arguing that the Indiana law promotes local 'jobs and industries ... by erecting
barriers to corporate control at the state borders"); Securities Industry Ass'n Brief, supra note 151,
at 6-8 (similar). Further, Dynamics pointed out that antitakeover statues in other states "are typi-
cally the product of the local business community," citing Professor Romano's empirical research on
the political economy of such statutes. Dynamics Brief, supra note 67, at 18, 19-20 (indicating that
the article would be available in February 1987, before oral argument in the case) (citing Romano,
Poluical Economy, supra note 37).
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or inadvertent. In MITE, Powell had clearly stated his understanding of
the reasons for antitakeover statutes:
Inevitably there are certain adverse consequences in terms of general public
interest when corporate headquarters are moved .... [T]he State and lo-
cality from which the transfer is made inevitably suffer significantly.' 74
Indeed, as White pointed out in his CTS dissent, Indiana admitted in
its brief to a protectionist purpose: to prevent bidders from "remov[ing
Indiana companies] from the State."' 75 Powell in his majority opinion
referred to such a purpose obliquely when he justified state chartering:
"A State has an interest in promoting stable relationships among parties
involved in the corporations it charters . "..."176 The CTS majority's
casual indifference to the statute's purposes is surprising. In other dor-
mant commerce clause cases, the Court has shown little reluctance to
probe a state's motives. 77
174. 457 U.S. at 646 & n.*.
175. White stated:
The State of Indiana, in its brief, admits that at least one of the Chapter's goals is to protect
Indiana Corporations. The State notes that the Chapter permits shareholders "to deter-
mine ... whether [a tender offeror] will liquidate the company or remove it from the
State." Brief for Appellant in No. 86-97, p. 19.
CTS, 481 U.S. at 100-101 (White, J., dissenting). White described this protectionism as "the arche-
type of the kind of state law that the Commerce Clause forbids." Id. at 101. See also Ind. Chamber
of Comm. Brief, supra note 68, at 18 (arguing that the corporate governance "benefits [of the statute]
accrue to the advantage of the corporations, their employees, and the communities in which they are
located").
176. 481 U.S. at 91 (stating this interest was in addition to one "ensuring that investors in such
corporations have an effective voice in corporate affairs"). Further, in discussing the coercive as-
pects of some tender offers, Powell explained that individual shareholders might tender their shares
"even if they doubt the tender offer is in the corporation's best interest." Id. at 83. But the very
reason that coercive bids work is that shareholders act in their own interests, not those of sharehold-
ers or the corporation as a whole. Instead, Powell seems to suggest that somehow, paradoxically,
shareholders will act in the best interests of nonshareholder constituents. More to the point, the
statute's real effect is to hinder shareholders from acting in their own interests and at the expense of
non-shareholder constituents.
177. See, eg., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470-74 (1981) (allowing
Minnesota to ban sales of milk in non-returnable plastic cartons, even though Minnesota pulpwood
producers would be helped and out-of-state plastic producers would be hurt); City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (holding New Jersey cannot ban imports of solid and liquid wastes
while allowing locally generated wastes to be dumped in state landfills); Exxon v. Governor of Mary-
land, 437 U.S. 117, 125-29 (1978) (upholding Maryland's prohibition on ownership of retail gas
service stations by oil producers or refiners, despite evidence that the burden of the ban fell solely on
out-of-state companies); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)
(invalidating North Carolina's labeling program which permitted producers in the state to refer only
to USDA grade in reference to quality, thus preventing Washington State producers from using their
state's distinctive and costly supplemental labeling). Nonetheless, the Court has been criticized for
being in general too superficial. Professors DeBow and Lee conclude that the Court's reluctance to
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Faced with an admittedly protectionist scheme, the CTS Court had a
range of choices. First, it could have faced the issue squarely, found the
statute to be protectionist and invalidated it-which many commentators
have argued the Court should have done. 78 Second, it could have down-
played the statute's protectionist effects and found on balance its discrim-
ination against out-of-state interests was the only means to promote
legitimate local interests.1 79 Third, it could have rejected the doctrinal
tradition that equates protectionism with discrimination and recharacter-
ized the statute as nostalgic or paternalistic, even though its effects fall
disproportionately on out-of-staters.1 ° Fourth, the Court could have
carved out a special exception for protectionism packaged as corporate
regulation-which is what it did.
Can a corporate law exception be justified? At first glance, it seems
possible. As we have seen, states participate in a corporate chartering
market, selling their chartering services to a variety of local and national
firms. Viewed in this way, state protectionism through the chartering
process might be tolerated under the Court's "market participant"
rule.18 1 In other contexts, the Court has tolerated state protectionism
probe a public-choice explanation for the Indiana statute was not unusual. DeBow & Lee, Under-
standing (and Misunderstanding) Public Choice: A Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 TEx. L. Rev.
993, 994 n.4 (1988) (citing C7S as an example of the Court's "complete lack of interest in the public
choice explanation for the statutes under review").
178. See, e.g., Cox, The Constitutional "Dynamics" of the Internal Affairs Rule - A Comment
on CTS Corporation, 13 J. CORP. L. 317, 343 (1988); Garfield, supra note 116, at 57; Langevoort,
supra note 2, at 106-07 (criticizing the Court's failure to see that the statute was meant to protect
Indiana's economic interests); Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute, supra note 2, at 937; Regan,
Siamese Essays, supra note 2, at 1871.
179. Support exists for such a cost-benefit analysis. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 140 (1986)
(holding that a state law that discriminates against interstate commerce can be constitutional if its
non-protectionist purposes "could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means");
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (upholding state regulation that,
although discriminatory, effectuated a valid local objective for which no "reasonable and adequate
alternatives are available").
180. Regan accepts the possibility of this argument. Regan, Siamese Essays, supra note 2, at
1871, n.33. In some respects Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978), cited by
Powell in CTS, 481 U.S. at 88, 94, supports a theory of nondiscriminatory protectionism. Mary-
land's prohibition against oil companies' vertical integration into the local retail gas station market
apparently responded to market data that revealed inequitable gasoline distribution among retailers
during shortages. Although the Maryland prohibition had the effect of protecting local retailers,
such protectionism is tolerated when designed nondiscriminatorily to address a perceived evil the
state can legitimately address.
181. See Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 395 (1989) (summarizing current "market participant" doctrine);
Levmore, supra note 169, at 577 (concluding Court respects "state operations in the free market").
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when a state participates in one market-buying or selling resources-
and prefers local residents over out-of-state parties.182 For example,
South Dakota may during a concrete shortage sell from its state-operated
plant only to in-state buyers.
The market-participant rule rests on the notion that state residents,
who as a group create state resources, should be able to choose with
whom they deal and channel "their own" resources back to them-
selves."8 3 State regulation, although in some sense a product that com-
petes in a national market, stands on a different footing because a state's
use of its virtually limitless regulatory machinery to prefer local over out-
of-state interests is relatively costless. "84 The cost to national markets
imposed by a state's market-participant subsidy is limited, however, by
the amount of resources expended by the state, because the cost imposed
182. The "market participant" rule thus operates to allow a state to use its buying or selling
power to create a competitive advantage for its residents in interstate markets in which they compete
with non-residents. For example, when Maryland adopted a program to subsidize the recycling of
Maryland-titled abandoned cars, becoming in effect a purchaser of hulks, it could prefer Maryland
scrap processors over out-of-state processors, Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806
(1976); when South Dakota sold cement produced in a state-operated cement plant during a cement
shortage, it could choose local buyers over out-of-state buyers. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429,
435-39 (1980); when Boston funded public construction projects, it could require that work be per-
formed by firms whose work force was at least fifty percent local. White v. Massachusetts Council of
Const. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
183. See Coenen, supra note 181, at 409; Varat, supra note 169, at 529. In effect, the state
becomes less competitive in the market in which it participates in order to create an advantage for
local residents in another related market. For example, in White v. Massachusetts Council of Con-
str. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983), the Court upheld a Boston requirement that all public
construction projects funded by the city be performed by firms whose work force was at least 50%
local. Although this local-content requirement insulated the local labor market from nonlocal com-
petition, it also reimbursed the local community for underwriting public construction. Boston's
subsidy of local participants in the private labor market made the city a less competitive participant
in the construction market. There may be limits, however, on the extent to which the state can spite
itself. In South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984), a plurality of the Court
invalidated Alaska's requirement that out-of-state buyers of Alaska-owned timber have the timber
processed in Alaska prior to shipment. This local processing requirement gave local processors an
advantage in the private processing market, while at the same time making the state less competitive
in the timber market. The Court plurality said the special circumstances of foreign commerce (most
of the timber was shipped to Japan), a natural resource, and restrictions on resale distinguished the
case from other market participant cases. Id. at 96.
184. Coenen, supra note 181, at 427. Even if a state may be disciplined for protectionist use of
its regulatory power because the inefficiency of the state's protectionism eventually produces political
costs, dormant commerce clause doctrine embodies the conclusion that the costs of delay, the costs
created by retaliation, and the loss of national unity may sometimes prove too great for a market
solution. See Levmore, supra note 169, at 573-74 (arguing that when state interference is subject to
political correction, the Court uses a more deferential standard of review).
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cannot exceed the resources expended. Thus the label attached to the
challenged state activity-participation or regulation-has been
critical.185
The market-participant theory has some usefulness to the question of
preferences in the state chartering market. For example, if a state chose
to offer its chartering service only to local firms, thus preferring residents
who subsidized directly and indirectly the incorporation regime, the cost
imposed on excluded out-of-state firms would seem negligible, provided
that as foreign corporations they could still do business in the state. If
the state's regime were particularly attractive, it could be duplicated else-
where. No one has questioned on constitutional grounds that some
states have failed to make themselves attractive incorporation havens for
out-of-state firms.
Corporate law's dual participatory and regulatory character compli-
cates broader use of the market-participant theory. Generic corporate
codes do not produce, on balance, extraterritorial regulatory burdens. In
general, their regulatory aspects-such as rules governing corporate dis-
tributions for the protection of creditors or those limiting liability of cor-
porate participants-visit their regulatory burden through the internal
affairs doctrine wherever the incorporated firm does business or its par-
ticipants reside; the regulation falls indiscriminately on local and non-
local residents. Because of the pervasiviness and uniformity of generic
corporate codes, no one state bears this regulatory burden more than any
other, at least by design. To the extent generic corporate codes subsidize
a local incorporation regime, the subsidy relates to contributions (draft-
ing, updating, and dissemination services) by the local corporate bar.
Antitakeover statutes are far more problematic than generic corporate
codes. The statutes can be seen as a form of market participation-a
chartering service improvement intended to protect shareholders' trans-
fer/control rights or to memorialize implicit promises of stability made
to management 1 6-- and arguably any subsidy is at the expense of the
185. In New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988), the Court invalidated Ohio's tax
credit program for Ohio-produced ethanol, but not for ethanol produced in other states that did not
offer reciprocal treatment for Ohio-produced ethanol. The Court distinguished Ohio's program
from other valid subsidy programs on the ground taxation is "a primeval governmental activity."
Id. at 277. But it is difficult to see how the Ohio tax credits were not also a partial purchase of
ethanol. Presumably, an Ohio program giving state residents vouchers to purchase Ohio-produced
ethanol at reduced prices would have passed muster.
186. Coffee, Strain in the Web, supra note 34 (arguing that managers and other non-shareholder
constituents subsidize shareholder opportunism).
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state's chartering competitiveness. Aside from the question whether an-
titakeover statutes actually accomplish these purposes, the argument
misconceives the market-participant rule, which is meant to tolerate in-
state subsidies paid with state-created resources, a state of affairs that by
definition does not promote state competitiveness. Thus, even if we were
to conclude that some states, such as Delaware, are driven by market-
participant and not subsidizing motives,187 this has little relevance to a
market-participant analysis. Antitakeover statutes impose costs on na-
tional stock trading markets that are unrelated to, and predictably much
greater than, any loss to the state's chartering revenues.1 88 For these
reasons, the antitakeover subsidy, far from being a return to managers
and shareholders on their investment in the chartering state's incorpora-
tion regime, is more appropriately characterized as a regulatory taking
from shareholders unrepresented in the state political process for the
benefit of managers and other constituents who are. Because in a pub-
licly-held firm this regulation will typically fall more heavily on out-of-
state than in-state shareholders, we must return to our original question:
should this disparate impact be of concern under the dormant commerce
clause?
The participant-regulator dilemma can only be resolved by addressing
187. In some states, such as Delaware, the market-participation motive may be stronger than the
forced-subsidy motive. Although it might seem useful to categorize states according to which set of
motives predominates-setting the stage for applying a market-participation or state-regulation
rule-the categorization would gain little. The motives are hopelessly intertwined: effective protec-
tionism requires sensitivity to the chartering market and effective marketing of charters requires
being suitably protectionist. In either event, the cost of the protectionism will not relate to the value
of the chartering change.
188. No direct linkage exists between the subsidy's cost and the effect on chartering revenues. In
fact, antitakeover statutes may increase chartering revenues by making the state more attractive to
managers. Assuming counter-intuitively, that a protectionist antitakeover statute dried up all a
state's chartering business, the loss could well pale compared to cost of the statute's subsidy to
nonshareholder constituents. To illustrate, assume that Delaware enacted a relatively restrictive
antitakeover statute. Assuming (modestly) such a statute would cause share prices to fall 2% among
potential targets-as happened in Ohio-average control premiums for Delaware targets would fall
from 30% to 28%. See infra note 245 (empirical evidence on antitakeover statutes). Because this
negative effect should be felt in the prices for all takeovers, hostile and non-hostile, a loss of approxi-
mately 7% in control premiums to shareholders would occur. Given that Delaware charters about
half of likely takeover targets, the cost of its statute would be 7% of half of total takeover premiums
(which have been estimated at between $200 billion to $300 billion during the last decade). Thus,
Delaware would have imposed costs of between $14-21 billion over a ten-year period. On the other
hand, Delaware annually receives about $17 million in chartering revenues from incorporation and
franchise fees-$170 million over a decade. Even factoring in the value of indirect chartering reve-
nues, they would certainly fall short of the cost to shareholders.
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the underlying corporate federalism question: How does the current sys-
tem of incorporation-based ordering compare to the federal alternatives?
Although Powell's opinion does not foreclose the possibility that the
Court might inquire into the political process underlying state antitake-
over statutes, it was not part of the CTS thinking. Like a cheater in a
game of Blind Man's Bluff, CTS avoids this quagmire, adopting an un-
characteristic indifference to the economic and political motives of a
facially neutral statute. I return to this point later in my discussion of
the wisdom of the CTS gambit.
2. Inconsistent regulation: CTS constitutionalizes the internal
affairs doctrine
Dormant commerce clause doctrine also teaches that national markets
cannot survive in an environment of multiple state regulation. When
multiple inconsistent regulation renders interstate economic behavior le-
gally impermissible, or when multiple overlapping regulation becomes so
burdensome as to make such behavior economically infeasible, the Court
has intervened to limit state action.'I 9 But the Court has tolerated over-
lapping state regulation when it imposes only incremental requirements,
neither inconsistent nor overly burdensome." ° In the end, an inconsis-
tency analysis balances national and local interests.' 9 '
Because of the internal affairs doctrine, multiplicity in state corporate
law rarely occurs. But antitakeover statutes have an agenda different
189. See, eg., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S.
573 (1986) (invalidating New York requirement that liquor vendors in New York charge no more
than is charged in other states for the same products); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761
(1945) (invalidating Arizona's limits on the maximum lengths of trains).
Multiple regulation can be either overlapping or inconsistent. See Buxbaum, supra note 57;
Kozyris, Corporate Wars, supra note 29. Overlapping regulations-such as one that requires major-
ity voting and the other two-thirds voting--can be complied with by satisfying the more demanding
standard. Inconsistent regulations-such as one that mandates cumulative voting and another
straight voting---cannot be complied with simultaneously.
190. See, eg., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441-46 (1978) (invalidating
Wisconsin law limiting truck length to 55 feet, since other states permit 65-foot double-trailer trucks
whose comparable safety Wisconsin did not contest).
191. The Supreme Court has protested that it is not balancing state and federal interests. See,
e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670, 691 (1981) (Powell, J., for plural-
ity and Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But it is difficult to see how the Court is not balancing when it
determines, or not, that a state statute interferes with free-trading rights. Inevitably, the extent of its
interference and the weight of its justification must be compared-that is, balanced. For example, in
Kassel, cited by Powell in CTS, 481 U.S. at 88, a plurality of the Court held that national interests in
an efficient highway system outweighed a state's safety interests, given the costs of compliance with
truck-size limits. 450 U.S. at 671.
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from generic corporate codes, sometimes desperately seeking to protect
local businesses incorporated elsewhere. If more than one state's an-
titakeover statute were to apply to a particular takeover activity, and
some of them prescribed inconsistent behavior, national markets in cor-
porate shares would be impaired.1 92
Powell presents in CTS a simplistic and sweeping solution to the in-
consistency problem. Assuming that publicly-held corporations are sub-
jects of regulation that "are in their nature national, or admit only of one
uniform system.., of regulation," '193 Powell concludes that the risk of
inconsistency would be removed if only the chartering state regulates.
He makes no mention that Indiana's statute reaches only Indiana corpo-
rations with operational and shareholding contacts to the state.
By transforming the question into one of risk, rather than actual in-
consistency,1 94 and by treating the corporation as a creature of its char-
tering state, the CTS decision constitutionalizes the internal affairs
doctrine, at least as it concerns antitakeover statutes.1 95 The risk of in-
compatible, inconsistent antitakeover regulation disappears if only the
chartering state regulates; the risk is inevitable if two or more states can
192. Even multiple overlapping regulation, by virtue of the uncertainty of compliance, adds
costs.
193. 481 U.S. at 88-89 (quoting Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 U.S. (I How.) 299, 319 (1852)).
Powell also cited the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 304, which states:
The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine the right of a
shareholder to participate in the administration of the affairs of the corporation... except
in the unusual case where with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more
significant relation under [interest-analysis] principles ....
194. In other cases the Supreme Court has focused on actual inconsistency. Compare Kassel v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670, 691 (1981) (striking down Iowa law even
though no other midwestern state regulated truck lengths) with Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325
U.S. 761 (1945) (invalidating Arizona's limits on the maximum lengths of trains because other states
set different limits).
195. Others, though without taking this final plunge, have commented on the importance of the
internal affairs doctrine to the CTS dormant commerce clause analysis. See Brilmayer, Rights, Fair-
ness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1298-99 n.72 (1989) (commenting that the internal
affairs doctrine "received something of an imprimatur" in CTS); Buxbaum, supra note 57, at 31-32
(stating that the "limited jurisdictional reach [of the second-generation statutes] now turns out to be
critical to the fate of these statutes under dormant commerce clause scrutiny"); Garfield, supra note
116, at 582 (concluding CTS "made highly suspect any legislation which extended its jurisdiction to
foreign corporations"); Kozyris, Some Observations, supra note 32, at 515 (describing CTS as the
"virtual canonization" of the internal affairs doctrine); Pinto, Takeover Laws After CTS, supra note
162, at 762, 764 (concluding that the internal affairs doctrine should be a "significant factor" in
determining state corporate law's constitutionality, but does not "establish a constitutional
requirement").
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meaningfully regulate takeovers of public corporations.196 As to multi-
state publicly-held firms, no "moderate reading" of CTS on this point
seems possible. 197 Although economically the shareholder-manager rela-
tionship is not isolated from other relationships among corporate constit-
uents-equity investment is inextricably linked to other inputs and
outputs of the firm-the Court imbues it with an artificial autonomy by
accepting the "inside-outside" dichotomy of the internal affairs doctrine.
196. Antitakeover statutes apply only to publicly-held firms, the only ones prone to hostile take-
overs. See, eg., IND. CODE § 23-1-42-4(a) (Supp. 1986) (defining "issuing public corporation" as
one with 100 or more shareholders). Although it may be possible to imagine deviations from the
internal affairs doctrine in the case of a single-state pseudo-foreign corporation-that is, a corpora-
tion whose business and investors are almost exclusively in one state, but which is incorporated
elsewhere-the risk of inconsistency is unavoidable as a practical matter in public corporations.
Almost by definition, public corporations have multistate investors who trade in interstate markets.
An interest-based choice of law rule would suggest, at the least, the regulatory power of the charter-
ing state.
In fact, the only state statutes that extend some of their generic corporate rules to foreign corpora-
tions limit their extraterritorial application to nonpublic firms that conduct a majority of their busi-
ness in-state. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(a), (e) (Deering Supp. 1990) (exempting foreign
corporations whose securities are listed on a national stock exchange certified by the California Com-
missioner of Corporations or that conduct less than half their business in California); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 1320(a) (McKinney 1986) (exempting foreign corporations whose stock is listed on a
national securities exchange or that have less than one percent of their business income in New
York).
197. Powell commented that deviation from the internal affairs doctrine occurred only in the
"rarest situations." 481 U.S. at 90. It has never occurred with respect to a multistate public corpo-
ration. See Kozyris, Some Observations, supra note 32, at 513 n.46 (finding that all such cases have
involved pseudo-foreign corporations).
Soon after CTS, Professor Buxbaum argued that the decision does not and should not be under-
stood to constitutionalize the internal affairs doctrine. Buxbaum, supra note 57, at 35. The argu-
ment seems correct if limited to single-state (essentially non-public) businesses. Otherwise, nothing
in CTS supports the view that non-chartering state legislatures are constitutionally empowered to
use corporate law to "do something" about the social consequences of takeovers. Id. at 32. Profes-
sor Buxbaum argued that the Supreme Court's "minimal scrutiny" choice of law analysis developed
in other contexts should inform any reading of CTS and that even inconsistent corporate regulation
might survive commerce clause scrutiny if the impact is minimal. Id. at 54 ("The less directly a state
law impacts on that stock market trading institution, however, the less sensitive the commerce clause
scrutiny need be.") Unfortunately, Professor Buxbaum cannot point to how CTS assimilates this
more fluid choice of law analysis. In the end, it indeed seems to be wishful thinking:
The concurrent apotheosis of the state of incorporation's primacy, however, though an-
nounced in order to reduce the separate confusions assertedly implicit in conflicting state
involvement in share transactions, may be too high a price to pay for that policy shift.
Id. at 53. CTS saw it differently. Professor Buxbaum's prediction that "we soon may have a moder-
ate amount of interstate conflict regarding substantive regulation of these structural changes," id. at
34, has not materialized. State antitakeover statutes increasingly have been limited to domestic cor-
porations. See infra note 318. Nor have we seen, as Professor Buxbaum feared we might, the "De-
lawarization" of state corporation law. Id. at 54. Delaware's antitakeover statute turned out to be
among the mildest in the third generation. See infra note 320.
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CTS's constitutionalization of the internal affairs doctrine, the linch-
pin of the CTS corporate federalism, is remarkable. To avoid multiplic-
ity, the doctrine elevates national interests in predictability, stability,
certainty, and ease of application-treating them as essential to corporate
free-trading rights-yet fixes all corporate rights and duties with the
chartering state. The effect is to overrule Paul v. Virginia, 198 to the ex-
tent it held that recognition of corporate relationships is within the regu-
latory power of each state in which the corporation does business. The
internal affairs doctrine thus refines the "artificial entity" conception of
the corporation, which treats the corporation as a creature or concession
of state law. 199 The doctrine, applicable only to matters of corporate
governance, recognizes only the law of the chartering state. In other
words, under the constitutionalized internal affairs doctrine, the man-
ager-shareholder relationship in public corporations is a creature of the
law chosen by management.
CTS's artificial entity solution to the inconsistency problem runs con-
trary to the Court's own evolving view of the corporation and takes a
doctrinal step backward, encouraging decision by metaphor rather than
balanced analysis. A "natural entity" theory in which the corporation,
like an association of persons, has a status because of the aggregation of
constituents finds support in recent cases involving corporate rights
under the first and fifth amendments.20 For example, in First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti-which invalidated state limits on the speech
prerogatives of corporate managers-it was irrelevant to both the chal-
lenged statute and the divided Court where the business was incorpo-
rated.20 1 This is surprising, since one of the principal arguments for the
198. Buxbaum, supra note 57, at 54.
199. Under an "artificial entity" or "creature of law" theory, the corporation exists only because
of a government grant. This view traces its origins in American jurisprudence to Justice Marshall's
opinion in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819):
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation
of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter
of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These
are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created.
Powell quoted this passage with approval in CTS. 481 U.S. at 89.
200. See, eg., Braswell v. States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765 (1978). See Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54
U. CH. L. REV. 1441, 1442 n.3 (1988).
201. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (invalidating Massachusetts
statute prohibiting certain political contributions by any corporation incorporated in the state or
doing business in the state). In the case, two national banks (chartered by the United States) and
three business corporations challenged a Massachusetts statute. None of the Justices attached any
[Vol. 69:445
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statute was that shareholders were captive speakers.2 ' 2 According to the
"creature of law" conception of the corporation, the extent of their cap-
tivity presumably would have been measured by the law defining the
manager-shareholder relationship. Instead, the majority and dissenting
opinions treated the corporation as having a status independent of state
law-a natural, constitutional status.
A "nexus of contracts" theory, which treats the corporation as having
no independent status but merely as an aggregation of voluntary and
contractual relationships, also finds support." 3 In CTS, Powell alludes
to a partnership analogy, suggesting that just as a partner may transfer
importance to the fact that the Massachusetts statute prohibited political advertising by both domes-
tic and foreign corporations.
In separate dissents, Justices White and Rehnquist justified the Massachusetts statute on the
grounds that corporations are merely "creatures of law." White argued Massachusetts had an inter-
est in regulating corporate political spending to assure that managers' political ideologies would not
affect investment decisions, seemingly without regard to where the corporation is incorporated.
Why Massachusetts would have such an interest with respect to non-resident investment in non-
Massachusetts corporations is unclear, though elsewhere in his opinion he suggests that Massachu-
setts "has a strong interest in assuring that its citizens are not forced to choose between supporting
the propagation of views with which they disagree and passing up investment opportunities." 435
U.S. at 818. Justice Rehnquist finessed the question of the statute's reach by assuming that Massa-
chusetts had an interest in regulating corporations "created by the Commonwealth or ... admitted
into the Commonwealth... and regulated by state law," an attempted revival of Paul v. Virginia
conditioning power. Id. at 823-24.
If nothing else, Bellotti confirms that the Court uses the different conceptions of the corporation as
rhetorical devices. In CTS, White dissented from Powell's "creature of law" analysis on the theory
that CTS shareholders had free-trading rights that existed independently of how Indiana chose to
define them. 481 U.S. at 100. Rehnquist joined the CTS majority.
202. It is a remarkable omission, especially since at least some of the corporate challengers were
not incorporated in Massachusetts. The Court rejected the argument that the statute sought to
prevent shareholders from subsidizing corporate speech with which they disagreed. Bellotti, 435
U.S. at 792-95. Although apparently accepting the premise that Massachusetts could legitimately
concern itself with such a captive speaker problem, it rejected that that was the statute's purpose.
The majority, surprisingly, did not advance the obvious "artificial entity" argument that Massachu-
setts can have no interest in whether corporate resources are used to further views with which non-
Massachusetts shareholders of non-Massachusetts corporations may disagree.
203. The nexus theory is not terribly new. See W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEP-
TIONS 197 (1923) (arguing that corporation is "simply another mode by which individuals or natural
persons can enjoy their property and engage in business. Just as several individuals may transact
business collectively as partners, so they may as members of a corporation .... ); V. MORAWETZ, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OTHER THAN CHARITABLE § 1, at 2 (1882)
(arguing that "the rights and duties of an incorporated association are in reality the rights and duties
of the persons who compose it, and not of an imaginary being"). Economists have been largely
responsible for the recent resurgence of the notion. See, e g., Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976). See
Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1471 (1989).
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his property and income interests, but not his voting interest without the
consent of the other partners, Indiana's statute creates a similar bifurca-
tion.2"4 Once the corporate and partnership forms are seen as concep-
tually identical, it is a short step to recognize rights that exist
independent of state law. For example, White ultimately based his opin-
ion in MITE on the notion that shareholder transfer and control rights
exist independently of the chartering state-that is, they are not mere
creatures of state law.205
Each of these other theories, particularly a nexus theory, cuts through
accretions of corporate metaphor.206 Under both, shareholders' trans-
fer/control rights, like property and contract rights, have independent
constitutional stature.2 7 Neither weds the corporation to the chartering
state any more than a person's state of residence governs his natural sta-
204. 481 U.S. at 91 n.12. See CIS Reply Brief, supra note 115, at 14 (arguing that there is no
"meaningful constitutional distinction between partnerships and corporations"). Powell's analysis,
although it demonstrates the thin differences between the corporate and partnership forms, should
have led Powell to a different conclusion. If a partnership agreement, like Indiana's generic corpo-
rate code, allowed share transferability and a state law prohibited it so as to protect local partners
from an unwanted dissolution by out-of-state partners, there would seem to be little doubt that
searching constitutional scrutiny of the state prohibition would follow. It would make little differ-
ence that state law defines partnerships and partner rights. Although perhaps enough state-based
interests would justify the state's re-writing of the partnership agreement, it would not be a foregone
conclusion.
205. Although in MITE White attempted to take stock trading out of the sphere of "internal
corporate affairs," 457 U.S. at 645, the two are inextricably bound together, if not identical. See
Coffee, Strain in the Web, supra note 34, at 94. In other corporate federalism cases, White has
adopted the "creature of state law" metaphor. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478
(1977) (White, J.).
206. Each model serves as a surrogate for preferring one corporate constituency over another.
The "artificial entity" model prefers the constituency that has access to the relevant political ma-
chinery-at the state level, managers. The "natural person" entity prefers the constituency that
controls the corporate decision-making machinery-managers. The "nexus of contracts" model,
using its proponents' theory of shareholder wealth maximization, prefers shareholders.
207. Adopting this approach, Professors Butler and Ribstein argue that antitakeover statutes,
which give managers through the legislative process what they cannot obtain from shareholders
through the charter-amendment process, impair shareholder transferability expectations arising
under the corporate contract, in violation of the Constitution's contract impairment clause. See
Butler & Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOKLYN L. REv. 767 (1989)
[hereinafter Butler & Ribstein, The Contract Clause]; Butler & Ribstein, State Anti-Takeover Stat-
utes, supra note 4. Their analysis, however, takes significant liberty with current contract impair-
ment doctrine, which has not yet come to grips with the clause's original purpose of preventing
private contract avoidance through the legislative process.
In other contexts, the Supreme Court has federalized contract and property rights. In its replevin
cases, the Court made clear that a state cannot redefine due process rights that attach to contract
and property expectations on the basis that such expectations are state-defined. See Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See, e.g., Van
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tus and behavior, or any more than the state where a contract was signed
creates and regulates a contract. But each theory would have cast state
antitakeover and corporate law into uncertain dormant commerce clause,
choice of law and contract impairment waters, inevitably changing the
straight-forward CTS antitakeover blueprint. While validating the pro-
cess of state corporate law in the rest of its opinion, the CTS Court limits
it to assure stability in the process.
Professor Regan has suggested that CTS's use of the internal affairs
doctrine expresses a view that corporate events all occur in the state of
incorporation. But viewing the inconsistency problem as territorial
solves little; the metaphor is not terribly useful.20 8 As Professor Gergen
correctly points out, a state denied direct extraterritorial powers can ac-
complish the same things indirectly and territorially.2" For example, if
CTS had not been chartered in Indiana, but nonetheless had significant
operations in the state, Indiana could satisfy a formal territorial rule sim-
ply by requiring that any change in control of the firm's in-state opera-
tions be pursuant to a control-share regime, accomplishing indirectly
what Regan suggests it could not directly. Territorial formalism directs
the question of corporate federalism away from a full-fledged inquiry
about the nature of the corporation and of corporate law, and instead
toward another doctrinal layer of metaphoric muck. The real question,
from both a constitutional choice of law and ultimately federalism per-
spective, should not be where in some abstract sense transactions among
parties having interstate contacts occur, but what reasons we have for
permitting or disabling states from regulating those transactions. Locat-
ing a transaction merely marks the conclusion of an explicit or implicit
Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property" Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62
CORNELL L. REv. 445 (1977).
208. Regan would rephrase the inquiry as: In what state did the relevant corporate transaction
take place? If there is value, as Regan suggests, in returning to the halcyon days of formal territori-
alism-and its attendant certainty and stolid legitimacy-then CTS becomes wrong and MITE
right. Under this view, the magic transfer of shares, their ownership, and corporate control occur in
a tender offer at the agent bank, usually somewhere near Wall Street in Manhattan. But this is
silliness if it means that only New York has authority to regulate transactions routed to the com-
puters of its financial institutions. By this analysis, state blue sky regulation of securities transactions
on national exchanges is extraterritorial and constitutionally infirm. Choosing any other single locus
creates equal silliness, and expanding to multiple loci only forces us to an interest-based analysis of
which loci are sufficient in theory and fact. See Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute, supra note 2,
at 941-42.
209. Gergen, Territoriality and the Perils of Formalism, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1735 (1988).
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analysis of a theory of the transaction and the interests (public and pri-
vate) we view as meaningful under that theory.
Modem choice of law theory, which the Supreme Court has adopted
in other contexts, admits of transactions subject to more than one set of
state regulation.210 Under an interest analysis in the corporate context,
incorporation simply emerges as an important referent, not a locator of
power. The internal affairs doctrine reflects that private parties have
chosen and expect to be bound by governance rules established by the
chartering state.21 States, which have a collective interest in assuring
certainty for consumers in the chartering market (managers and share-
holders), have with rare exceptions adhered to this incorporation-based
choice of law regime.2 2 Nonetheless, if managers behave opportunisti-
210. Under an interest-based analysis, the application of more than one state's laws to a set of
facts is constitutionally possible. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 305-06, 312-13,
(1981) (plurality opinion) (upholding Minnesota court's application of its insurance rule permitting
"stacking" of uninsured motorist coverage, even though decedent and the drivers involved in the
accident were all Wisconsin residents and the insurance policies had been delivered in Wisconsin;
because the decedent worked and commuted in Minnesota, his insurance company did business in
Minnesota, and his surviving spouse had moved to Minnesota, Minnesota had a "significant aggrega-
tion of contacts, creating state interests, such that application of its law was neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair"). See also Brilmayer, supra note 195, at 1296.
An example employed by Professor Regan illustrates the possibility of multiple rules governing
the same behavior. Suppose Georgia prohibits the mailing of pornography to Georgia residents and
fines those who do. If an Illinois resident mails pornography to a Georgian, may Georgia (assuming
it had jurisdiction) fine the Illinois pornographer? Could Illinois at the same time have a licensing
scheme for pornographic mailers? It would seem possible to characterize the pornography transac-
tion as occuring in both states. Moreover, both states arguably have significant interests in the
transaction; Georgia in deterring its residents' gaining access to pornography and Illinois in avoiding
becoming a pornography repository and trading center.
Multiple rules are also possible in the international context. Recently, Colombia sought to prose-
cute an Israeli citizen for training Colombian drug terrorists; Israel is prosecuting the same person
for divulging Israeli military secrets during the training. Wall St. J., May 9, 1990, at 1 col. 1. Each
country's interest in the transaction is largely unrelated to where the transaction occurred.
211. See Brilmayer, supra note 195, at 1298-99 (arguing that though few object to applying the
law of the incorporating state, a corporation often wields considerable political influence in states
other than its state of incorporation). That corporate law is partially regulatory suggests that this
private choice should not be conclusive. Although the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional-
ity of the internal affairs doctrine as a state choice of law rule, Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629,
642-43 (1935), this hardly implies that the doctrine is the only legitimate choice of law rule. See
Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on State Choice of Law Doctrine, 84 HARV. L.
REv. 806, 816 (1971); Kozyris, Corporate Wars, supra note 29.
212. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (widespread prevalence of doctrine). If states
were parochially to deviate from the internal affairs doctrine, certainty would be lost. Because cer-
tainty reduces planning costs, states interested in promoting incorporation-as opposed to the use of
other, less-lucrative forms of business organization-have a collective interest in assuring a stable
incorporation environment.
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cally toward investors, or shareholders toward non-shareholder constitu-
ents, the private-ordering justifications for an incorporation-based regime
may and should give way.
The possibility of opportunism by managers explains territorial state
blue sky laws, which are not incorporation-based." 3 Perceived opportu-
nism by shareholders explains antitakeover statutes, many of which ex-
tend to foreign corporations. That managers have chosen to incorporate,
and the values of certainty, predictability, stability, and ease of applica-
tion implicated in the choice, should not end the inquiry as a constitu-
tional matter.214 To illustrate, consider the case of a multiparty, high-
interest note, usurious under some states' laws. If the parties choose to
have the note governed by the law of a state without a usury law, their
choice-though presumably entitled to some weight-should not be con-
trolling. The states of the co-obligors' residences, where the effects of
usurious interest will be felt, could require that their state courts apply
their usury limits; the state chosen by the parties might decide differ-
ently. In general, our federalism does not preclude the possibility.
This more fluid choice of law perspective has relevance to CTS. Indi-
ana's interest in regulating transactions affecting firms with significant
management, employee, tax, and community ties to Indiana would seem
to be as great whether a firm is incorporated in Indiana, whether it is
incorporated elsewhere, or whether it is incorporated at all.2 5 Although
managers' choice to incorporate the firm in Indiana and shareholders'
investment in an Indiana corporation might warrant significant defer-
213. See Kozyris, Some Observations, supra note 32, at 520 n.67 (recognizing statutes as excep-
tions to internal affairs doctrine, but describing them as "limited to intraterritorial distributions").
They nonetheless interfere with national capital markets by regulating from whom managers can
raise capital and set the terms of the transactions, including how the capital may be used-both
extraterritorial effects. The Supreme Court has upheld their constitutionality, despite their inciden-
tal effects on interstate commerce. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 554-56 (1917); Merrick v.
Nw. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568, 590 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S.
559, 564-66 (1917). See also Levmore, supra note 169, at 619 (arguing that the market will correct
excessive interference because a state that unduly limits its citizens' ability to participate in national
capital markets will eventually be compelled by local political forces to correct its stridency).
214. Blue-sky regulation illustrates this point. States are constitutionally empowered to regulate
securities transactions involving residents, regardless of whether or where the seller is incorporated.
See supra note 213 (cases upholding constitutionality of such statutes). In addition, more than one
state may apply its regulation to the same securities offering, thus creating the possibility of multiple
and even inconsistent disclosure and fairness rules.
215. Many have noticed the incongruity that one and only one state-the state of incorpora-
tion-should decide indirectly the fate of a multistate business relationship. See, e.g., Cary, supra
note 11, at 672-73; Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545 (1984).
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ence,2 16 only an unthinking passion for certainty and predictability can
explain why these private choices should always control. Just as a theory
of political legitimacy suggests that states should not have regulatory
power over those without political access in the state, states should pre-
sumptively have such power if a firm's activities give it political access.
So long as this access does not place the firm in a position through which
unrepresented, out-of-state interests can be exploited, private choice
should not automatically trump public policy. 217
To summarize, by treating the corporation as a creature only of its
chartering state, CTS carves out a niche for corporate transactions un-
like that for any other economic activity. Unlike an interstate train,
whose unitary nature no single state can regulate, or an interstate sales
contract, whose multiple effects a number of states can regulate, CTS
leaves the corporation to the regulatory power only of the state chosen by
the corporate parties-in particular, by management.21 Stripped of its
metaphoric adornments, it is the height of laissez faire government. By
shunning any meaningful analysis of the allocative, efficiency, or predict-
ability implications of incorporation-based ordering, Powell's constitu-
tional embrace of the internal affairs doctrine leaves intact and
unassailable states' abdication to management-controlled ordering. At
the very least, it is constitutional doctrine resting on a shaky foundation.
3. Balancing: CTS places nothing in the national pan
Inconsistency analysis under the dormant commerce clause is a subset
of the broader balancing that is inevitable when national, free-trading
rights conflict with local interests. While the inconsistency analysis fo-
216. The parties' private expectation and the chartering state's interest become stronger as the
participants' need for legal certainty increases. Thus, the case for the chartering state's exclusivity is
strongest for public corporations and weakest for pseudo-foreign corporations.
217. See Brilmayer, supra note 195, at 1298; Levmore, supra note 169, at 623; L. TRIME, supra
note 169, at 408-13. Even Professors Butler and Ribstein, who advocate a contract impairment
analysis of antitakeover statutes, admit constitutional analysis should balance (1) the impairment of
shareholder "contract" rights taking into account countervailing appraisal, redemption or proxy
voting rights and (2) the state justifications for the impairment. See Butler & Ribstein, State Anti-
Takeover Statutes, supra note 4, at 633.
218. This returns the Court to a discredited full-faith-and-credit line of cases that had enshrined
the internal affairs doctrine for unincorporated mutual insurance companies. Order of United Com-
mercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947); Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the
World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938); Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925);
Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915). The Court's full-faith-and-
credit analysis is of doubtful continuing validity, replaced by a "minimal scrutiny" rational basis
analysis. See Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHi. L. REV. 440, 444 (1982).
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cuses on impediments to such rights when multiple states regulate, the
balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 219 takes into account a single
state's interference, weighing the state and national interests.
But the CTS majority refused to weigh. On the premise that power
over corporate governance resides with the chartering state and that the
Indiana statute's "primary purpose" to assure shareholder collectiviza-
tion was rationally related to this power, Powell's inquiry ended.22° The
Court's conclusion that state law fixes shareholder free-trading/control
rights221 essentially guts the premise of MITE that the commerce clause
protects the interstate market for corporate control-and the control
rights freely traded in the market-from local intervention. CTS beats a
retreat from the federalizing potential of MITE, whose logical limits ex-
tended well beyond antitakeover statutes to, at least, generic corporate
law affecting control transactions.222
The CTS Court's refusal to balance can be seen in two lights. First, it
may have been a broader rejection of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.; Powell
does not mention the case.223 But this seems unlikely. Cases of overlap-
ping state regulation-such as truck mudflap cases-appear to survive
CTS.22 4 These inconsistency cases inevitably force judicial weighing of
the costs imposed on a free-trading activity-the switching and re-
219. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (stating that state statute is invalid under the commerce clause if
its burden on commerce "is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits").
220. 481 U.S. at 91.
221. The Court adopted the argument of CTS and the SEC that "a share of stock has no inher-
ent rights except those that state law and the relevant corporate documents give it." See SEC Brief,
supra note 101, at 16 n.15; CTS Brief, supra note 8, at 42 (arguing that the "'market for corporate
control' is a market created only by State law defining property rights and ownership interests") (em-
phasis in original); CTS Reply Brief, supra note 115, at 7-8.
222. For example, the predominant state rule that board approval is a pre-condition to a merger
has many of the characteristics of an antitakeover statute. See Levmore, supra note 169, at 624
(pointing out that "[n]o case or commentator seems to notice the rather startling potential for com-
merce clause claims in corporate law after MITE"); Coffee, Strain in the Web, supra note 34, at 94-
100 (also criticizing this federalism lapse).
223. See Langevoort, supra note 2, at 103 & n.45. In fact, both Powell (481 U.S. at 87) and
Scalia (481 U.S. at 95) cite to Professor Regan's article in which he argues that the Court should not,
and in fact does not, balance state interests against the burdens on interstate commerce; rather the
Court should only prevent purposeful economic state protectionism. See Regan, The Dormant Com-
merce Clause, supra note 169, at 108.
224. Powell cited to a number of them. 481 U.S. at 88. See, eg., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (invalidating Illinois requirement of contoured rear fender mudflaps on
trailer trucks in the state because 45 states permitted, and contiguous Arkansas required, straight
mudflaps; switching mudflaps caused a two hour delay); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761
(1945). See also Regan, Siamese Essays, supra note 2, at 1883 (agreeing that transportation and
communication cases are proper even under a protectionism standard).
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switching of mudflaps-against the state interest in public welfare,
safety, and aesthetics. By the same token, if one state alone imposes a
significant burden, balancing would be implicated.
Second, and more persuasive, CTS simply takes an easy out and fol-
lows the lead of its inconsistency analysis, reaffirming the artificial entity
conception and the inviolacy of the internal affairs doctrine. Powell's
language hardly seems equivocal:
This beneficial free market system [in ownership of corporations] depends
at its core upon the fact that a corporation-except in the rarest situa-
tions-is organized under, and governed by, the law of a single jurisdiction,
traditionally the corporate law of the State of its incorporation.
225
Although White's plurality opinion in MITE had taken care not to chal-
lenge explicitly state corporate law or the internal affairs doctrine,226
MITE's concern for unimpeded share transferability had actually
crossed into corporate governance. CTS steers a clear course away, re-
turning the Court to mainstream corporate federalism.
After CTS, any justification by the chartering state for its corporate
regulation, including an amorphous "interest in promoting stable rela-
tionships among parties involved in the corporations it charters," is suffi-
cient.227 Free-trading/control rights need not be placed in the balance
because, according to CTS, corporate federalism is not constrained by
"any particular economic theory. '228 This contrasts with the Court's
preemption analysis, which admitted the possibility of unacceptable
effects. 2 2 9
On the tricky question of what interest Indiana could have in protect-
ing non-Indiana shareholders, Powell wrote enigmatically of the state's
"substantial interest in preventing the corporate form from becoming a
shield for unfair business dealing. '230 However understood, the state-
ment suggests that the chartering state can blithely insulate managers
from the interstate market for corporate control. Whether Powell's "un-
225. 481 U.S. at 90.
226. 457 U.S. at 645-46 ("Tender offers do not .. . implicate internal affairs of target
company.").
227. 481 U.S. at 91.
228. In fact, Powell treated the coercive nature of some tender offers as simply "additional justi-
fication" for state power. 481 U.S. at 92. State chartering authority would seem to be its own
justification. In the process, federal courts are effectively removed from discerning economic effi-
ciency, at least explicitly. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1978).
229. Cf. Oesterle, Delavare's Takeover Statute, supra note 2, at 947 (arguing that the commerce
clause and Williams Act standards in CTS "appear to merge to a substantial degree").
230. 481 U.S. at 93.
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fair business dealings" refer to layoffs and plant closings that sometimes
follow takeovers or simply the "possibility of coercion in some takeover
bids,"23' Indiana can premise its regulatory power on the most tenuous
of interests. Whether to protect non-shareholder constituents from op-
portunistic shareholders or to protect shareholders from themselves, the
state's incorporation-based power is nearly limitless. Rational basis re-
view in constitutional law, as in corporate law, is tantamount to no re-
view at all.
This result and the Court's spuming of the role of the control market
were not inadvertent. The control market had been a central feature of
MITE and of Posner's Seventh Circuit opinion,232 but Powell concluded
that the market's value presented too unsettled a question to justify a
judicial response.233 Built on the same foundation, CTS's refusal to bal-
ance is as shaky as its inconsistency analysis.
III. THE MEANING OF THE CTS GAMBIT-SOME HYPOTHESES
To appreciate the CTS federalism gambit, it is useful to contemplate
some hypotheses that might explain the decision and the Court's real
agenda. Who were the winners and losers of the Court's doctrinal and
analytic liberties? Five nonexclusive hypotheses seem possible:
(1) CTS had few ulterior motives; it accepted that Indiana sought
merely to protect shareholders from coercive takeover bids-the Pro-share-
holder Hypothesis.
(2) CTS underwrote protectionism; it sought to strengthen the position
of local stakeholders in takeovers-the Pro-stakeholder Hypothesis.
(3) CTS was reactionary; it followed the Court's traditional corporate
jurisprudence, which generally defers to corporate managers-the Pro-
management Hypothesis.
(4) CTS had misgivings about the regulatory vacuum left by MITE and
federal inaction; it sought to invigorate the states' regulatory power over
corporate relationships-the Pro-state Hypothesis.
231. Id. at 92.
232. The importance of the market for corporate control was the central fixture both of White's
dissent, 481 U.S. at 100-01 (charging the majority with ignoring "the practical impact" of the Indi-
ana statute to "frustrate any transfer of control"), and of Posner's opinion below. 794 F.2d at 250.
233. In a footnote Powell stated:
[T]here is no reason to assume that the type of conglomerate corporation that may result
from repetitive takeovers necessarily will result in more effective management .... The
divergent views in the literature-and even now being debated in the Congress-reflect the
reality that the type and utility of tender offers vary widely.
481 U.S. at 92 n.13 (emphasis in original).
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(5) CTS was wary of federal intervention; it sought to keep federal
courts, the SEC, and Congress out of the business of takeover regulation
and more generally out of corporate governance-the Anti-federal
Hypothesis.
Despite the charm and insights offered by a search for the Court's pur-
poses, it should be undertaken warily. Discerning the psychology of de-
cided cases, like probing the intent of a legislature, has its limits. For
example, Powell's opinion in CTS reflects a remarkable adoption of the
content, form, and structure of petitioner CTS's brief.2 34 Divining the
Court's real agenda can quickly deteriorate into meaningless conjecture
and anthropomorphic rambling about the Court's motives. Of greater
interest is the decision's effect: the CTS antitakeover blueprint and in-
corporation-based private ordering.
This Part tests these hypotheses and in the process clarifies the CTS
corporate federalism. It lays the groundwork for exploring how this fed-
eralism has operated since CTS, for making predictions about how it will
play out, and for evaluating its wisdom.
A. Pro-shareholder Hypothesis
CTS pivots on the assumption that Indiana was protecting sharehold-
ers from potential coercion. Some have found the pro-shareholder expla-
nation attractive;235 others are suspicious. 23 6 If the hypothesis is right,
the Court was co-opted into the charade of the second-generation
antitakeover statutes.237 Although the rhetoric of shareholder control
234. See CTS Brief, supra note 8, at 9-12 (Summary of Arguments). Powell, however, did not
pick up on CTS's explicit federalism theme.
235. Booth, State Takeover Statutes Revisited, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 120 (1989); Booth, Tender
Offer Law, supra note 106, at 762 (arguing that CTS's collectivization analysis counterbalances the
Williams Act regime's preference for bidders, which can acquire control without paying each share-
holder the price the shareholder would demand if there were no pressure to sell); Davis, supra note
52, at 505; Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute, supra note 2, at 944 (concluding that the "CTS
opinion can be read without strain as consistent with ... whether the statute is intended to serve, and
does, arguably, in fact serve the interests of the shareholders"); Oesterle, The Rise and Fall, supra
note 95, at 236 (concluding that the CTS Court was "clearly impressed" by the Indiana statute's
protection of shareholder autonomy); Pinto, Takeover Laws After CTS, supra note 162, at 750 n.223
(1988); Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Corporate Law, 41 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 473 (1987) [hereinafter Pinto, Takeover Statutes].
236. See, eg., Langevoort, supra note 2, at 111 (concluding Court's acceptance of the "dubious
legislative purpose of promoting shareholder autonomy" is "thoroughly unconvincing").
237. A close relative of the Pro-shareholder Hypothesis is the Confusion Hypothesis-that the
Court was confused by the real stakes of state antitakeover legislation and failed to understand its
effect on hostile bids. The hypothesis, at least in this simple form, can be easily discarded. Undoubt-
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rights must be treated as an element of the CTS antitakeover
blueprint,238 it was not the inspiration.
The Pro-shareholder !Iypothesis falters at a number of levels. An-
titakeover statutes, passed at the behest of local management in response
to takeover fears, reveal decidedly non-shareholder motives. Nothing in-
dicates that the Indiana legislative process represented shareholder inter-
ests or that the legislature worried about them. Research on the political
economy of other states' antitakeover statutes confirms this assumption.
Shareholder groups have never supported state antitakeover statutes and,
when given a chance, have been vehemently critical.2 39 Powell acknowl-
edges that generic corporate codes' authorization of shark repellants,
such as staggered boards and cumulative voting,2" shifts the governance
advantage toward management; antitakeover statutes merely continue
the trend.
The actual workings of the Indiana control-share statute also suggest
shareholders were not the intended beneficiaries. The statute, like most
antitakeover statutes, is both underinclusive and overbroad. Its optional
character, requiring management to opt into the statutory regime and,
once in, allowing management to opt out in a management-approved bid,
leaves shareholders unprotected in a number of situations. For example,
the statute offers no protection if managers opportunistically decide to
sell to a bidder who offers them a side deal. Only when management
edly, Powell understood the Indiana statute's reach and purposes. The antitakeover issue was not
new to the Court; Powell's MITE opinion had grappled directly with Illinois's purpose; White's
cogent CTS dissent properly framed the issue as state interference in a national control market; the
subtle but indisputable abandonment of MITE evidenced significant sophistication; the blueprint for
constitutionally-sufficient antitakeover legislation could not be more clear.
A more respectable version of the Confusion Hypothesis, however, can be advanced. It posits that
the Court neither understood the true nature of the chartering market nor that the internal affairs
doctrine is not so much a choice of law rule, but governmental deference to private ordering. See
infra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
238. Post-CTS antitakeover statutes have slavishly adhered to the rhetoric. For example, Dela-
ware's official synopsis of its antitakeover statute refers to striking "a balance between the benefits of
an unfettered market for corporate shares and the well documented and judicially recognized need to
limit abusive takeover tactics." 66 DEL. LAWS § 204 (1988). The official name of North Carolina's
fair-price statute is "The North Carolina Shareholder Protection Act." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-75
(Supp. 1988).
239. The Securities Industry Association (representing a variety of securities firms) and T.
Boone Pickens's United Shareholders Association submitted briefs in CTS arguing against the stat-
ute. See also Coffee, Corporate Federalism, supra note 51, at 770 (describing Wall Street's opposi-
ton in New York); Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute, supra note 2, at 892 & n.63 (describing
opposition by shareholder groups in Delaware).
240. 481 U.S. at 85-86.
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chooses the statutory regime must the shareholders enfranchise a bidder.
Even if one views collectivization as a problem limited to hostile bids, the
purpose was inartfully expressed. The statute broadly regulates bids
whether for all shares or only some, failing to distinguish between the
more coercive partial or two-tier bid and the less coercive any-and-all
bid.241  By the time the Court decided CTS, partial and front-end bids-
the subject of the literature cited by the Court-were becoming a thing of
the past.2 42
But Indiana may still have done an effective, though sloppy, job for
shareholders. Some have argued that control share statutes actually en-
courage bids by giving bidders a mechanism to appeal directly to share-
holders,243 although this tactic has not been used. Moreover, even if
antitakeover statutes discourage bidders, shareholders on balance may
241. The Indiana control share statute, for example, would disenfranchise a bidder who acquired
control shares from a dominant shareholder in a negotiated sale.
242. See Impact of Corporate Takeover" Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 380 (1985) (study by
Office of the Chief Economist of the SEC) (reporting that "incidence of two-tier offers has fallen to
nine percent of the total in 1984"); id. (statement of SEC Chairman Shad) (commenting that "of the
65 tender offers commenced during the first five months of fiscal year 1985, only one was a two-tier
offer"); Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point, supra note 34 (decrying the CTS antitakeover regime
because its justification-structurally coercive bids-is a practice that has become a rarity). This
decline seems to have resulted from firm-specific defenses, such as poison pills, and the easy availa-
bility of takeover funds from bank syndicates and the junk bond market, which made partial or
front-end-loaded bids tactically dangerous and unnecessary. Although Professor Booth has argued
that the decline in structurally coercive bids can be attributed to state antitakeover statutes, Booth,
State Takeover Statutes Revisited, supra note 235, this explanation is unconvincing. The decline had
begun long before CTS was decided in mid-1987; before CTS, lower courts had uniformly invali-
dated second-generation statutes.
243. A number of commentators argued that control share statutes may, in fact, facilitate hostile
bids. See R. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQUISITIONs 308-12 (Supp. 1988)
(arguing that control share statutes "actually may work in favor of the acquirer"); Goldman, Dela-
ware Anti-Takeover Legislation Is Needed, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 31, 34 (describing the Council
of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association's concern that an Indiana-
type statute would "turn every offer into a plebiscite that by its nature would favor the bidder, and
could actually promote takeovers"); Lipton, supra note 41, at 30 (arguing that control share statutes,
far from discouraging bust-up mergers, may be counterproductive since they allow a bidder to buy a
20% block and then demand a shareholder vote, conditioned on a tender offer or other control
transaction).
Moreover, because the record date for the enfranchising vote will likely be set to fall before the
bidder's tender offer closes, the enfranchising vote will include the shareholders most likely to favor
the bid. See 481 U.S. at 74 n.2 (assuming that the board will be duty-bound to set the record date so
that it falls before the Williams Act first permits purchases of shares). Cf. Booth, Tender Offer Law,
supra note 106, at 771 (assuming that because the bidder will hold the shares most likely to have
been voted for enfranchisement and the Indiana statute sterilizes the bidder's shares, voting at the
meeting will be by non-tendering shareholders, the ones least likely to favor enfranchisement),
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benefit. 2" The statutes tread a fine line. While they drive away some
bids, they increase the price when bids are made. A bidder must offer a
higher price to gain approval for its bid in order to satisfy the statute's
pricing formula or to receive enough tenders to avoid the statute. On
balance, fewer but higher-priced bids may represent a positive gain for
shareholders. Event studies on how the statutes affect stock prices, how-
ever, produce a negative picture of the Indiana statute specifically and
other second-generation statutes in general.245
The Court's territorial analysis and its refusal to weigh shareholders'
transfer/control rights in the commerce clause balance confirm that
shareholder protection did not inspire the CTS blueprint. By effectively
closing any opening for statutes that are not incorporation-based, CTS
prevents a state from regulating bids directed at resident shareholders of
foreign corporations. Although Powell vaguely suggests that a state's
takeover regulation must also be shareholder-based, not just incorpora-
tion-based, 246 it is unlikely both are necessary. For if CTS means that
244. Professor Romano, for example, has speculated that antitakeover statutes and shark repel-
lants may benefit shareholders because they raise bid prices and the proportion of shares acquired.
Romano, Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 501; Romano, State Competition Debate,
supra note 60, at 737-39. Empirical evidence supports this. According to one study, Jarrell & Brad-
ley, supra note 159, Table 1, antitakeover legislation has produced higher premiums and a greater
percentage of shares acquired:
Period TO premium % shares
Pre-Williams Act 32% 42%
Williams Act 53% 61%
Widespread state antitakeover statutes 73% 72%
245. See Ryngaert & Netter, Shareholder Wealth Effects of Ohio Antitakeover Law, 4 J.L. Eco.
& ORGANIZ. 373 (1988) (finding 2% drop in stock prices among firms subject to takeovers following
the passage in Ohio of an antitakeover package that included a non-shareholder constituent statute,
one validating poison pills and another allowing limitations on director liability); Schumann, State
Regulation of Takeovers and Shareholder Wealth: The Effects of New York's 1985 Takeover Statutes,
Bureau of Economics Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission (1987) (finding overall 4.4%
drop in the price of New York firms during enactment of New York's moratorium statute); Wood-
ward, How Much Indiana's Anti-Takeover Law Cost Shareholders, Wall St. J., May 5, 1988, at 32,
col. 3 (finding 6% drop in share value related to Indiana statute).
The effect on shareholders of antitakeover statutes, however, is often difficult to measure. The
events surrounding the legislative process were sometimes ambiguous or slow, making it difficult to
identify when the market incorporated the antitakeover information. For example, Professor Ro-
mano could not find any significant price changes after the adoption of second-generation antitake-
over statutes in Connecticut, Missouri or Pennsylvania. Romano, Political Economy, supra note 37,
at 184-85.
246. Powell, in justifying the Indiana statute under the Court's one-sided balancing analysis,
stated: "Moreover, unlike the Illinois statute invalidated in MITE, the Indiana Act applies only to
corporations that have a substantial number of shareholders in Indiana." 481 U.S. at 93. Professor
Oesterle places great weight in the word "moreover," suggesting it may indicate that antitakeover
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shareholder contacts are a necessary condition to state antitakeover
power, the decision creates a huge shareholder-protection gap.247 Most
Fortune 500 firms are incorporated in shareholder-poor Delaware.
If, as seems a better reading of CTS, incorporation-based jurisdiction
is both necessary and sufficient, the political economy of the second-gen-
eration antitakeover statutes and the chartering market raise doubts that
shareholder interests are necessarily represented. In the end, CTS's rhet-
oric of shareholder protection masked other purposes.
B. Pro-stakeholder Hypothesis
Takeovers are destabilizing. They are pointed symbols of an economy
in the throes of wrenching adjustment. Those with stakes in the corpora-
tion's business-employees, labor unions, suppliers, communities-are
inevitably affected. Their interests have a silent presence in state an-
titakeover legislation and are an explicit part of the political rhetoric sur-
rounding takeovers.24
This motivation was not lost on Powell in MITE and could not have
been lost on the CTS Court. A plausible explanation for the CTS turn-
around was to assure political representation for stakeholder constitu-
ents, who had been disregarded in White's plurality opinion in MITE. It
has been said that CTS reflects a pervasive disenchantment with the ef-
fects of an unconstrained control market. 249  A surprising number of
commentators have understood and justified CTS on the basis of its os-
tensible pro-stakeholder purpose.25°
Much supports this view. Justices Brennan and Marshall, who had
statutes must be jurisdictionally grounded in shareholder contacts. Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover
Statute, supra note 2, at 934.
247. Langevoort, A Comment on CMS, supra note 2, at 107.
248. See Coffee, Strain in the Web, supra note 34, at 68-70; Langevoort, A Comment on CTS,
supra note 2, at 116-17; Macey, State Legislation, supra note 3, at 475; Romano, Future of Hostile
Takeovers, supra note 51, at 462 & n.12.
249. See, eg., Coffee, Strain in the Web, supra note 34, at 100 (arguing before CTS was decided
that "it is doctrinally indefensible to trim the federal statute by deferring to state law and then
emasculate the state's power in deference to the federal government's control over interstate com-
merce"); Langevoort, A Comment on CTS, supra note 2, at 102-05 (concluding Court had an "intel-
lectual ambivalence" about unregulated bids).
250. Coffee, Uncertain Case, supra note 118, at 460-65; Davis, supra note 52, at 517; Garfield,
supra note 116, at 565, 569 (concluding that Indiana's statute, like other antitakeover statutes, was
based on protectionist motives, and that such legislation "is not a product of the market for corpo-
rate charters"); Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 82, at 1887; Millon,
supra note 4, at 925 (concluding "recent state takeover legislation represents a first step toward
reshaping corporation law [to] protect various interests of nonshareholders").
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dissented in MITE on mootness grounds, joined the CTS majority.251
Justice Scalia's famous CTS concurrence-"a law can be both economic
folly and constitutional"-carries with it a strong sense of Indiana's pro-
stakeholder purpose.2 5 2 A popular perception persists that a lack of
takeover regulation most affects non-shareholder constituents. The rhet-
oric of shareholder autonomy provided Indiana, with the help of the
CTS Court, a useful ruse for protecting these constituents indirectly.2 5 3
Powell's failure to address this fundamentally protectionist purpose is
understandable. Although (as discussed before) protectionism should
not necessarily be invalidating, the Court's sleight of hand avoids the
quagmire.
The Pro-stakeholder Hypothesis, however, suffers from a number of
fallacies. Most significant, it conflicts with the Court's territorial analy-
sis. If protecting stakeholders from takeovers were a significant compo-
nent of the Court's silent agenda, it is remarkable that the Court would
have so clearly limited the extraterritorial reach of antitakeover statutes
and thus the power of stakeholder-interested states. CTS leaves most
vulnerable extraterritorial state antitakeover statutes, arguably the most
solicitous of stakeholder interests.2 54
Further, little indicates that the structure of antitakeover statutes pro-
tects stakeholders, although it may occasionally be one of the side-effects.
The statutes provide broad opt-out possibilities for management-ap-
proved takeovers and recapitalizations, whose stakeholder effects have
been as devastating as hostile bids.255 Little suggests that managers,
when given antitakeover prerogatives, watch out for stakeholders, whose
disciplining and oversight compulsion of management behavior is even
less than that of shareholders.
251. In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975), Brennan and Marshall dissented
from the Court's construction of the Williams Act to require a showing of irreparable harm before a
bidder who had violated the Act's disclosure requirements could be enjoined from pursuing his bid.
252. 481 U.S. at 96-97 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that entrenching management or pro-
moting industrial stagnation can be sufficient state purposes).
253. Langevoort, supra note 2, at 107.
254. Davis, supra note 52, at 521 (arguing that allowing only the state of incorporation to regu-
late takeovers "is clearly at odds with the objective of state protection of local stakeholders").
255. Empirical studies confirm that employment effects are as much related to changing eco-
nomic conditions as they are to takeovers. See supra note 81 (summary of empirical evidence on
employee effects). In fact, evidence suggests that hostile takeovers are less responsible for economic
dislocations than management takeovers structured as leveraged buyouts or recapitalizations. Id.
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C. Pro-management Hypothesis
Hostile takeovers threaten incumbent management. Antitakeover
statutes chill hostile bids, thus insulating managers from the market for
corporate control. Managers' jobs are perpetuated; their performance is
shielded from the disciplining effects of a robust control market.
A Pro-management Hypothesis-one that posits that CTS empowers
managers to insulate themselves from control markets-finds little direct
support in the CTS opinion. Nonetheless, the statute's pro-management
effect was the principal defect identified by Posner in his Seventh Circuit
opinion"' and by appellee Dynamics. Some commentators have seen it
as CTS's principal effect.2" 7 Studies of the political economy of antitake-
over statutes, 258 as well as the opt-in and opt-out nature of the statutes
themselves, strongly support the hypothesis.
Managers, particularly of firms with significant employment and other
business ties to the state, represent a cohesive, well-funded interest group
that wields significant political clout.259 To attract and maintain local
incorporation and to foster a favorable climate for business, a state legis-
lature must offer firm-specific accessibility and responsiveness. In fact,
this promise of fealty may be a principal reason for maintaining a non-
Delaware incorporation. 2 ' The history of second-generation antitake-
over statutes confirms that state legislatures outside of Delaware have
been prepared to make good on this promise.
Even though a pro-management lean is ingrained in the Court's corpo-
256. 794 F.2d at 264.
257. Butler, supra note 3, at 373 (arguing that anti-takeover statutes are not evidence of a mar-
ket for corporate charters but "the triumph of [the managers of] a particular corporation in a state's
interest-group battles"); Macey, State Legislation, supra note 3, at 470-71 (stating takeover laws "are
nothing more than extremely costly devices for providing job protection for inefficient top level
managers of poorly run firms").
258. See supra note 116 (discussion of political economy of second-generation statutes). In
CTS, the Indiana Chamber of Commerce, "the largest association of businesses in Indiana, having
more than 1,500 business firms as members" filed an amicus brief supporting the statute. Ind.
Chamber of Comm. Brief, supra note 68, at 2.
259. See, e.g., Cahill, Foreign Investors, Local Politics, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1990, § 3, at 13, col.
2 (minaging.director and chief executive of BTR P.L.C., a British conglomerate) (describing Massa-
chusetts legislature's swift and hostile reaction to BTR's tender offer for Norton, a Massachusetts
firm; "state governments are clearly setting a precedent to become the unquestioning defenders of
local management").
260. See Romano, Law as Product, supra note 28, at 265 (finding that the firms that did not
reincorporate in Delaware tended to be older firms, presumably with long-time and valuable ties to
the state's political community).
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rate jurisprudence,"' a number of defects exists in this version of the
Pro-management Hypothesis-which posits that CTS operates as a carte
blanche for blatant management entrenchment. For example, the align-
ment of the Court is equivocal: Justices Marshall and Brennan joined
the majority;26 2 Justice White wrote the dissent.263
In addition, CTS leaves intact important constraints on management's
use of the state legislative process to withdraw from the control market.
The CTS preemption analysis, although weaker than MITE's, makes
clear that antitakeover statutes cannot interfere with the bidding process
and sets a vague floor on interference with shareholders' transfer/control
rights. The CTS territorial analysis effectively removes the legislative op-
tion for firms incorporated in takeover-neutral Delaware.
A weaker, subtler version of the Pro-management Hypothesis, how-
ever, proves far more convincing. By reaffirming state preeminence in
corporate law, the Court validates an incorporation-based system of pri-
vate ordering. 26 Because managers control the incorporation and
261. See, eg., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (denying shareholders standing
under § 10(b) to challenge "internal corporate mismanagement"); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1 (1977) (denying standing under § 14(e) of the Williams Act to an unsuccessful bidder
claiming that management had deceived investors during the takeover fight); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (interpreting § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act as requiring
scienter" to impose liability on corporate managers who fail to uncover corporate fraud).
In the first amendment context, the Court has viewed the corporate entity from a management
perspective. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of California, 475 U.S. 1 (1986)
(plurality) (declaring unconstitutional state regulation requiring utility to include messages by con-
sumer group); Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530 (1980)
(declaring unconstitutional state law banning management-written inserts in monthly utility bills,
despite ratepayers' protests); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (holding
that state cannot, consistent with the first amendment, forbid corporate management from expres-
sing its views on a state referendum, even though the referendum does not materially affect the
corporation's business).
262. Brennan and Marshall have advocated the view that the federal securities laws impose sig-
nificant managerial constraints. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 674-75 (1983) (Blackmun, Brennan
and Marshall, J.J., dissenting) (deploring effect of "personal gain" rule to excuse a knowing and
intentional violation of an insider's duty to shareholders); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,
469-70, 480 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (agreeing with appeals court ruling that a breach of,
management fiduciary duties constitutes a fraud on minority shareholders); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 217 (1976) (Blackmun and Brennan, J.J., dissenting) (questioning Court's
technical and restrictive "scienter" requirement).
263. White joined the majority, and even wrote the Court's opinion, in decisions that insulated
management from federal review. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462 (1977) (White, J.); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
264. This version of the Pro-management Hypothesis can also be seen as a modification of the
Pro-shareholder Hypothesis, if one accepts the law-and-economics argument that rules apparently
favoring management will predictably be in the best interest of shareholders. See Baysinger & But-
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reincorporation of their firms, as well as the coverage of antitakeover
statutes, a federalism regime that encourages state activism essentially
defers to management ordering.265 If so, this invites a more searching
inquiry into the Pro-state Hypothesis.
D. Pro-state Hypothesis
The hypothesis that CTS sought to strengthen states' corporate regula-
tory hands can be seen as deriving from two sources. First, the Court
sympathized with the plight of states in deterring takeovers that cause
local dislocations-a recasting of the protectionist Pro-stakeholder Hy-
pothesis. Second, the Court refused to stray into uncharted federalism
water and to place state corporate law in doubt. The opinion addresses
the latter explicitly, the former implicitly.
As we have seen, a protectionist justification would have run into a
doctrinal thicket. Although the Court might have avoided it on some
theory of nondiscriminatory protectionism or a market-participant anal-
ysis, the Court would have been forced to sanction state intervention in
interstate markets to protect local interests.266 Further, this version of
the Pro-state Hypothesis, like the Pro-stakeholder Hypothesis, falters
when one considers the Court's territorial analysis.
A more convincing explanation is the one presented to and chosen by
the Court: the tradition of corporate federalism.267 References to the
traditional power of states to regulate corporate internal affairs marble
ler, Role of Corporate Law, supra note 47; Fischel, The Race Revisited, supra note 47; Posner, supra
note 47, at 389-92; Winter, Government and the Corporation, supra note 47, at 28.42.
265. CTS argued in its brief:
There is no substantive difference between the [Indiana statute] (which corporations may
elect not to follow) and an otherwise identical statute that would authorize a corporation to
adopt the [statute's] definition of voting rights as a charter provision.
Crs Reply Brief, supra note 115, at 29-30. See also Ind. Chamber of Commerce Brief, supra note
68, at 4 (arguing that the Indiana statute "is in the nature of a shareholder rights charter provision").
See also supra note 115 (both parties made this argument).
266. Powell posed this possibility in his MITE concurrence. 457 U.S. at 646.47 & n.*; see supra
note 174. Professors Johnson and Millon accept that states, consistent with the Williams Act, may
prefer stakeholders at the expense of shareholders on the theory that "state law is the source of law
defining stock rights ... [including] the conditions under which, and the degree to which, share-
holders will participate in the takeover decisionmaking." Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Wil-
liamsAct, supra note 82, at 1886. But this analysis, if correct, is conclusive. If corporate rights were
entirely a matter of state law, the Court's preemption inquiry into effects on shareholder trans-
fer/control rights would be beside the point. As I have already argued, the Court seems to retain
some supervisory role, at least under the Williams Act. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying
text.
267. See supra note 8 (CTS's federalism argument).
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the opinion. 268 While MITE suggested that out-of-state share transfers
could not be a chartering state's concern, CTS corrects this federalism
lapse and deftly sweeps the full shareholder-manager relationship back
under the state rug. Some commentators have understood CTS in this
light.269
The tradition can be justified on a number of levels, to many of which
the Court alludes. State antitakeover statutes are legislative, thus more
legitimate than federal judicial solutions. Placing corporate regulation
with the states avoids casting on the federal judiciary the task of resolv-
ing the economic and policy debate of corporate responsibility, particu-
larly in the takeover context. In CTS, for example, the evidentiary
record was virtually nonexistent,270 and Judge Posner's Seventh Circuit
opinion was built largely on his own empirical views of takeovers, ap-
plied to Dynamics's bid for CTS.
A Pro-state Hypothesis also is consistent with the view that takeover
regulation was needed from some quarter. From appearances, states had
been performing the function, their legislatures and courts adapting
quickly to changes in the dynamic takeover market. With no promise of
federal action, CTS defaulted to the states.
In the end, however, the Pro-state Hypothesis is unsatisfying because
corporate law is and can be only weakly regulatory. The CTS territorial
analysis would have barred Indiana from regulating Dynamics' takeover
of CTS had the business been incorporated in another state. CTS effec-
tively limits Indiana's interests to those chosen by the consumer of its
chartering service-corporate managers.
E. Anti-federal Hypothesis
To say that CTS reflected a preference for state-based private ordering
268. 481 U.S. at 86 (noting in preemption analysis "[t]he longstanding prevalence of state regula-
tion in this area"); id. at 89 (noting in analysis on inconsistency that "[n]o principle of corporation
law and practice is more firmly established than a State's authority to regulate domestic corpora-
tions"); id. at 91 (noting in balancing analysis "State's role as overseer of corporate governance").
Scalia went further, describing a state's authority over the structure of domestic corporations as
"sacrosanct." Id. at 96.
269. See Langevoort, A Comment on CTS, supra note 2, at 106 (stating the "Court [is] commit-
ted to maintaining a separation between the federal and state spheres of influence in matters of
corporate law"); Pinto, Takeover Laws After CTS, supra note 162, at 778-79.
270. There had been a one-day evidentiary hearing before the trial court, see 794 F.2d at 251,
but apparently no evidentiary record on the motives or effects of the Indiana statute. CTS Brief,
supra note 8, at 27 n.13.
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does not fully describe the Court's federalism gambit.271 The decision
also repudiates, and thwarts the inevitability of, a concurrent federal
role-effectively stanching the federalization of corporate law.272
That CTS sought to avoid corporate federalization finds some support
in the makeup of the Court majority, which included Justices Rehnquist,
O'Connor, and Scalia.273 But this is hardly conclusive: Justices Brennan
and Marshall also joined the majority. Nevertheless, the way CTS fore-
stalls each of the different ways in which corporate federalization might
occur is revealing.
L Williams Act preemption
The CTS antitakeover blueprint shuns significant judicial federaliza-
tion using the Williams Act and creates a highly tolerant environment
for antitakeover statutes.274 Federal courts need only ask whether the
statute avoids interfering with the bidding process and leaves intact some
federally-protected shareholder transfer/control rights. The judicial pre-
emptive role is not terribly intrusive. Only a state statute undercutting
the assumption implicit in the Exchange Act or Williams Act of a state-
based proxy or tender offer mechanism calls for judicial intervention. 75
In effect, only a statute (or pattern of statutes) raising a significant risk of
federal legislative intervention triggers the judicial gatekeeping function.
This is a far cry from MITE, which had opened a gaping federalism hole
with the possibility that firm-specific defenses authorized by state statute
could be subject to preemption review.
271. Although an Anti-federal Hypothesis would seem the necessary flip side to the Pro-state
Hypothesis, a Pro-regulation Hypothesis could accommodate them both. But the two are necessar-
ily antithetical if one understands the Pro-state Hypothesis as essentially one deferring to private
ordering. In that light, the real regulation implicated by federal intervention could not operate con-
currently with a private-choice corporate federalism.
272. Professor Langevoort was the first to recognize that CTS carried forward the Court's tradi-
tion of corporate federalism. Langevoort, A Comment on CTS, supra note 2, at 110 (noting the
"Court's well-established belief that corporate law is the business of the various states, not (without a
clear indication from Congress) of the federal government").
273. O'Connor, along with Powell, represented the swing in the Court, originally joining the
majority in MITE and then reversing course to steer away in CTS.
274. See Langevoort, A Comment on CTS, supra note 2, at 110.
275. At least one lower court has seen Williams Act preemption as a question of preserving base-
level control rights. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1002
(E.D. Wis.) (stating preemption test as whether antitakeover statute "foreclos[es] a proxy contest
opportunity"), aff'd, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989).
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2. Protection of transfer/control rights
Under the CTS blueprint, the judiciary assumes a formal and simple
commerce clause role. After CTS, lower courts need only ask whether
an antitakeover statute is facially discriminatory or extraterritorial. CTS
squelches MITE and avoids the uncharted waters of judicially federal-
ized shareholder rights. Had CTS not embraced the "creature of law"
metaphor and the internal affairs doctrine, federal courts would have
been forced to arrive at some constitutionally-based notion of the proper
shareholder-manager relationship-well beyond the Exchange Act and
the Williams Act assumptions about shareholder control rights. Because
firm-specific defenses authorized by state law are in many respects func-
tionally identical to statutory antitakeover regimes, the breadth of the
federal judicial task could have become almost limitless.
By doing precisely the opposite-constitutionalizing the chartering
state's power over corporate governance, at least for publicly-held firms
with multistate activities-the Court avoided a host of problems. Fed-
eral judges are saved from the elusive and enormous job of discerning
such matters as: the sufficiency or dominance of state contacts under an
interest-based choice of law regime; the precise nature of state rules of
corporate governance;276 the motives and political economy of state cor-
poration and antitakeover statutes; the participatory or regulatory nature
of these statutes; the impact of particular governance rules on the control
market; the efficiency of takeovers; and the sources for takeover
premiums.
Powell's opinion illustrates how unprepared the federal judiciary is for
the task. On the question of the merits and demerits of tender offers,
Powell stated that "in many situations the offer to shareholders is simply
a cash price substantially higher than the market price prior to the of-
fer.",277 Powell does not hint at why this cash is available, nor how it
relates to providing "more effective management or ... needed diversifi-
cation. 2 78 Judge Posner's decision in the Seventh Circuit was no better.
276. The problem came up both in MITE and CTS. On the question whether the Illinois ad-
ministrative hearing interfered with the bidding process, the Seventh Circuit was forced to delve into
whether state law allowed review of a tender offer's substantive fairness. 457 U.S. at 639 n.15. On
the question whether the Indiana statute called for a record date before or after the 20-day open
period, the Supreme Court assumed that state fiduciary law would compel the target's board to set a
record date before the tendering deadline. 481 U.S. at 74 n.2.
277. 481 U.S. at 92 n.13.
278. Id.
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3. Explicit federal preemption
CTS also minimizes the possibility of explicit federal legislative or ad-
ministrative preemption. The Court's abandonment of MITE preemp-
tion not only expands the reach of state law, but reduces the level-
playing-field philosophy of the Williams Act to an interpretative tool, not
a source of federal power. CTS thus narrows the SEC's preemptive and
rulemaking powers to instances of state interference with the bidding
process. The SEC has apparently construed CTS in this way, seeking
broader preemptive power from Congress.279
Further, the Court's elevation of the internal affairs doctrine to consti-
tutional status avoids the need for explicit federal preemption, adminis-
trative or legislative. Under an incorporation-based regime, multiple
state standards of behavior are impossible. Additional costs in the con-
trol market may arise because of the presence of antitakeover statutes,
but not because of any confusion caused by an antitakeover patchwork.
Preemption would only become an issue if states seemed to be going too
far.
4. Federal occupation of the field
The CTS illusion of takeover regulation on behalf of shareholders and
even stakeholders deflates the pressure for comprehensive federal occu-
pation of the field, whether in the form of comprehensive takeover legis-
lation or even a federal corporate code.280 Although Congress
constitutionally can occupy and preempt as much as it has the political
will to do, CTS deftly puts off this inevitable regulatory moment.
F. Summary: The Nature of CTS Corporate Federalism
CTS defines a corporate federalism of incorporation-based private or-
dering. It is the reverse of federalism prevalent in other areas in which
the residue occupied neither by Congress nor by the negative commerce
279. In hearings before Congress, SEC Chairman Ruder suggested that the SEC should be given
preemptive power, indicating doubts about the agency's current power to intrude into matters of
corporate governance. Tender Reform (Part 2): Hearings on H.R. 2172 Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., Ist
Sess. 136 (1987) (statement of David S. Ruder, Chairman of the SEC) [hereinafter Hearings:
Tender Reform (Part 2)].
280. CTS raised the specter of comprehensive federal corporate law: "Federal law could estab.
lish a 'comprehensive balance of power' in tender offers only by Federalizing all aspects of corpora-
tion law .... " Moreover, "State law has always provided the comprehensive regulation." CTS
Brief, supra note 8, at 30.
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clause defines states' regulatory powers over commerce.2 " l Under CTS,
the residue not occupied by private parties facilitated by state law defines
federal power over corporate governance. In this presumptively sacro-
sanct private realm, making the case for federal intervention faces a stiff
burden. Contrary to others' reading of CTS, the case's meaning is not to
prefer a corporate constituency or even a particular federalism actor, but
rather to ensure a process.282
CTS's concern for a process of private ordering and not regulation is
found in the critical role played by the internal affairs doctrine. Dormant
commerce clause review is avoided if state power extends only to the
state's "own" corporations. The ironic effect is that a state, whether or
not the chartering state, has no true regulatory power to interfere with
the control market; at most, chartering states have facilitative power.283
A chartering state that sought to regulate the market, at the expense of
managers and shareholders, could well experience charter flight. In ef-
fect, CTS chose to see the problem as one of state interference, as to
which market and political responses could correct excesses, rather than
exploitation, which only judicial intervention could correct.2 84
States' facilitative powers are nonetheless limited by a vague Williams
Act preemption analysis, which mandates that antitakeover statutes steer
clear of interfering with the actual bidding process and leave intact some
base level of transfer/control rights. Although the preservation of such
rights may be a contorted reading of Congress' intent when it enacted the
Exchange Act and the Williams Act, and perhaps an endeavor pursued
more cleanly under the commerce clause, this minimal federalization at
281. Three federalism models have been suggested. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 169, at
n.5q-100.
282. This differs from the traditional conception of "process" in dormant commerce clause doc-
tnne, which commentators have conceived of as one in which political forces may check states'
regulatory excesses. See Eule, supra note 169, at 438-43; Levmore, supra note 169, at 567 (distin-
guishing "process" review to assure political representation when a state interferes with national
markets and judicial "value" review to implement substantive economic policy when a state exploits
a monopoly position at the expense of national markets). The CTS process involves the interaction
of private markets, a horizontal state chartering market, and the vertical federal-state relationship as
it concerns corporate governance.
283. Cf. Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 82, at 1886, 1923 (assuming
CTS leaves to states the regulatory role to "step into the breach" and make "the crucial policy
judgments about the appropriateness and frequency of takeovers"). With a constitutionalized inter-
nal affairs doctrine, it is hard to see how states can do this unless managers agree.
284. See Levmore, supra note 169, at 619-26 (characterizing MITE as a case of exploitation on
the assumption no political forces would correct a state's adoption of a burdensome antitakeover
statute).
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least roots the Court in congressional assumptions. 28 5 Federalism ac-
commodations are sometimes inelegant.
Beyond this, shareholders' transfer/control rights find virtually no
constitutional protection. To the extent the Court retained a federalism
gatekeeping function, the reason seems not to have been to prevent man-
ager opportunism or to protect stakeholders, but rather to deflate pres-
sure for a greater federal role. To have granted the states meaningful
power to protect shareholders or stakeholders would have required sanc-
tioning some fluid choice of law rule, inviting a patchwork of state regu-
lation and inevitably a comprehensive federal response. Noticeably
lacking from CTS federalism of incorporation-based private ordering is
any supervisory responsibility in the courts over the process, in particular
the state legislative process. CTS blindly shunts aside the question of
protectionism and the likely reaction the decision set into motion.
Whether CTS actually forestalls the political necessity for a compre-
hensive federal response to the takeover phenomenon is another ques-
tion, which I address next, first by considering post-CTS corporate
federalism and then its merits.
IV. How THE CTS GAMBIT HAS PLAYED OUT
A. CTS Corporate Federalism in Practice
The reaction to CTS confirms its federalism ploy; the corporate regu-
lators have played their hands much as a federalism explanation of the
case would predict. Except to host a preemption debate, Congress has
not reacted; the SEC has been cautious, reluctantly filling the one-share,
one-vote vacuum left by Congress and the states; federal courts have ad-
hered closely to the CTS antitakeover blueprint, invalidating only extra-
territorial statutes; state legislatures have continued to enact antitakeover
laws, some pressing CTS's outer limits; and state courts have filled in the
legislative gaps.
L A stalemated Congress
CTS withdraws the invitation made in MITE for Congress to inter-
vene to regulate takeovers. CTS leaves little confusion about the reach of
state antitakeover statutes or who ostensibly has regulatory power.
285. See id. at 569 (arguing that judicial review is appropriate when the myriad complexity of an
area warrants case-by-case review; congressional inaction can be seen as deferral to the courts).
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A spate of congressional bills and hearings followed CTS.286 The bills,
many repackaging proposals pre-dating the decision, spanned the spec-
trum: requiring that takeovers be accomplished only by tender offer;287
extending the open period for tender offers to forty-five business or sixty
calendar days;288 prohibiting bidders from making purchases during a
cooling-off period after a tender offer terminates; 289 banning poison pill
defenses;290 preempting state laws that allow reductions of existing com-
mon shares' per-share voting rights;29 1 and declaring congressional ap-
proval of the internal affairs doctrine.292
The prevalent sentiment among members of Congress was that CTS
had properly left corporate governance matters with the states: corpo-
rate federalism is a powerful mindset.2 93 Senator Proxmire, for example,
commented soon after CTS: "The States are .. . looking to us [to
act].... I think we should leave as much as we can to the States." '29 4
Management groups, such as the Business Roundtable and the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers, supported the proposals to further
regulate tender offers, but vehemently opposed any preemption of state
corporate governance rules.295 Bidders and shareholder groups were also
286. See, eg., Supreme Court Decision on Indiana Law Remains Prime Topic at Takeover Hear-
ings, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1011 (July 10, 1987).
287. See, e.g., S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1987), reprinted in 133 CONG. REc. S7594-95
(daily ed. June 4, 1987) (requiring that any acquisition of more than 15% be by tender offer); see also
Oesterle, The Rise and Fall, supra note 95, at 245 & n.202.
288. See, eg., S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (45 business days); H.R. 2172, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987) (60 calendar days).
289. See, eg., S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(3)(D) (1987), reprinted in Regulating Hostile
Corporate Takeovers: Hearings on S. 227, S. 678, S. 1264, S. 1323, and S. 1324, Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, and Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong, Ist Sess. 58-59 (1987) (prohibit-
ing purchases for 30 days after tender offer expires) [hereinafter Hearings: Regulating Corporate
Takeovers]. See also Oesterle, The Rise and Fall, supra note 95, at 245 n.203.
290. See, e.g., S. 678, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
291. See, eg., H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
292. See, eg, S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 1324, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987).
293. See, e.g., Hearings: Regulating Corporate Takeovers, supra note 289, at 321 (comments of
Sen. Proxmire) (expressing the view that "we should leave as much as we can to the States"); id. at
329 (comments of Sen. Wirth) (stating that regulating bidders has "been a purview of the States
before").
294. Hearings: Regulating Corporate Takeovers, supra note 289, at 80, 321 (comments by Sen.
Proxmire during hearings). Cf. Proxmire, The M&A "Game" Is Not a Productive Enterprise, Nat'l
L, J., Nov. 9, 1987, at 21-22, col. 1 (arguing that to "service debts, especially [from] hostile take-
overs, companies must retrench research and development as well as terminate otherwise productive
workers").
295. See, eg., Hearings: Regulating Corporate Takeovers, supra note 289, at 328 (statement of
H. Brewster Atwater, Chair of the Business Roundtable's Task Force on Corporate Responsibility)
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represented, decrying management-led state interference in the control
market and the "failure of states to enact effective laws."' 296 The securi-
ties industry also participated, favoring federal preemption for national
firms.297 State government, including the National Conference of State
Legislatures, argued that antitakeover statutes responded to local condi-
tions and the interests of individual shareholders, employees, and com-
munities.2 98 No representatives of labor or local state government
participated in the hearings.
With only three exceptions, none of the post-CTS takeover bills left
(stating support for closing 10-day window, lowering notification levels and increasing disclosure
requirements); others have echoed this view. See, e.g., Tender Offer Reform (Part 1): Hearings on
H.R. 2172 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings: Tender Offer Reform (Part
1)] (statement of H. Brewster Atwater) (stating that bill's preemption of state corporate governance
rules was "one major flaw, which could counteract all of its otherwise positive features"); id. at 215
(statement of James P. Carty, Vice President, Government Regulation, National Association of
Manufacturers) (warning that "[a]ny diminishing of the state role would result in NAM not support-
ing such legislation").
296. Hearings: Tender Offer Reform (Part I), supra note 295, at 460-61 (statement of Robert
Monks, President of Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc.) (stating also that "the current abuses
are made possible by the failure of States to enact effective laws... worthwhile experimentation ...
is becoming seriously flawed"). See also id. at 127 (statement of Nelson Peltz, on behalf of the
Alliance for Capital Access) (stating that state takeover regulation "will do very little to assure that
basic economic policy questions affecting this Nation and its competitiveness are answered in an
appropriate manner"); id. at 481 (statement of T. Boone Pickens) (stating that after CTS "the Busi-
ness Roundtable was nowhere to be found on Capitol Hill" and that "[tihey discovered that it was
much easier to get their way in the States"); id. at 447 (statement of Roland M. Machold, Director,
Division of Investments for the State of New Jersey) (stating that "corporate influence at the State
level is very powerful, and.., investor interests are dispersed and very weak"); Corporate Takeovers:
Hearings on S. 1323 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 97 (1988) [hereinafter Hearings: Corporate Take-
overs] (statement of T. Boone Pickens) (stating that the "Business Roundtable wants hostile take-
overs stopped, but would allow 'friendly' mergers to continue").
297. See, eg., Hearing" Tender Offer Reform (Part 2), supra note 279, at 38 (statement of Bruce
Wasserstein, then-managing director of First Boston) (criticizing the "crazy quilt of overlapping
protective laws" and recommending federal preemption of regulation of all but truly "local"
companies).
298. See, eg., Hearings: Tender Offer Reform (Part 2), supra note 279, at 9 (statement of Joseph
W. Harrison, majority leader of the Indiana State Senate and sponsor of Indiana control-share stat-
ute, on behalf of the National Conference of State Legislatures) (stating that "I stress that because I
want you to know it was just not at the insistent (sic) of an Indiana corporate management that we
reacted to this problem"); id. at 22-23 (statement of Joseph I. Lieberman, Attorney General of
Connecticut) (stating support of CTS, even though Dynamics has significant operations in Connecti-
cut, and arguing that State representatives have knowledge of local circumstances and companies);
id. at 120 (letter of National Governors' Association) (opposing any federal preemption). Cf. id. at
98 (statement of Michael J. Connoly, Massachusetts Secretary of State) (favoring "limited preemp-
tion" under a federal one-share/one-vote rule).
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committee.2 99 One that did, the House Ways and Means tax bill to elimi-
nate deductibility of interest incurred in takeovers, may have triggered
the 1987 stock market crash and was ultimately deleted in conference a °
Another, which became the federal plant-closing statute, was a mild pal-
liative that may have done more harm than good.3 °1
The rate at which bills related to takeovers have been filed in Congress
has fallen off since CTS.3 °2 This decline coincides with Professor Ro-
mano's findings that in the pre-CTS period, the rate of congressional
299. One of the three bills reported out of committee, S. 1323, would have lowered the section
13(d) reporting threshold to 3%, narrowed the ten-day window to 24 hours, required that any acqui-
sition above 15% be by tender offer, and increased the open period for tender offers to 35 business
days, as well as increased insider trading penalties and criminal sanctions. Only the insider trading
provisions survived. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988), codified at, Securities Exchange Act § 21A, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1
(1988).
Characteristic of congressional paralysis on takeovers has been Congress's long-standing inability
to narrow the § 13(d) ten-day window for disclosing a 5% foothold acquisition, a relatively non-
controversial proposal. S. 227, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) (Sen. D'Amato) (closing 10-day win-
dow to 24 hours); S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (proposing reduction of window to five days
and prohibiting additional purchases prior to filing). See Macey & Netter, Regulation 13D and the
Regulatory Process, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 131 (1987) (discussing costs of ten-day window); Oesterle, The
Rise and Fall, supra note 95, at 231 & n. 136 (describing Congress as "intent on closing the window
to a few days"); Note, Proposed Legislation to Close the 13(d) Window, 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 433 (1988).
300. See infra note 383 (describes empirical study that indicates the stock price decline of Octo-
ber 14 and 16, which led to structural sell pressure, triggered the October 19, 1987 crash).
301. Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988).
Known as the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), the law requires that
businesses with more than 100 employees give sixty days notice to workers of a plant closing or mass
layoff (both of which the law defines), unless the employer is actively seeking to avoid the action or it
was necessitated by unforeseeable circumstances. Failure to give the required notice entitles employ-
ees to back pay and benefits for each day the notice was not given, and allows local communities to
recover at most a $30,000 civil penalty. Under WARN, injunctive relief is specifically not available.
Some argue that state plant closing laws hurt those they mean to protect. Macey, Externalities,
Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes,
1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 197. See also Note, State Plant Closing Legislation: A Modern Justification for
the Use of the Dormant Commerce Clause as a Bulwark of National Free Trade, 75 VA. L. REV. 845,
862 (1989) (arguing that "[sltate plant closing statutes alone, without other far-reaching reforms,
punish the very activity upon which the economy relies without promoting a substitute").
302. For the period from 1982 to April 1987 when CTS was decided, Professor Romano counted
62 bills dealing with regulation of tender offers in general (11.3 per year), 27 dealing with acquisi-
tions in specific industries such as airlines and oil (4.9 per year), 26 dealing with taxation of acquisi-
tions (4.7 per year), and 8 dealing with acquisitions by non-U.S. firms (1.3 per year). Romano,
Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 479 (based on a review of the subject index of CCH's
Congressional Index). Using the same tabulation method for the period from May 1987 to Decem-
ber 1990, I count 12 bills dealing with regulation of tender offers in general (3.3 per year), 7 dealing
with acquisitions in the same particular industries (1.9 per year), and 8 dealing with taxation of
acquisitions (2.2 per year), and 6 dealing with acquisitions by non-U.S. firms (1.7 per year).
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takeover bills related statistically to actual takeover activity. 303
Nonetheless, the rate of congressional hearings on takeovers-perhaps
an even more accurate measure of congressional interest in the subject-
increased during the period after CTS, up until takeover-poor 1990.10
During the unsettled period between MITE and CTS, Congress held
twenty-one hearings on takeovers, approximately 2.2 per year; since CTS
there have been thirty-three such hearings, approximately 9.2 per year.30 5
This relative increase suggests that congressional activity (even though
Gen Spec For
Year TO Indus Tax Inv
1982 1 - 9 -
1983 1 1 2 2
1984 14 11 3 1
1985 22 10 9 -
1986 - 4 - -
1987 (pre-CTS) 24 3 3 5
1987 (post-CTS) 5 - 1 3
1988 1 - - -
1989 4 6 4 -
1990 2 1 3 3
303. The rate also correlates to the perceived constitutionality of state antitakeover statutes.
304. Professor Romano does not explain her preference for using bills as indicators of congres-
sional interest. See Romano, Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 470-79.
305. To tabulate hearings, I used the subject index of the Congressional Information Service
(COMPETITION, CORPORATIONS, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION, SECURITIES) for hearings related to
takeovers, tender offer regulation, mergers and acquisitions, leveraged buyouts.







1987 (Pre-CTS) 3 7
TOTAL 11 21





For the post-MITE and pre-C7S period, I counted hearings held between June 1982 and April 1987.
For the post-CTS period I only included hearings through the end of 1990. There were no hearings
held during 1990, a year in which takeover activity declined by one-half.
That hearings were held (shown in the "Set of Hearings" data) may not tell as much as the days
hearings were held (shown in the "Number of Hearings" data). A set of hearings would seem to
reflect that a committee or sub-committee chair considered a topic of sufficient interest to warrant
having it aired. The number of hearings would seem to reflect the depth of that interest and the
variety of sources considered worth hearing. Whichever data on hearings better reflect congressional
interest, both data indicate an increased interest during the post-CTS period.
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no legislation emerges) may serve an end in itself. Congress has become
a useful forum for the takeover debate, but is stalemated by the compet-
ing factions.30 6
2. An ambivalent SEC
While continuing to argue against antitakeover statutes in court, 0 7
lobbying unsuccessfully against such statutes before state legislatures,
and seeking federal legislation preempting state antitakeover statutes,30 8
the SEC has not itself taken a significant regulatory or preemptive role.
In the federalism process set into motion by CTS, the SEC has advocated
for the control market.
The SEC came closest to a regulatory role when it reluctantly inter-
eceded in 1988 in the one-share, one-vote controversy, the recent high
point in SEC activism in corporate governance. Rule 19c-4 prohibits the
stock exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers Au-
tomated Quotation (NASDAQ) service from listing the common stock of
any firm that undertakes a recapitalization which reduces existing com-
mon shareholders' per-share voting rights.30 9 At first the SEC had
sought to leave the question to the exchanges, but when they balked, it
stepped in."' ° Reluctant and cautious, the SEC clearly kept in mind
306. Two statements by Senator Metzenbaum summarize where Congress stands:
The answer does not lie in banning hostile takeovers. Despite the abuses, some-takeovers
do improve management and help achieve a company's potential. Congress shouldn't tilt
the takeover playing field one way or the other.
Hearings: Corporate Takeovers, supra note 295, at 2.
I would strongly urge you to discuss with your colleagues and friends at the Business
Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce and NAM that it is time that they deliver a
few votes on this issue and we will move this subject.
Id. at 113 (comment by Sen. Metzenbaum to Robert E. Mercer, Chairman and CEO of Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Co.).
307. See Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 82, at 1882 (describing
SEC staff's mandate and position in third-generation cases).
308. See Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute, supra note 2, at 929-30 & n.196.
309. Securities Exchange Act Rule 19c-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1990); Voting Rights Listing
Standards-Disenfranchisement Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 25,891, [1987-1988 Transfer
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,247 (July 7, 1988) [hereinafter Final Release]. See also Com-
ment, Rule 19c-4: The SEC Goes Too Far in Adopting a One Share, One Vote Rule, 83 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1057 (1989) [hereinafter Comment, SEC Goes Too Far].
310. The rules of the New York Stock Exchange prohibit the listing of dual-class stock. In 1984
the NYSE, fearful of losing listings to exchanges that allowed non-voting or low-voting stock, sus-
pended its rule against such listings. At the same time it sought, with the SEC's assistance, to
negotiate a uniform listing standard with the other exchanges. When the exchanges refused to agree
voluntarily to listing standards for multiple classes of stock with disparate voting rights, the SEC
proposed a uniform standard. Voting Rights Listing Standard-Proposed Disenfranchisement
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commentators' admonitions that low-voting stock was a governance mat-
ter "in the realm of state rather than federal control."3 ' As adopted, the
rule not only recognizes "valid business and economic purposes" for low-
voting stock and exempts it when issued in a registered public-offering or
to effect a "bona fide merger or acquisition," '12 it also excludes various
takeover defense mechanisms on the theory that state law properly gov-
erns.31 3 Nonetheless, the rule signals SEC doubts about the ability of
state voting rules and fiduciary law to deal with shareholder "collective
Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 24,623, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,143
(June 22, 1987) [hereinafter Proposing Release]. A year later it adopted the rule. Final Release,
supra note 309.
311. Proposing Release, supra note 310, at 88,771; Final Release, supra note 309, at 89,213.
Commentators pointed to the remark of a Senate staffer following the 1975 amendments to the
Exchange Act:
[I]n drafting these new sections of the law which give the SEC power over exchange rules, I
can tell you that there never was any intent to go into this [corporate governance] area.
The Congress would look at it as a grave breach of Congressional intent ....
Symposium on Federal and State Roles in Establishing Standards of Conduct for Corporate Manage-
ment, 31 Bus. LAW. 1091, 1096 (1976) (remarks by Stephen Paradise, former Assistant Counsel to
the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee), quoted in Proposing Release, supra
note 310, at 88,776 n.70.
Other commentators argued that a uniform listing standard would undermine the federalism
structure that allows private parties to "fashion the relationship between capital and control in the
manner best suited to the enterprise" and would in effect establish a federal corporation law of
voting rights. See Proposing Release, supra note 310, at 88,776 (citing Dent, Dual Class Recapitali-
zation: A Reply, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 725 (1986)); Lipman, "One-Share, One-Vote" Rule:
Smothering Stock Owners with Love?, Legal Times, Nov. 14, 1988, at 23. See also Seligman, Equal
Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687 (1986).
312. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 19c-4(d)(1),(2),(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-
4(d)(1),(2),(3) (1990); Final Release, supra note 306, at 89,219. Ironically, this was the very kind of
transaction-half-voting stock issued by General Motors to purchase EDS and Hughes Aircraft-
which prompted the NYSE to suspend its one-share, one-vote rule. See Booth, Tender Offer Law,
supra note 106, at 757 & n. 142.
313. The rule excludes control share statutes, which can operate to disenfranchise controlling
shareholders. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 19c-4(d)(4), 17 C.F.R. 240.19c-4(d)(4) (1990).
The Commission stated its belief that "deference to state-legislated control share acquisition statutes
designed to specifically regulate change in control is appropriate." Final Release, supra note 309, at
89,225. See also Davis, supra note 52, at 509.
In addition, the SEC's release states that the rule excludes poison pills, although the assertion
finds no textual support. A typical pill's exclusionary flip-in rights have the effect of disparately
reducing the per share voting rights of the excluded bidder, an effect falling squarely under the rule's
prohibition. The SEC implies that since poison pills are never supposed to be triggered they are not
covered. Final Release, supra note 309, at 89,226. Further, low-priced stock issued in a defensive
stock lock-up would seem to be covered since such stock operates much as high-voting stock to give
its holder voting rights disproportionate to the holder's investment. Nonetheless, the SEC stated
that the "fairness of the compensation paid for voting stock [in a lock-up] generally should be deter-
mined by state law." Id.
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action" problems.314 The Business Roundtable challenged the rule, and
the D.C. Circuit invalidated it on federalism grounds.315
3. Pressing, but more deliberative, state legislatures
States have accepted the CTS invitation. Within six months of the
decision, fourteen states adopted third generation statutes; 316 others re-
vised their second-generation statutes. Today more than forty states
have some version of an antitakeover statute, and state antitakeover stat-
utes cover approximately eighty percent of United States assets.
Since CTS, antitakeover statutes have continued to fall into much the
same categories as the second-generation statutes. Each follows the CTS
blueprint: none interferes with the bidding process; each employs a
structure arguably designed to further shareholders' individual or collec-
tive interests; and each is grafted onto existing corporate law structures,
such as voting or appraisal rights. They remain facilitative, largely op-
tional for managers. Some state statutes have addressed the uncertainty
of particular firm-specific takeover defenses, explicitly authorizing poison
pill plans and their discriminatory flip-in feature.317 Few third-genera-
tion statutes have been extraterritorial; those few that at first were, along
with others in the second generation, have been pared back to fit the CTS
blueprint's territorial mandate.31 8
314. Final Release, supra note 309, at 89,216.
315. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The Business Roundtable is a
lobbying group representing 200 chief executives of the nation's largest corporations. See infra notes
365-369 and accompanying text (discussion of rule's validity under a federalism perspective).
316. See Romano, Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 461.
317. Such plans allow shareholders to exercise rights to redeem their shares or buy new securi-
ties at a substantial discount (usually 50% from market) if the target engages in a flip-in transac-
tion-that is, a merger into or other self-dealing transaction with the bidder. To ensure the dilution
of the bidder's stock, and thus the effectiveness of the plan, flip-in plans exclude the bidder from
exercising its redemption rights. Some states have invalidated this discrimination among sharehold-
ers of the same class. Bank of New York v. Irving Bank Corp., 142 Misc. 2d 145, 536 N.Y.S.2d 923
(Sup. Ct. 1988) (interpreting corporate statute to require equal treatment of all shareholder of same
class). Given its nearly impenetrable nature-provided it stands-the poison-pill defense is more
potent than the statutory defenses.
318. In 1988, Professor Kozyris identified ten states that had extraterritorial antitakeover stat-
utes: Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Massachusetts, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennes-
see, and Washington. See Kozyris, Some Observations, supra note 32, at 530-31 & n.113. Three of
them have since repealed or amended their laws to apply only to locally incorporated firms. See
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1201(6) (WESTLAW AZ library, legis file); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
9A-01(5) (WESTLAW NC library, stat file); OHIO S.B. 321 § 1101.10(3)(Y), (Z) (approved Apr. 11,
1990) (WESTLAW OH library, legis file). Courts struck down the extraterritorial application of two
others, though the statutes remain on the books. Tyson Foods Inc. v. McReynolds, 865 F.2d 99 (6th
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A significant development in the third generation has been the explo-
sion of non-shareholder constituency (or stakeholder) statutes.319 The
statutes, which are generally limited to takeovers and other control
changes, are designed to give directors greater latitude in structuring and
justifying takeover defenses. Although some have expressed the hope
that the statutes might realign corporate governance to reduce the exter-
nalities of manager and shareholder opportunism, the statutes may cause
precisely the opposite effect. None gives stakeholders enforcement
fights; none applies extraterritorially to foreign corporations doing busi-
ness in the state.
The third-generation enactments in Delaware and Pennsylvania are
illustrative.
a. Moderated Delaware statute
In January 1988, Delaware enacted a mild third-generation statute.
The statute, which applies only to Delaware-incorporated targets, pro-
hibits a fifteen percent acquiror from entering into any business combina-
tion with the target for three years after a hostile takeover, but gives
bidders at least eight routes by which to avoid the prohibition. 320 Most
Cir. 1989) (holding that the Tennessee Authorized Corporation Protection Act, TENN. CODE. ANN.
§§ 48-35-401 to 48-35-406 "guarantee[s]" inconsistent regulation); TLX Acquisitions Corp. v. Telex
Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Ok. 1987) (invalidating OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1145 et seq.).
Despite rewriting their corporation codes, Florida, Massachusetts, and Washington still have extra.
territorial antitakeover provisions. Florida Business Corporations Act, ch. 89-154, § 95(4)
(WESTLAW Fla. library, legis file) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0901); MASS. GEN. L.
ch. 110D, § I (3)(e) (Lawyer's Co-Op Supp. 1990); Washington Business Corporations Act, ch. 225,
§ 198 (13), 1989 Wash. Legis. Serv. 520 (West). Idaho and Nebraska have not changed their extra.
territorial statutes. IDAHO CODE § 30-1601(6) (Supp. 1988); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2442 (Supp.
1988).
319. The statutes allow, and in one case even mandate, directors to consider the effect of a
takeover bid on non-shareholder stakeholders, such as "employees, suppliers, creditors and custom-
ers, the economy of the state, region and nation, community and societal considerations." See, e.g.,
MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West Supp. 1989). Others presume validity if a majority of
disinterested directors makes the determination based on such interests. See Hanks, supra note 114,
Despite their revolutionary abandonment of the rhetoric of shareholder wealth maximization, the
statutes (like other antitakeover statutes) have been adopted with little legislative debate. Id. at 20,
320. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1990). Some exclusions are contained in the statute; others
arise from its operation: (1) the acquisition of 85% of the target's stock in one transaction; (2) the
target board's election (within 90 days of the statute's effective date) to opt out of the statute; (3) an
opt-out amendment of the articles or bylaws effective after a 12-month waiting period; (4) approval
by the board and two-thirds of disinterested shares of a business combination with a 15% acquiror;
(5) approval by the board of such a transaction before a triggering 15% acquisition; (6) the bidder's
conditioning of its tender offer on receiving sufficient consents to replace the board before acquiring
stock; (7) the use of a "cleansed" wholly-owned subsidiary into which the target's assets are trans-
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significant is an exemption for tender offers of eighty-five percent or more
of the target's shares.321
The legislative history of the Delaware statute reflects both the con-
cerns of possible migration from Delaware if it did not act, and the risk
of a federal response if it was too aggressive. As originally proposed, the
antitakeover bill, drafted by the state bar's Corporation Law Section,
would have applied to ten percent acquirors and exempted only tender
offers for ninety percent or more of a target's stock (without excluding
insider holdings from the calculation).322 In response to comments from
SEC Commissioners and institutional investors, 23 the bill's drafters
moderated the bill's antitakeover effects. The chairman of the Corpora-
tion Law Section later reported to the Delaware legislature that the re-
vised bill "is a product of a series of compromises" reflecting the
comments by "attorneys, academics, corporations, pension funds, federal
officials and others to an earlier draft. 324 Professor Jensen, a leading
academic proponent of an unregulated chartering market, pointed out to
the drafters that if Delaware adopted the statute as proposed, it would
add "considerably to the pressures for Federal chartering., 325
ferred in a squeeze-out merger; (8) a proxy contest in which the bidder seats a new board to approve
the bidder's proposed business combination. See Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute, supra note
2, at 886-88, 916-17; Romano, Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 464.
321. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2) (1990). In computing the 85%, shares held by manage-
ment and management-controlled ESOPs are excluded. The effect is that the statute exempts tender
offers that attract 85% or more of publicly-held shares. See also Garfield, supra note 116, at 584
(pointing out that the statute discourages any-and-all bids that attract less than 85% tenders, even if
followed by a squeeze-out merger offering the same consideration).
322. The first draft by the Council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar
Association was circulated publicly in November 1987. See Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute,
supra note 2, at 889 & n.49 (citing Business and the Law: Compromise Near in Delaware, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 21, 1987, at D2, col. 1).
323. Commissioners Grundfest, Cox and Ruder wrote in opposition to the first draft. See Oes-
terle, Delaware's Takeover Statute, supra note 2, at 889 & n.51 (concluding that the "principal rea-
son for the modifications" were the SEC letters); Garfield, supra note 116, at 584-85 & n.264
(describing comments by institutional investors and SEC Commissioner Cox questioning anti-coer-
cive purpose). Wilmington Trust, Delaware's largest bank, wrote: "We urge you to scrap the pro-
posed measure or to consider substantial modification." See id. Institutional investors were among
the 150 who wrote letters commenting on the draft. See Sontag, A Takeover Law Grows in Dela-
ware, Nat'l L. J., Apr. 11, 1988, at 1, 19-20. See also Romano, Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra
note 51, at 463.
324. Testimony ofA. Gilchrist Sparks, III Before the Delaware Senate and House Judiciary Com-
mittees (Jan 20, 1988), reprinted in Smith & Furlow, Guide to the Takeover Law of Delaware, Corpo-
rate Practice Series (BNA) 297 (1988). In addition, labor unions were represented in legislative
hearings on the Council's bill. See Smith & Furlow, at 271-75.
325. Letter from Michael C. Jensen to David B. Brown (Dec. 8, 1987), cited in Oesterle, Dela-
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The Delaware statute was also a product of the state chartering mar-
ket. Delaware's secretary of state reminded legislators of the $170 mil-
lion in chartering fees, representing seventeen percent of the state's total
revenues, produced by Delaware's corporate law. He stated that "at
least half" of the correspondence from managers of the largest Dela-
ware-incorporated firms suggested that they "would look seriously at...
changing their Delaware incorporation" if the statute were not
adopted.32 a It is worth noting that the Delaware legislature showed none
of this solicitude when it later adopted a labor-contract protection law to
insulate local workers from both incumbent managers and outside
bidders.3
2 7
b. Pennsylvania's daring disgorgement statute
In April 1990, Pennsylvania enacted an antitakeover package that in-
cludes a novel and potentially potent disgorgement statute.328 Under the
statute, any controlling person (defined as a twenty percent shareholder,
a twenty percent bidder or any other person seeking control by proxy
contest or otherwise)329 must disgorge to the company any profits real-
ized from the sale of the target's stock during an eighteen-month period
after becoming a controlling person; disgorgement applies to all stock
acquired twenty-four months before or eighteen months after coming
under the statute.33°
Surprisingly, the legislative history of the statute reflects moderation
and a more fully-represented process than in the typical second-genera-
tion enactment. An early version of the bill that was finally enacted into
ware's Takeover Statute, supra note 2, at 890 n.5l ("I am convinced that this law will do enormous
damage to corporate America and to the shareholder of Delaware corporations").
326. Testimony Before the Delaware House and Senate Judiciary Committees (Jan. 20, 1988)
(statement of Secretary of State, Michael E. Haskings), reprinted in Smith & Furlow,supra note 324,
at 259. In the drafting committee, A. Gilchrist Sparks, chairman of the Delaware bar, argued
against an opt-in statute on the theory that if shareholders would approve opting into the statute,
managers "would be much more likely to pursue a reincorporation merger out of Delaware... [into]
some state with opt-out legislation already in place." See Smith & Furlow, supra note 324, at 299,
See also Romano, Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 463-64'(describing the decision to
adopt an opt-out, rather than opt-in, statute apparently because of management pressure).
327. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 706 (1988). The Delaware statute applies to Delaware-based
businesses, wherever incorporated.
328. 1990 PA. S.B. 1310 (to be codified at 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2571-74). The package
also includes a relatively non-descript control-share statute and a revised non-shareholder constitu-
ency statute. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1721, 2561-67 (Purdon 1990).
329. See 1990 PA. S.B. 1310 (to be codified at 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2573, 2573.1(a)).
330. Id. (to be codified at 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2574).
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law had been introduced in October 1989 in response to a proxy contest
by the Belzberg family for Armstrong World Industries, incorporated
and based in Pennsylvania.331 It contained relatively standard stake-
332 TePnholder-constituency and control-share provisions. The Pennsylvania
Senate originally passed the measure in December.333 The House, how-
ever, substantially modified the bill, adding a provision to clarify that the
state's 1983 redemption statute applied to proxy insurgents, which would
have the effect of converting every proxy contest into an any-and-all
tender offer. It also added the disgorgement provision, a novelty among
antitakeover statutes.334 As proposed, the disgorgement provision ap-
plied to any person seeking to influence control and had no opt-out pro-
cedure; its ostensible purpose was to preclude greenmail, but its effect
was to withdraw much of the financial incentive for any takeover or
proxy contest.3 35
Reaction from shareholder groups to the House bill was quick and
harsh, focusing principally on the proposed clarification to the redemp-
tion statute. Institutional shareholders, including the Pennsylvania State
Employees' Retirement System, stated they would stop investing in
Pennsylvania companies if the state rendered proxy fights impossible.336
331. See Controversial Pa. Bill Would Make Takeovers More Difficult, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 474 (Mar. 30, 1990) [hereinafter Controversial Pa. Bill]; Takeovers Face New Obstacles, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 19, 1990, at Dl, col. 3. A Washington, D.C. lawyer drafted the bill for the Penn-
sylvania Chamber of Business and Industry. Ironically, it was a threatened takeover by the
Belzbergs of an Indiana corporation that prompted the statute upheld in CTS.
332. See Legislative Brief- Pennsylvania, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1772 (Dec. 1, 1989)
(describing bill's authorization to directors to consider the interests of communities, employees, sup-
pliers, and the corporation's long-term health when faced with a bid); Controversial Pa. Bill, supra
note 331, at 474 (describing bill's control-share provisions).
333. See Pa. Rules Committee Curtails Reach of Takeover Bill Disgorgement Section, 22 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 600-01 (Apr. 20, 1990) [hereinafter Committee Curtails Reach].
334. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2541-48 (Purdon Supp. 1989). The redemption statute
requires that if any person gains control of 20% or more of a firm's shares, shareholders may redeem
their shares for a judicially-determined fair price, including a control premium. The statute does not
explicitly exempt management buyouts, although Pennsylvania courts have read it to do so. The
House bill sought to clarify lingering uncertainty about whether the redemption statute applied to
shareholders who mounted a proxy fight, without actually buying stock. Controversial Pa. Bill,
supra note 331, at 475.
335. Id. Greenmail is the practice of buying a substantial block of stock and threatening to
launch a tender offer or proxy contest to take control unless management agrees to have the firm
repurchase the block at a premium.
336. The chief investment officer of the $9.6 billion Pennsylvania State Employees' Retirement
System said he would recommend that the fund stop investing in Pennsylvania companies if the bill
were to pass. Cooney, Debate Heats Up on Controversial Takeover Bill, Reuters, Feb. 14, 1990
(reporting statement of Kenneth G. Mertz). The Institute of Shareholder Services in Washington,
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They argued that the measure would be counter-productive, costing
Pennsylvania jobs in the long run and making it hard for Pennsylvania
firms to raise capital. Westinghouse and other Pennsylvania-incorpo-
rated firms threatened to reincorporate unless the bill was moderated,
such as with an opt-out procedure.337 SEC Chairman Breeden also criti-
cized the bill for depriving shareholders of their proxy and governance
rights, stating that the SEC "won't hesitate to enforce federal interests"
in protecting shareholders' rights.338
In response to this criticism, the House deleted its clarification to the
redemption statute.339 Under the revised bill passed by the House in
early April, any disgorged funds would have to be plowed back into ex-
pansion of the company's Pennsylvania operations. 34° The Senate
amended the bill to clarify that disgorgement does not apply to those
mounting a proxy fight for purposes other than gaining or changing con-
which advises institutional investors on proxy and governance issues, said Pennsylvania corpora-
tions' stock would become "junk stock." Controversial Pa. Bill, supra note 331, at 475. Public
pension funds in California, New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, and Florida threatened to reas-
sess their Pennsylvania holdings. See id.; Takeovers Face New Obstacles, supra note 331.
The threat of the Pennsylvania retirement fund to disinvest brought a vitriolic attack by the Penn-
sylvania Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the bill's principal proponent. See Chamber of Busi-
ness and Industry Responds to Statement of Ken G. Mertz, PR Newswire, Feb. 14, 1990 ("Mr.
Mertz's threats or warnings not-withstanding, it is the legislature of this commonwealth that sets the
laws. Fund managers do not.... [To the extent a pension fund is a long-term shareholder, and not
a speculator, Senate Bill 1310 will protect the long-term investments made in Pennsylvania compa-
nies by pension funds.")
The support of one institutional investor, the mutual-fund group Fidelity, created some contro-
versy. Soon after weighing in against the bill, Fidelity was chosen to manage Armstrong's $180
million employee savings plan; it then changed course and backed the bill. Pennsylvania Delays
Takeover Vote Amid Disputes, Reuters, Apr. 18, 1990.
337. westinghouse, for instance, reluctantly supported the bill only after a provision was added
allowing it and other companies to opt out. See Takeovers Face New Obstacles, supra note 331;
Troy, Takeover Bill to Be Amended, U.P.I., Apr. 16, 1990.
338. Speaking to the Council of Institutional Investors, Breeden said the bill would deprive
Pennsylvania firms' shareholders of the right to use the proxy system and would leave "management
free to run the company into the ground." Tough Anti-Takeover Bill Approved by Pennsylvania
House, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 514-15 (Apr. 6, 1990) [hereinafter Tough BillApproved].
339. See Tough Bill Approved, supra note 338, at 514 (reporting on House vote). The House
also deleted an exemption for management from the 1983 redemption statute.
340. A House Appropriations Committee fiscal note warned that although the bill would "pre-
vent the economic and social upheaval associated with many takeovers, it could also encourage the
entrenchment of mediocre management that could eventually reduce company profits and thereby
both the taxes and dividends they would pay," See Tough BillApproved, supra note 338, at 514. It
pointed out that less-restrictive anti-takeover statutes in other states at least temporarily reduced
stock prices. Id.
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trol and to allow an opt-out for existing and newly-incorporated firms. 34 1
The bill then went to a House-Senate conference committee, which de-
leted the plow-back provision because of constitutional concerns.342
With these revisions the bill passed in time for the legislature's spring
recess. The day after it was signed, a Belzberg company and two Arm-
strong shareholders filed separate suits challenging its
constitutionality. 343
The disgorgement statute seems to strongly discourage proxy contests
and tender offers. Nonetheless, the statute has at least two significant
holes. First, because a firm can opt out of the statute by reincorporating
as a new Pennsylvania corporation in which the articles specify the stat-
ute to be inapplicable, 3" a bidder or insurgent could make its control
initiative contingent on shareholders approving the reincorporation after
acquiring control. Second, because profits "belong to and are recover-
able" only by the corporation, a successful bidder or insurgent could
waive the rights or simply not exercise them after acquiring control; if a
shareholder brought a derivative suit, the board presumably, could refuse
demand.
The real burden, then, falls on unsuccessful bidders and insurgents.
For example, resorting to greenmail if a takeover bid goes awry is not
possible; an unsuccessful tender offeror cannot sell its toehold position
(typically around five percent) to compensate for the expense of the failed
effort; an insurgent could gain nothing if its overtures resulted in a
favorable recapitalization or a white-knight merger. The extent to which
the statutorily-created risks and uncertainty will actually discourage con-
trol changes has yet to be seen. But the history of takeovers, like the
history of war, demonstrates that defenses are invariably surpassed by
more potent offensive weapons. For instance, despite great concern
(some of it no doubt strategic) that Delaware's antitakeover statute
would kill takeovers, it has not.
341. 1990 PA. S.B. 1310 (to be codified at 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2571 (opt-out procedure
during 90 days after enactment), 2573.1 (clarifying control)). See 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 600
(Apr. 20, 1990); Pennsylvania Delays Takeover Vote Amid Disputes, Reuters, Apr. 18, 1990. The
Senate committee also revised the disgorgement provision to exempt management purchases and
narrowly defeated an "any time" opt-out scheme. Committee Curtails Reach, supra note 333, at
601.
342. See Pa. Legislature Approves Modified Anti-Takeover Measure, 22 See. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 630 (Apr. 27, 1990).
343. Pennsylvania Adopts Anti-Takeover Law, U.P.I. (Apr. 27, 1990) (reporting challenging
shareholders "are prepared to take the case to the Supreme Court if necessary").
344. 1990 PA. S.B. 1310 (to be codified at 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2571(b)(2)(ii)).
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4. Relieved federal courts and the invalidation of rule 19c-4
Lower federal courts have perceived and been receptive to the CTS
antitakeover blueprint, which leaves them a remarkably easy review task.
Since CTS, courts have uniformily struck down statutes with an extrater-
ritorial reach.345 Although a comparative debate has developed about
which statutes are better or worse for shareholders,34 6 to date it has had
little immediate legal consequence. Since CTS, no court has invalidated
any antitakeover statute solely for being a ruse.347
In June 1990, the D.C. Circuit invalidated rule 19c-4, the SEC's one-
share, one-vote rule.348 The SEC had promulgated the rule under the
authority of section 19(c) of the Exchange Act, which allows the SEC on
its own initiative to amend rules of the stock exchanges and NASDAQ as
it "deems necessary or appropriate.., in furtherance of the purposes" of
the Act.349 The court held that "[b]ecause the rule directly controls the
substantive allocation of powers among classes of shareholders" it in-
trudes into state corporate law and is beyond the agency's powers.350
345. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. McReynolds, 865 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1989) (invalidating Tennessee
statute that applied to foreign corporations); Campeau Corp. v. Federated Dept. Stores, 679 F. Supp.
735, 739 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (invalidating Ohio statute that regulated "foreign businesses" that ac-
quired "resident" corporations); TLX Acquisition Corp v. Telex Corp, 679 F. Supp 1022, 1029
(W.D. Okla. 1987) (invalidating Oklahoma statute with a jurisdictional reach comparable to the
Illinois statute in MITE, the court stating its unconstitutionality was "certain" because it created an
"impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation").
346. See, eg., Davis, supra note 52, at 506; Johnson, State Takeover Statutes: Constitutionality,
Community, and Heresy, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1051, (1988) (comparing New York's and Dela-
ware's business combination statutes to each other and to control-share statutes); Johnson & Millon,
Misreading Williams Act, supra note 82 (arguing that fair-price and moratorium statutes are better
designed against coercion than control-share statutes; moratorium statutes can be expected to be
most expensive to shareholders); Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute, supra note 2, at 881-82
nn.19, 20 (concluding that shareholder voting is less important under the Delaware statute than
under Indiana's); Pinto, Takeover Laws After CTS, supra note 162, at 736 (comparing non-share-
holder constituency statutes and Delaware's business combination statute); Note, State Regulation of
Takeovers: Delaware's State Statute Is Best Choice Available, 14 J. CORP. L. 661 (1989).
347. See Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837 (1st Cir. 1988) (invalidating stat-
ute that required bidders to disclose their control intentions, subject to a penalty of a one-year freeze
on any takeover attempt if a bidder failed to make the required disclosure, on the ground that the
penalty is preempted by the Williams Act's disclosure scheme for 5% acquisitions); Batus, Inc. v.
McKay, 684 F. Supp. 637 (D. Nev. 1988) (invalidating statute that required the deposit of shares for
a 60-day period after the commencement of a tender offer, on the ground that the period frustrated
the Williams Act goals).
348. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
349. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1988). See Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, Rule 19c-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1990); Final Release, supra note 309.
350. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 407.
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The court stated that state law traditionally governed "the distribution of
powers among the various players in the process of corporate govern-
ance."' 1 The court focused on the assumption-intent dichotomy, also
present in Williams Act preemption. Although admitting that the Ex-
change Act "contains an implicit assumption that shareholders will be
able to make use of the information provided in proxy solicitations in
order to vote in corporate elections," '52 the court concluded that the as-
sumption could not overcome the fact that Congress had "no... inten-
tion[s] ... to interfere in the management of corporations. 35 3 Relying
on the Supreme Court's "creature of state law" metaphor, the D.C. Cir-
cuit concluded the rule could well turn "regulation of the securities mar-
kets into the vehicle for federalizing corporate law."
354
351. Id. at 411-12.
352. Id. at 411 (quoting Final Release, supra note 309, at 53 Fed. Reg. at 26,391-93). The SEC
based its argument primarily on its authority under § 14(a) of the Exchange Act to regulate the
proxy process. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988). In addition, it
also suggested it had authority under provisions empowering it to supervise exchange and NASDAQ
registration, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 6(b)(5), 15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(5), 78o-
3(b)(6) (1988), and those authorizing it to set up a national market system in securities. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 11A(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2) (1988). The court concluded that each
was bounded implicitly by the Act's "purposes," as is § 19(c) explicitly. Business Roundtable, 905
F.2d at 415-17 (also commenting that the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act were essentially
deregulatory, hardly "justifying regulation of corporate governance").
353. Id. at 411 (quoting Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 1934 Senate Report at
10). See also id. (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1934) (deleting as
unnecessary section 13(d) of the bill, which the court found making explicit that the SEC could not
"interfere with the management of the affairs of an issuer")).
An anomaly arises because of the interaction between the exchanges and the SEC. The exchanges
are empowered to regulate corporate governance under their broad conditioning power, and the SEC
is empowered to oversee the exchanges' rules. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 6(b)(5),
15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(5), 78o-3(b)(6) (1988) (authorizing SEC in registering exchanges or
NASDAQ to consider whether the proffered rules "in general .... protect investors and the public
interest"). If the SEC's supervisory power were as broad as the exchanges' conditioning power, Rule
19c-4's validity would be virtually unquestionable. The court dealt with this by suggesting that the
SEC's veto power over exchange rules dealing with matters of internal corporate governance could
well be limited. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 409-10 (commenting that the SEC has not exer-
cised its veto and the breadth of the exchanges' rules "tells us nothing about the criteria of judgment
the Commission may apply").
354. Id. at 412-13 & n.7 (quoting Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) ("Corpora-
tions are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the
understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors
with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation." (quoting
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975))). The court's concern about a "slippery slope" into federal
corporate law is marbled throughout the opinion. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 410 (stating
that "purposes" of Exchange Act can be framed at any level of generality if SEC's argument that it is
empowered to ensure fair shareholder suffrage were accepted); id. at 411-12 (worrying that approval
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5. Still astute state courts
Since CTS, the pressure on state courts to take an active role in resolv-
ing the broader takeover debate has abated. Not surprisingly, state
courts, particularly Delaware's Supreme Court, have been increasingly
deferential to management, with firm-specific defenses receiving less ex-
acting judicial scrutiny.355
Nonetheless, Delaware's Supreme Court has not lost sight of its feder-
alism role. After Delaware passed its business-combination statute, it be-
came clear that the statute did not prevent politically infamous "bust-
up" takeovers.3"6 While the statute and its exemption for acquisitions of
eighty-five percent or more of a firm's stock strongly discourage coercive
partial or two-tier bids, acquisitions followed by asset sales remain possi-
ble. In Paramount v. Time, the Delaware court corrected this legislative
failure with a vengeance.357 In an opinion, largely incomprehensible ex-
cept as part of a vertical federalism dialogue, the court stated that a bust-
up acquisition, whether proposed by management or by a hostile bidder,
would trigger a Revlon auction duty.35 8 Because the auctioning of Dela-
ware corporations, at least as the accepted "fair" procedure now stands,
generates an intimidating "winner's curse, '359 the court effectively dis-
of major issues traditionally governed by state law could be subject to the SEC's "discretionary
control").
355. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); Shamrock
Holdings v. Polaroid, Inc., 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
356. See Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute, supra note 2, at 914-17 & n.138 (concluding that
leveraged buyouts, whose financing is premised on selling off the target's assets, are still possible
under the statute, largely because "[ilt may be common for ... any-and-all offers to attract enough
stock to meet the 85% cap").
357. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). Others have alluded to the linkage between the constitutional-
ity of antitakeover statutes and the role played by state courts. See Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover
Statute, supra note 2, at 951 (suggesting that "the role of Section 203 in takeovers may well depend
on whether the Delaware courts will police against self-serving behavior by target managers purport-
ing to act on behalf of shareholders").
358. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(invalidating asset lock-up because board had failed to conduct an auction when bust-up of the target
became "inevitable"). The nearly uniform assumption about Revlon before Time-Warner was that
the auction duty was more likely to be triggered, if not exclusively so, when management had an
interest in a bid. When in Revlon the Delaware court said that the board had an auctioneer's duty
when a "sale of the company became inevitable," this cleary implied that this was because manage-
ment was bidding. 506 A.2d at 182. In fact, all the auction cases until Time-Warner involved either
management bids or a self-imposed auction. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 124.
359. The "fair" auction process for Delaware firms seems to require that the board solicit the
bidders' "best bid" and then institute additional rounds in which new "best bids" are solicited, until
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couraged all but the most committed bust-up bidders or reorganizers.
B. Legality of the Current Corporate Federalism
By viewing CTS as a federalism gambit intended to solidify incorpora-
tion-based private ordering and to thwart federal intervention, some pos-
sible conclusions emerge about the current antitakeover regime.
L The clear case against extraterritorial antitakeover statutes
The only insuperable federal regulation imposed by the CTS antitake-
over blueprint arises from its prohibition against antitakeover statutes
that are not incorporation-based. Only these statutes risk a patchwork of
state regulation that would invite a congressional response or force
courts to balance contact-based interests, either option a deviation from
the value-neutral process effected by CTS. Lower federal courts have
understood this.
2. The clear case for Delaware's statute
If anything, the CTS antitakeover blueprint is one designed for Dela-
ware. Delaware's lack of shareholder contacts presents no problem be-
cause the statute is incorporation-based; Delaware thus has an interest in
"its" corporations' shareholders, wherever they reside. 3" Further, even
one bidder refuses to bid higher. See, e.g., B. BURROUGH & J. HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE
GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABIscO 353, 395-501 (1990) (describing the auction for RJR Nabisco).
The winner, according to theories concerning auctions involving repeat bidders, will end up pay-
ing its reserve price (what it values the assets at) plus the aggregate of the transaction costs incurred
by all the bidders in the auction. See Macey, Auction Theory, MBOs and Property Rights in Corpo-
rate Assets, 25 WAKE FOREST. L. REV. 85 (1990). This not-so-intuitive result can be explained with
an example. Suppose a repeat bidder bids against nine other bidders and can expect to win once
every ten times it bids. Each time it bids it incurs transaction costs, such as those for estimating the
value of the firm, obtaining legal and tactical advice, and securing financing. During the bidding,
when it reaches its reservation price, it will continue to bid in order to cut its losses. Dropping out at
the reservation price would force the bidder to swallow all of its transaction costs; continuing and
winning may minimize the size of the loss. But the same loss-cutting incentive also shapes the
behavior of the other bidders. Our bidder, to have a chance of submitting the winning bid, must take
into account that each of the other bidders will keep on bidding above its reservation price up to the
point that winning produces just as big a loss as losing. Thus, our bidder will continue bidding up to
the sum of its reservation price plus the aggregate of all the transaction costs of all the bidders in the
auction. This aggregate represents the average of all the transaction costs over the course of ten
auctions, where each bidder predictably wins once. See French & McCormick, Sealed Bids, Sunk
Costs, and the Process of Competition, 57 J. Bus. 417, 424 (1984).
360. See, eg., Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute, supra note 2, at 935 (concluding that
CTS's reference to the shareholder contacts required by the Indiana statute should not be read as a
requirement).
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though most Delaware-incorporated public firms operate primarily out
of state, the internal affairs rule avoids the risk of any conflicts.
Although Delaware might seem to provide out-of-state managers the
protectionism which the state where their business is headquartered does
not,361 Delaware is as even-handed as was Indiana. Delaware's statute is
unique because it protects without discriminating, accomplishing its pur-
pose even-handedly for all public firms incorporated in Delaware that do
business nationwide. At most, the statute protects Delaware's chartering
dominance-and with it local chartering, franchise, and corporate bar
revenues-but CTS makes clear the Supreme Court has no intentions of
inquiring into the political economy of state chartering. If such protec-
tionism is constitutionally suspect, then so is corporate federalism. The
effect of its statute falls equally on bidders from Delaware, from the tar-
get's home state, and from other states.
Although adopting a Pro-shareholder, Pro-stakeholder, or Pro-state
Hypothesis to explain CTS raises doubts about this analysis, we have
seen that each conflicts with the CTS blueprint. Little suggests that the
Supreme Court will intercede to stop Delaware from "sacrificing share-
holder interests. '362 Because the Court seems prepared to intervene only
to protect the process of corporate law-for example to forestall further
federal intervention-the Court will not likely intercede. Delaware's in-
corporation-based statute, of all the third-generation statutes, is least at
risk. Invalidating the Delaware statute-particularly given the relatively
full representation of interests in the statute's adoption and its, at most,
mild effect on shareholders-would compel the conclusion that the pro-
cess of incorporation-based private ordering is unworkable and requires
federalization.
3. A tentative case for Pennsylvania's daring disgorgement statute
Pennsylvania's disgorgement statute interferes neither with the process
361. See id. at 941.
362. See, eg., id. at 944 (arguing that CTS can be "read without strain" as whether the statute
"in fact serve[s] the interests of the shareholders of Delaware corporations"). Although persuasive
arguments can be made that the Delaware statute is both overbroad and underinclusive and that it
impinges on shareholder autonomy, these same problems plagued the Indiana statute, but were of
little concern to the CTS majority. See supra note 237 and accompanying text and supra note 254
and accompanying text. Even though the Delaware statute leaves arguably more discretion in the
hands of managers to block an unwanted bid than did Indiana's, Powell's reference to at least four
different explanations for why the statute benefitted shareholders strongly suggests the Delaware
statute would easily survive a transfer/control rights review.
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of tender offer bidding nor proxy voting. It is incorporation-based and
serves the arguably legitimate purposes of preventing greenmail and forc-
ing any acquirer of control to focus on the long-run. Although it may do
this at far greater cost than it is worth, CTS clarifies that this irony (and
subsidy) is not part of the antitakeover blueprint. The relevant point is
that tender offers and proxy contests are still possible as a technical mat-
ter. It is also significant that the Pennsylvania legislative process led to
moderation of the original bill. The capital and chartering markets are
not neutralized. In fact, the fight over the disgorgement statute may
have invigorated the process; institutional investors threatened to dis-
invest, and some Pennsylvania managers sought to opt out. The process
legitimized by CTS, although imperfect, nonetheless functions.
The Supreme Court should predictably refuse to interject itself before
the repercussions of the statute, both in its operation and its reception in
other states, are felt fully. At present, there is no conflict in the circuits,
literally or figuratively.
363
4. A good case for rule 19c-4
The D.C. Circuit's invalidation of rule 19c-4 reflects a failure to see the
rule in the broader context of the process of corporate federalism set into
motion by CTS. From this perspective, much suggests the rule should
have been upheld.3" The decision did not result from an aggressive cam-
paign of federalization; the SEC was a reluctant mediator. The rule
mildly departed from traditional corporate federalism, regulating (with a
number of exceptions) only one kind of entrenching device. Its conflict
with specific state governance rules has limits-it does not affect other
entrenching devices (such as ESOP parking) and explicitly excludes con-
trol share statutes. It arose out of and is confined to the SEC's oversight
of stock listing requirements. Apparently, state principles will guide the
rule's difficult interpretive questions-such as when a merger that effects
a recapitalization is "bona fide. ' , 365
Although the D.C. Circuit worried about the slippery slope down
which the rule might take the SEC, the firebreak proposed by the SEC
363. SEC Commissioner Grundfest commented, "If enough states adopt a Pennsylvania-type
statute, they are begging for pre-emption." Sontag, Will Feds Eventually Intervene?, Nat'l L.J., Apr.
23, 1990, at 3, 22.
364. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 407 n.1 (collecting law review articles).
365. Furthermore, all these questions are left to the SEC in the first instance, not the courts. See
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Washington University Open Scholarship
548 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
seems wholly workable. The SEC suggested that "the unique historical
background of the NYSE's one share, one vote rule"3 66 separates the rule
from wholesale intervention into corporate governance. This limitation
would empower the SEC only to preserve longstanding exchange rules,
but not to erect its own governance regime. Unlike broad-brush private
enforcement of corporate "fairness" under section 10(b), which the
Supreme Court rejected in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,367 rule 19c-
4's breadth and enforcement fall primarily to the SEC, an agency with
significant currency before the Supreme Court. If the Court meant for
CTS to establish a corporate federalism process, it is difficult to justify
excluding the SEC. In any event, such exclusion may well be futile. The
SEC, using its "regulation by raised eyebrow" powers, suggested soon
after the D.C. Circuit decision that the exchanges and NASDAQ imple-
ment voluntarily a one-share, one-vote listing condition.368
V. AN EVALUATION OF CTS CORPORATE FEDERALISM
In many respects, CTS and its corporate federalism can be judged in
much the same way as any other federalism gambit. Will the process
legitimated by CTS predictably encourage state experimentation, foster
responsive local government, and promote national unity-as compared
to the federalized alternatives? 369  CTS forces a comparison of state-
based corporate law, and in particular antitakeover statutes, with the
likely product of federal intervention. The Court's failure even to allude
to this comparison looms as the case's greatest blind spot.
This Part sketches the federalism analysis absent in CTS, focusing on
the wisdom of CTS corporate federalism as it applies to antitakeover
366. Brief for Respondent SEC, at 21 n.24, quoted in Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 413. The
D.C. Circuit understood the argument to mean that Congress had implicitly approved the rule; the
SEC pointed out that the legislative history of the Exchange Act contained favorable references to
the NYSE's rule. Id.
367. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
368. See Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 410 n.5 (citing Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate
Governance, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 545, 571 (1984)). See also Wall. St. J., June 13, 1990, at A3-4, col. 2
(reporting that "SEC market regulation director Richard Ketchum called on the exchanges to adopt
uniform 19c4-type rules" and stated "'There's always been a wide degree of consensus [among the
exchanges and the NASD] that there should be voting rights rules [and] I hope that staring into the
vacuum, they will respond' ").
369. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 169, § 6-35, at 539-40. Many misconceive the question
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statutes.370 It pursues the comparison along the traditional federalism
lines of inquiry, which coincidentally largely parallel the analytical
frameworks of the free-marketers, the public-choice theorists, and the
reformists.
A. Incorporation-based Efficiency: The Adequacy of Constraints in the
Market for Antitakeover Statutes
Federal regulation of the market for antitakeover statutes can be justi-
fied if such statutes produce externalities. As we have seen, both the
reformists and many free-marketers essentially claim that antitakeover
statutes have characteristics of public goods consumed by managers (and
perhaps non-shareholder stakeholders) who do not fully internalize the
costs shifted by the statutes to shareholders-the statutes are subop-
timal.3 1 Others, in particular Professor Coffee, argue that antitakeover
statutes control opportunism by shareholders and bidders, whose control
transactions do not internalize the costs borne by managers when their
expectations in a "long-term promise" with the firm are taken without
compensation-the statutes are optimal.3 72 Although the debate can be
pursued in the abstract,373 it is relatively meaningless as a critique of
CTS or the current antitakeover regime. Instead, the appropriate de-
bate-framed as one of federalism-begins with whether forces that opti-
mally balance the competing interests constrain the market for
370. To keep the problem tractable, I do not pursue a fuller inquiry into the wisdom of CTS
corporate federalism, as applied beyond antitakeover statutes.
371. Reformists argue that antitakeover statutes differ little from, and perhaps are worse than,
generic corporate codes. See, e.g., Garfield, supra note 116, at 571. Free-marketers attempt to place
the statutes in a different category. See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, The Contract Clause, supra note 207
(arguing that antitakeover statutes, and other state law intrusions by judges and politicians without
the same incentives as the private parties, interfere with efficient private ordering; suggesting that the
contract impairment clause safeguard against government interference in this private ordering); Fis-
chel, From MITE to CTS, supra note 3.
372. Coffee, Strain in the Web, supra note 34, at 91. Coffee argues that antitakeover statutes and
defenses serve as cost-saving alternatives to formalizing implicit promises to managers and other
constituents of stability. Reasonable expectations in these promises, according to Coffee, are
usurped without compensation and redistributed to shareholders, in a takeover.
373. Coffee's redistribution theory suffers from a number of defects. As Professor Oesterle ar-
gues, modem contract doctrines, including that of good faith, could enforce Coffee's "long-term
promises" (if true); severance pay clauses could serve the purpose; and the theory is overbroad,
ceding to managers greater power to behave opportunistically than is denied to shareholders. See
Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute, supra note 2, at 943; Oesterle, The Rise and Fall, supra note
95, at 242. Empirical evidence also undercuts the theory. Stakeholders fare no better, and may fare
worse, in management takeovers (LBOs and recapitalizations) compared to hostile takeovers. See
supra note 80 (describes effect of takeovers on workers).
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antitakeover statutes, and then compares this constrained market to a
likely federal product.
To date, analysis of the constraints on the antitakeover regime has
been far too narrow, perhaps because corporate reformists and free-mar-
keters generally agree. For the reformists, the antitakeover regime
spawned by CTS confirms the fears of a "race to the bottom." Dela-
ware's decision to enact antitakeover legislation, despite the absence of a
local shareholding or employment constituency, also confirms their fears.
For the free-marketers, the antitakeover statutes present a market para-
dox, correctable only by federal intervention. The free-marketers' as-
sumption that states will not purposefully offer managers, nor will
managers choose, a significantly suboptimal set of corporate rules de-
pends on the interaction of a number of markets, most significantly a
healthy market for corporate control. But antitakeover devices are spe-
cifically designed to weaken that market's disciplining effects.374 While
extolling the chartering market, the free-marketers deplore the dysfunc-
tional market for antitakeover statutes.
Neither camp sees the existence of much constraint. Nonetheless, Pro-
fessor Romano correctly (and virtually alone) identifies the legacy of
CTS corporate federalism as political. The wisdom of the current state-
based antitakeover regime is not merely a question of efficiency, but
whether state political forces produce a better takeover regime than
would the federal political process. The account of these political forces,
however, is incomplete. The market for antitakeover statutes seems to
operate under far more constraints, many of them political, than has
been recognized. That CTS and its third generation of antitakeover stat-
utes has not squelched takeover activity nor abated the call by some
management groups for greater federal tender offer regulation suggests
that the legislature-in-the-pocket explanation for the state antitakeover
regime may be incomplete.375
374. The paradox that a healthy chartering market depends on a healthy control market, but a
weak control market is likely if the chartering market is not healthy, also holds true for the charter-
ing market, though in diluted form. If certain incorporation statutes suboptimally offer managers
excessive flexibility to opt out of the control market, managers will not be disciplined for their subop-
timal choice, particularly in the case of mature businesses in which equity capital needs may not be
great and the risk of bankruptcy is minor. See Davis, supra note 52, at 510-11.
375. Romano, Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 465 & n.20 (reporting that even
after the Delaware antitakeover statute the National Association of Manufacturers continued to
lobby Congress for amendments to the Williams Act that would increase beyond 20 days the tender
offer waiting period and require additional disclosure about bidder's intentions and financing).
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Before turning to these constraints, it is important to keep our bear-
ings. Speaking of an "optimal" or "better" federalism means making im-
portant value judgments. An efficiency comparison of a state-based
regime and federal intervention may be empty, for even if it is possible to
gauge the constraints under which each operates, the comparison cannot
work without making assumptions that essentially presuppose the result.
The comparison forces the choice of a referent by which to measure the
results. Should corporate federalism maximize shareholder wealth; mini-
mize externalities on non-shareholder constituencies; legitimize manage-
rial prerogatives; or take into account the human costs of economic
dislocation? A full efficiency analysis thus requires resolving the empiri-
cal questions of where takeover premiums originate and how antitake-
over statutes reallocate the premiums, as well as the distributive question
of which sources matter to US. 3 76
For present purposes, I pursue a much less ambitious task, identifying
the constraints on the market for antitakeover statutes from the perspec-
tive of shareholders.
L Market constraints
That a market in antitakeover statutes exists seems clear enough.
Many states enacted third-generation statutes in response to Delaware's
adoption of its business combination statute, which in turn had been
prompted by concerns that firms would reincorporate outside Delaware
if the state did not act. Pennsylvania's recent disgorgement statute is the
latest competitive entry.
From the shareholders' perspective, a number of market forces con-
strain managers in choosing a statutory antitakeover regime. Antitake-
over statutes come in an integrated package, which unlike the provisions
of a model form contract cannot be plucked and adopted piecemeal. As
state corporate law now stands-its incorporation-based nature en-
trenched by the internal affairs doctrine-an incorporated firm can use
only the package offered by its chartering state, even though other states
may offer more desirable pieces. Because of this, managers may be reluc-
tant to reincorporate simply because of the perceived advantages of an-
other state's antitakeover regime.37 7 For example, firms must balance a
376. See, e.g., Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point, supra note 34, at 847-48 (arguing that share-
holder wealth maximization should not be the exclusive measure for antitakeover statutes, whose
purposes are much more encompassing).
377. See, e.g., Bernstein, How to Keep Raiders at Bay-On the Cheap, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 29,
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Delaware-incorporated firm's decision to take advantage of Penn-
sylvania's new antitakeover package with the additional costs of Penn-
sylvania incorporation, including a less-developed body of caselaw, a
more partisan judiciary, a potentially more fickle legislature, and a less
experienced and sophisticated corporate bar than Delaware's. By the
same token, firms must balance the decision to reincorporate in Delaware
against the loss of local political responsiveness.
The managers' need to raise capital also contrains the market for an-
titakeover statutes. Even if such antitakeover statutes dampen the disci-
pline flowing from the control market, managers' desire for the prestige
and the predictably higher compensation that come with overseeing a
larger business may constrain the choice of which antitakeover regime
managers opt into.378 The recent experience in Pennsylvania illustrates
the operation of these constraints.
Further, the possibility of a takeover (even if by proxy fight) is not
completely foreclosed-and, indeed, could not be if the Williams Act and
proxy regulation under the Exchange Act are understood to place some
bounds on state interference with control rights. The increasing recep-
tiveness of institutional shareholders to proxy fights and their increasing
success suggests that managers may find that faith in the invulnerability
of a state's antitakeover regime-and lax performance-only invites ex-
posure in the control market.379 The history of takeover defenses shows
that those seeking control find ways around them.
2. Wings effects of threatened federal intervention
In addition to these market constraints, the threat of federal interven-
tion always looms in the wings, producing a regulating effect.380 States
that go too far in abdicating to manager opportunism risk federalization
in the form of federal preemption or occupation. The reformists and
1990, at 59 (reporting that some executives who are impressed with the possibilities under the Dela-
ware antitakeover statute view reincorporating in Delaware as not "worth the hassle").
378. The Indiana Chamber of Commerce made a similar argument in CTS, which said that if a
statute allows manager opportunism, firms incorporated in the state will have difficulty attracting
equity investors. Managers of such disadvantaged firms will find that their own value fall in the
executive labor market. Ind. Chamber of Comm. Brief, supra note 68, at 20.
379. See Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 117,
131-51 (1988) (describing increased institutional investor activism on takeover issues).
380. The academic literature rarely mentions the federal wings effects, but it is a prevalent theme
of the popular takeover literature. See, eg., B. BURROUGHS & J. HELYAR, supra note 359, at 267,
390-91, 513; Sontag, supra note 363.
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free-marketers, focusing almost exclusively on the competition among
chartering states,381 disregard this important force. Because it carries the
risk of true regulation, it may be far more potent than state competition.
The evidence of a wings effect is compelling. At an obvious level, the
states' circumspection in the second-generation antitakeover statutes in-
dicated their awareness of MITE's federalization. The relative restraint,
particularly in Delaware, in the third generation indicates at the least
caution toward CTS. The base-level transfer/control rights apparently
federalized in CTS and the possibility of intervention against blatant pro-
tectionism affected the course of the Pennsylvania statute. A state law
that allowed managers to withdraw from the control market, that bla-
tantly protected the local employment or tax base, or that was not incor-
poration-based would face federal intervention.
CTS is not the only floor. Calls for federal intervention gained the
attention of the third-generation drafters, with apparent effect. More-
over, federal disclosure laws may embarrass managers into not reincor-
porating opportunistically.
The control market is sensitive, perhaps hypersensitive, to this wings
effect. In October 1987, the proposed House Ways and Means tax bill
that would have limited the deductibility of interest incurred to finance
takeovers, leveraged buyouts, and recapitalizations sent shudders
through the control market.382 The investment community pointed to
the tax bill as the fundamental cause of the dramatic ten percent decline
381. See Romano, Law as Product, supra note 28, at 227-32 (summarizing state competition
literature). A few, however, have recognized a federal wings effect, though without elaboration. See
Garfield, supra note 116, at 592 (concluding that Delaware's "restraint [in its business combination
statute] is probably best explained by Delaware's concern with a federal preemptive response").
382. H.R. 3545, Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 10138-40, 10142-
44 (1987). The bill sought to discourage both friendly and hostile takeovers, though treating them
slightly differently. For friendly deals, it would have eliminated deductions for interest expenses
exceeding $5 million a year on debt incurred to acquire more than 50% of another firm's stock or of
a firm's own stock in a recapitalization. For hostile takeovers, it would have made nondeductible all
interest on debt used to finance the acquisition of more than 20% of a targets's stock or assets. The
House Ways and Means Committee's purposes were clear:
The Committee believes that corporate acquisitions that lack the consent of the acquired
corporation are detrimental to the general economy as well as to the welfare of the ac-
quired corporation's employees and community. The committee therefore believes it is
appropriate not only to remove tax incentives for corporate acquisitions, but to create tax
disincentives for such acquisitions.
H.R. REP. No. 391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1086 (1987). See also Mitchell & Netter, Triggering the
1987 Stock Market Crash: Antitakeover Provisions in the Proposed House Ways and Means Tax Bill,
24 J. FIN. EcON. 37, 39 (1989); Solomon & Dicker, The Crash of 1987 A Legal and Public Policy
Analysis, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 191, 225-26 (1988).
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of October 14-16, which precipitated the October 19 freefall. Event stud-
ies comparing stock price changes to events related to the bill seem to
confirm these suspicions.383
Evidence of the wings effects exists in the congressional takeover fo-
rum in which the securities industry, shareholder groups, bidders, and
management groups have participated. One must wonder why Congress
continues to hold regular hearings on takeovers, and why members of
Congress continue to introduce takeover bills, whose provisions would
both increase regulation of tender offers and limit takeover defenses. The
hearings and bills, experience makes clear, go nowhere. But they are
portentous messages to drafters of state antitakeover statutes: "If the
states don't watch out, the feds might."
3. State populism
The legitimacy of antitakeover statutes has depended on creating the
appearance that the interests of shareholders and other constituents are
being served. This quells popular antipathy toward special-interest poli-
tics, as well as satisfying legal restrictions at the state level on private
legislation.38 a The rhetoric and politics of populism constrains the form,
383. The bill's antitakeover provisions were introduced in the late afternoon of October 13, 1987,
and were approved by the House Ways and Means Committee in the late afternoon of October 15.
On October 14 and 16 (the two trading days immediately following announcement of the bill's intro-
duction and approval), the Standard & Poors 500 index fell 2.9% and 5.2%. On October 28, when
committee Chairman Rostenkowski suggested there might be changes to the antitakeover provisions,
the index rose 4.9%, and on October 29 when he formally indicated the statute would be modified, it
rose 2.9%. During the next month Rostenkowski indicated his willingness to modify the provisions,
which ivere finally dropped in a House-Senate conference on December 15. The next day, stock
prices rose 2.2%. See Mitchell & Netter, supra note 382, at 43-44 (tables I and 2).
Mitchell and Netter found these stock price changes statistically significant for general stock
prices and for a portfolio of firms that were takeover targets. Id. at 44, 50 (tables 2 and 3). In
addition, trading by arbitrageurs, who bear the risk of regulatory restraints on the control market,
confirms that takeover investment was linked to the tax bill. Id. at 53 (table 4). Although the
authors found some evidence marginally linking the October 14 decline to the announcement of a
higher than expected trade deficit, no other significant contemporaneous events occured on the other
four event dates associated with the bill. Id. at 59-62.
Although the tax bill seems to have triggered the initial decline, institutional and structural factors
such as index arbitrage and portfolio insurance inherent in the equities (cash), futures, and options
markets were largely responsible for the October 19 freefall. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK
FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS (Jan. 1988); DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK, REPORT (Feb. 1988). See also
Solomon & Dicker, supra note 382 (concluding that the decline was triggered by fundamental fac-
tors, but exacerbated by index arbitrage and the buying of portfolio insurance).
384. In some states, state constitutional prohibitions against special-interest legislation mandate
this political populism. See Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory In.
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if not substance, of antitakeover statutes. Other political actors, besides
management, have a presence in the legislative process of antitakeover
statutes.3s5
Over time, the forces of populism predictably will work with the poli-
tics of generic corporate law to limit manager opportunism in antitake-
over statutes. As the corporate bar becomes involved in revising
antitakeover statutes as part of its periodic review of generic corporate
codes, its preference for rules that invite uncertainty and litigation--or,
stated more graciously, rules that balance the competing interests in a
takeover-will tend to produce more moderate versions of antitakeover
statutes than those drafted and enacted in the desperate heat of a take-
over battle.38 6 As this happens, the political currency of new takeover
targets to tighten these moderated statutes will begin to wane. Populism
can only stomach so much special-interest politics.
B. A Political Comparison: A Preferable, but Paralyzed, Congress
The Coase Theorem predicts that with few exceptions an efficient re-
sult will follow regardless of the existing legal rules whenever competing
interests are represented in a negotiated solution, provided transaction
costs are not too high.387 The Theorem, though not a theory of political
philosophy, is reflected in the prevalent assumption that federal takeover
legislation will reflect "rational economic thought, ' 388 because interests,
besides those of managers-including shareholders, bidders, stakehold-
ers-will be better represented at the federal level than they are currently
at the state level. 38 9 A political perspective thus avoids choosing an effi-
ciency referent. A fully represented negotiated solution would decide the
terpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 232-33 (1986); Romano, Future of
Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 469.
385. See Coffee, Corporate Federalism, supra note 51; Johnson, supra note 9, at 868-69, 923
(concluding that the legal community "screen[s] and translate[s] widely held social norms into legal
doctrine").
386. See supra note 318 (revisions of extraterritorial statutes); supra notes 328-34 and accompa-
nying text (legislative history of Pennsylvania's recent disgorgement statute).
387. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-94 (1937), reprinted in READINGS
IN PRICE THEORY 331, 336-39 (G. Stigler & K. Boulding eds. 1952). Professor Schwab suggests that
because the Theorem purports only to predict the result of bargaining under low transaction costs, it
is more accurately described as a Prediction. Schwab, Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen
and Economists Do Not, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1171, 1176 (1989).
388. See, e.g., Langevoort, A Comment on CTS, supra note 2, at 123.
389. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 52, at 501 (concluding shareholder groups better represented at
the federal level).
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distributive question of whose interests matter.39 °
1. Is representation likely to be fuller at the federal level?
Managers, consumers in the chartering market, are better represented
at the state level than are shareholders. Even though states, through
state employee pension funds, are often the largest single shareholder in
any given state, shareholders never took part in the politics of the sec-
ond-generation statutes and remain on the periphery in the third genera-
tion.391 Neither institutional shareholders, individual shareholders, nor
bidders form a cohesive group at the state level. 3 92 Because to be effec-
tive they would have to conduct effective lobbying at the state level on
numerous fronts, free-riding predictably discourages any one shareholder
or bidder from making the effort, particularly against the odds of cohe-
sive management opposition.393
Based on her assessment of federal legislative activity before CTS, Pro-
fessor Romano entertained little hope for a broad-based federal takeover
response, concluding that shareholders are as diffuse and unorganized at
the federal level as at the state level and that any federal takeover re-
sponse would mirror that of the states.3 94 Romano found, as might be
expected, that bills introduced in Congress during the period between
MITE and CTS looked much like state second-generation statutes. As-
suming that any federal legislation would be based on some extant propo-
sal, Romano imagined a mandatory regime that increased the difficulty
390. In the same vein, some have argued that such questions as the desirability of control mar-
kets, the problems of bidder overpayment, industrial policy and resource allocation can only be
addressed comprehensively in Congress. See Davis, supra note 52, at 513-14; Macey, State Legisla-
tion, supra note 3, at 488.
391. See, eg., Hearing" Tender Reform (Part 1), supra note 295, at 447 (statement of Roland
M. Machold, director, Division of Investments for the State of New Jersey) (stating that "corporate
influence at the State level is very powerful and.., investor interests are dispersed and very weak"),
See also Davis, supra note 52, at 502 (describing passivity of Wisconsin pension fund during enact-
ment of Wisconsin's antitakeover statute); Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute, supra note 2, at
889 n.51 (describing similar passivity by Delaware's Board of Pension Trustees).
392. See, eg., Hearings: Tender Offer Reform (Part II), supra note 297, at 22 (statement of
Joseph I. Lieberman, Attorney General of Connecticut) (supporting the result in CTS even though
Dynamics is domiciled in Connecticut). See also Romano, Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note
51, at 468.
393. Macey & Miller, supra note 28.
394. Romano, State Competition Debate, supra note 60, at 712-13 (suggesting that there is no
reason to think that "diffuse and unorganized" shareholders would be any more capable of commu-
nicating their views to Congress than to state legislatures). See also Garfield, supra note 116, at 597
& n.312.
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of takeovers or an opt-out federal antitakeover statute modeled on a state
version, different only from the state counterparts in that it would have a
national scope.
But CTS reversed the direction of the federalism winds, and Romano's
prediction seems flawed at two levels. First, the antitakeover spirit of the
pre-CTS bills was more likely caused by MITE itself, which placed the
constitutionality of a state response in serious and universal doubt, than
any intrinsic congressional antipathy to takeovers. Before and after
CTS, Congress provided a forum for those who had been denied an effec-
tive remedy elsewhere. The pre-CTS bills generally reflected antitake-
over interests; many post-CTS bills have contained proposals for federal
preemption of state antitakeover legislation.
Second, continuing congressional paralysis and the spectrum of groups
that have spoken on the takeover issue in congressional hearings, particu-
larly following CTS, contradicts a theory of federal legislative capture.
Institutional shareholders, the securities industry, and recently, noninsti-
tutional shareholders have been well represented in Congress, collectively
perhaps better than management interests.3 95 Although free-riding may
pose a problem, for many institutional investors, the expense of lobbying
at the federal level may be relatively small, at least no more an impedi-
ment than it is for management groups.396 For example, after the Octo-
ber 1987 stock market crash, Wall Street immediately and successfully
sought to kill the House Ways and Means antitakeover provisions.3 97 In
addition, the SEC, traditionally a significant voice in Congress, has a se-
curities industry and shareholder bias, if not a mandate.
395. Institutional shareholders can and have organized before Congress. See Romano, Future of
Hostile Takeovers, supra note 5 I, at 503 & n. 112. In the takeover context their interests will gener-
ally overlap with individual shareholders.
In other contexts, individual shareholders appear to have been far more poorly represented. For
example, under the Investment Company Act of 1940-the federal regulation of mutual funds, the
poor woman's stock portfolio-statutory protection against investment advisor self-dealing is toler-
ated under a deferential waste standard. Inv. Co. Act § 36(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C §§ 80a-l-80-b-21
(1988)). See, e.g., Meyer v. Oppenheimer Management Corp., 895 F.2d 861, 866 (2d Cir. 1990)
(upholding fees paid by fund for sales and distribution pursuant to Rule 12b-1 plan, since they "were
not so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and
could not have been the product of arm's-length bargaining") (quoting Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch
Asset Management, Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 906 (1983)).
396. In the post-CTS hearings, the College Retirement Equities Fund sent a representative to
testify before Congress. See Hearings: Regulating Corporate Takeovers, supra note 293, at 354
(statement of James S. Martin, executive vice president of CREF).
397. Langley, Wall Street Interests, Aided by Reagan, Seek to Kill Anti-takeover Tax Rules, Wall
St. J., Oct. 30, 1987, at 16, col. 1.
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If anything, congressional response to takeovers has historically
evinced a remarkably pro-Wall Street attitude. As noted before, signifi-
cant lobbying by the securities industry prompted Congress to moderate
the Williams Act, which as originally proposed was decidedly antitake-
over.39 Today, the interests of the securities industry and shareholder
groups on the question of state antitakeover powers have coalesced, and
the latter appear to be better represented than in the past. Despite signif-
icant pre-CTS pressure on Congress to do something, nothing happened.
Why is this so? One answer may be that members of Congress answer
to a different set of political expectations than do state legislators. At the
state level, local issues and protectionism are significant components of
state politics; state legislators perceive corporate law, rightly or wrongly,
as a significant element in the package that leads a business to migrate to
or from the state. 399 The scorecard for state legislators' re-election re-
volves around the electorate's perceptions on local issues, such as tow
well the legislator serviced constituents and how well state government
fostered local employment.'
At the federal level, incumbency depends to a greater extent on the
electorate's perceptions about the national economy and the effectiveness
of national government, for which members of Congress are held ac-
countable." 1 Preventing the country from an economic downturn moti-
vates members of Congress, which helps explain why for the last decade
protectionism has been an unpopular issue in Congress. For example, a
398. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430
U.S. 1, 22 (1977) (commenting that the original Williams Act proposal, which was "avowedly pro-
management," evolved in response to "positions expressed by the SEC and other interested parties
from private industry and the New York Stock Exchange") (quoting 113 CONG. REc. 854 (Jan. 18,
1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams)). The Williams Act compromise may have reflected little more
than a division of spoils between the securities industry, interested in transactional fees, and corpo-
rate management. Empirical studies suggest that the Act extracts a price from bidders without
increasing the price to shareholders. See supra note 159. The interests of the securities industry and
of shareholders may not always coincide.
399. See Garfield, supra note 116, at 560-62 (reporting efforts by state and local chambers of
commerce to attract business).
400. M. JEWELL, REPRESENTATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES 48 (1982).
401. As Professor Romano points out, few members of Congress are affected by any one take-
over. Romano, Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 477. Although in any significant
takeover a handful of senators and representatives can be expected to want to protect their constitu-
ents, there will predictably be a lack of general consensus on any given takeover. In fact, if takeovers
are efficient, the rational course for a federal legislator would be to introduce a specific bill, garnering
local support for the effort, and hope that it goes nowhere. That certainly has been the pattern. Id.
(citing bills introduced by members of Congress on behalf of particular takeover targets in their
states or districts, though the bills make no progress).
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recurring theme of the post-CTS congressional hearings was the effect
takeovers have on United States competitiveness, and whether the con-
version of debt into equity in leveraged buyouts heightens the risk of a
recession. Neither subject has proved relevant in the politics of state an-
titakeover statutes. By contrast, witness Congress' quick retreat from the
antitakeover provisions of the House Ways and Means bill.
The current congressional paralysis reflects that Congress more than
the states integrates the competing views on takeovers." 2 The congres-
sional hearings are replete with statements by members of Congress of
the importance of a "level playing field."'"' 3 The absence of a national
consensus and, in some instances, the inability of takeover actors to iden-
tify their own interests reduces the pressure for a federal response. For
example, it is still unclear whether on balance leveraged takeovers help
or hurt the federal budget, which at the same time create enormous capi-
tal gains and transform equity into deductible debt. As Professor Ro-
mano reports, voters generally oppose takeovers; but takeovers confuse
them, and ultimately they become indifferent.' 4  And so the irony: Con-
gress is more representative, but because of this less likely to act.
Public-choice theory also predicts this outcome. The conditions for
federal legislative deference to state law exist for takeover regulation.
States, particularly Delaware, have made significant investments in their
antitakeover regimes; states offer a wide and growing variety of antitake-
over options; and in an area in which no national consensus exists, states
stand to take the blame for takeover regulation's failure." 5 From a man-
agers' perspective, state corporate law, with a constitutionalized internal
affairs doctrine, represents a desirable substitute for federal legislation.
402. See Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74
CORNELL L. REv. 43, 46 (1988) (concluding that Congress tries to alienate as few interest groups as
possible).
403. For example, Senator Metzenbaum stated: "Despite the abuses, some takeovers do improve
management and help achieve a company's potential. Congress should not tilt the takeover playing
field one way or the other. It should only ensure that it is level and that it is fair." Hearings:
Corporate Takeovers, supra note 295, at 2.
404. Romano, Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 490-95 (reporting "constancy" in
polls, but "confusion in public perceptions" about takeovers and a preference for state regulation).
405. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: To-
ward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REv. 265, 274-76 (1990). This also
explains why Congress has had less difficulty regulating national capital markets. No state had, or in
the 1930s could constitutionally have had, a dominant blue-sky regime; local diversity of securities
regulation was antithetical to predictable, uniform standards which capital markets crave; and the
Depression left Congress with no one to blame.
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Only one (pliant) legislature need be lobbied; state legislatures and courts
(particularly Delaware's) are as capable as Congress and the federal judi-
ciary; federal paralysis assures state law's preeminence. Indeed, manag-
ers will find state corporate law better than federal law because an
incorporation-based regime allows exit, which could well be unavailable
under a federal scheme. Theory matches reality: Congress is stalemated.
As desirable as a federal solution might be-such as one requiring that
antitakeover statutes be offered only on an opt-in basis4 6-the possibility
may not be realistic. The Supreme Court, whose wings presence may be
more strongly felt than any other market or regulatory force, has an im-
portant continuing gatekeeping role.
2. Is the federal government likely to be more responsive?
The federalism assumption that states can be more experimental, and
hence more responsive to market demand, finds support in the corporate
context. The history of corporate law reflects a self-correcting market.4 "7
The variety and growth of antitakeover statutes prove, if nothing else,
that the state antitakeover regime is flexible and responsive. There has
been significant product differentiation among the statutes, particularly
when compared to generic corporate codes. The recent Pennsylvania
disgorgement statute demonstrates the range of possibility at the state
level; the spectacle of individual firms obtaining a legislative response in
less than a week powerfully evidences states' willingness to please.
Even a fully-represented, negotiated federal solution would predictably
be less fluid or flexible than the current incorporation-based regime. By
definition, no federal solution would be final; adjustment inevitably
would be necessary. But Congress has become an ineffective institution
in a climate of rapid change; mistakes would not be easily corrected; re-
406. Garfield, supra note 116 (recommending that federal legislation require opt-in statutes with
disclosure requirements to overcome shareholder ignorance); Romano, State Competition Debate,
supra note 60 (similar proposal).
407. See Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate
Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 138-52 (1985) (describing monopolistic abuses under the special
charter system which were corrected through general incorporation statutes).
408. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. Further evidence of this response to market
demand is Delaware's court system, which can hear important takeover cases at the trial court level,
handle an appeal and reach a final decision in less than 10 days. See Coffee, The
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1618, 1622 (1989) (concluding that Delaware's specialized courts are better than federal judiciary);
Moore, State Competition: Panel Response, supra note 132, at 780 (describing process).
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sponses to new market conditions would not be quick.' Even delega-
tion to the SEC would suffer from the political illegitimacy of having far-
reaching policy decisions made by a single, politically unaccountable ad-
ministrative agency. Further, federal transaction costs arising from fed-
eral delay and indecision, as well as the mindset of state corporate law,
might offset the advantage of full representation. Because of these trans-
action costs, the Coase Theorem predicts a suboptimal solution.
An expanded federal role could force on the federal judiciary height-
ened corporate law responsibilities to make adjustments and mediate
conflicts unresolved by Congress.41 ° An inkling of how the courts might
perform that role arises from the story of CTS, in which the Supreme
Court had to reverse itself after Congress failed to react to the enormous
federalizing potential of MITE. To illustrate, Professor Kozyris has sug-
gested that Congress should federalize "transferability" rights, preempt-
ing state law that encroaches on effective transferability, whether in the
form of antitakeover statutes or a generic corporation rule that autho-
rizes firm-specific defenses, such as poison pills. 411 Putting aside the
question whether Congress has the political will to do this, the task of
determining which statutes and defenses unduly "encroach" on control
markets would essentially put the SEC or the courts in the position of
deciding substantive economic policy. 412 The wisdom of CTS and corpo-
rate federalism is that such imponderables are left to a fluid, adjustable
process.
Further, competing regulatory models would not constrain any uni-
tary federal corporate regulation, except to the extent the failure of
United States corporate policy eventually leads to business flight outside
the United States. Firms could not easily migrate from bad federal
law.41 Neither a chartering market nor the wings effects of higher-level
intervention would significantly constrain federal action.
409. Romano, Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 51, at 477-78. State mistakes-for exam-
ple, Smith v. Van Gorkom and Singer-are capable of relatively rapid adjustment.
410. Macey & Miller, supra note 28, at 501 (pointing out judicial activity will have little effect on
inter-group activity if "legislature acts quickly to restore the terms of the original bargain by nullify-
ing the court's decision through subsequent statutory enactment").
411. Kozyris, Corporate Takeovers at the Jurisdictional Crossroads: Preserving State Authority
Over Internal Affairs While Protecting the Transferability of Interstate Stock Through Federal Law,
36 UCLA L. REv. 1109 (1989).
412. For example, more than three years after CTS commentators cannot agree whether the
Indiana control-share statute helps or hurts shareholders. Cf. Booth, State Takeover Statutes Revis-
ited, supra note 235; Butler, Corporation-Specific Statutes, supra note 3.
413. Coffee, Corporate Federalism, supra note 151, at 761.
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But the states-as-laboratories argument is fundamentally flawed be-
cause antitakeover statutes create effects outside the enacting state. The
statutes, though perhaps "novel social and economic experiments, '4 14
produce effects that cannot be quarantined. They restrain freedom in
capital markets, employment markets, supply markets, and corporate
control markets throughout the country. A corporate law experiment
gone awry has repercussions far beyond the state's political borders. As
responsive as the state markets for charters and antitakeover statutes are,
the ultimate question is to whom. If the captive-legislature view is cor-
rect, the social and economic cost of waiting for the process to run its
course may not be worth the price. Again, the Supreme Court has an
important role to play.
C. National Unity: The Empty Fear of Retaliation
Although federalization has been justified to deflate the impetus for
state retaliation,415 state antitakeover statutes are immune from state re-
taliation by virtue of the constitutionalized internal affairs doctrine. For
example, when the Indiana statute forced CTS shareholders to subsidize
the desire of the firm's managers (and perhaps other non-shareholder
constituents) for stability, out-of-state shareholders and bidders, includ-
ing Connecticut-based Dynamics, felt the effect. But Connecticut or any
other state, even if one were inclined to retaliate by enacting a protake-
over statute, such as one requiring CTS managers to be passive, would be
powerless directly to do so under CTS. Nor does it prove meaningful to
do so indirectly by excluding CTS from conducting business in Connecti-
cut. CTS leaves the Supreme Court as the only federalism player capable
and suited to adjusting its antitakeover blueprint.
CONCLUSION
A federalism perspective of CTS offers a coherent explanation for the
decision's blueprint for a state-based antitakeover regime. No other pro-
vides as useful or appropriate a framework.
The decision's effect can be summarized:
(1) CTS forbids antitakeover statutes from interfering with the Wil-
414. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country.").
415. Regan, The Dormant Commerce Clause, supra note 169, at 1114.
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liams Act bidding process (and implicitly the proxy process under the
Exchange Act), forcing states to machinate statutes that operate by rede-
fining shareholder voting, appraisal, and redemption rights.
(2) CTS weakly federalizes shareholder transfer/control rights.
Shareholders must retain "voice" or "exit" rights-that is, the ability to
oust management by either voting their shares or selling them to some-
one who can. For the Court to have done less would have risked setting
into motion the demise of state-based corporate federalism.
(3) CTS constitutionalizes the internal affairs doctrine, but some-
what inconsistently refuses to place into the balance economic justifica-
tions for shareholder free-trading rights. Although CTS seems to
withdraw meaningful review of the political motives of state chartering, a
federalism understanding of the case suggests that the Court may implic-
itly have retained some supervisory authority.4" 6 Discriminatory protec-
tionism, a theory undeveloped in the CTS record, is not sanctioned.
This CTS blueprint leaves takeovers subject to decentralized private
markets, incorporation-based state facilitation, and a federal-state dialec-
tic. No one corporate constituent is necessarily a winner or loser. The
process catalyzed by CTS saves the federal judiciary (and for that matter
each of the federalism players) from resolving definitively the empirical
and policy takeover debate. From the Court's perspective, not only does
this preserve federal judicial resources and credibility, it legitimizes the
Court's role as federal/state gatekeeper. By restoring state corporate law
to its traditional status after the MITE scare, the Court would seem to
have nothing to lose and everything to gain.
The CTS gambit sets into motion a process, with which the Court
need not (and predictably will not) interfere until it is clear how it is
playing out. Nonetheless, because CTS may not have anticipated or
taken into account the congressional takeover stalemate, the importance
of the Court's gatekeeping role is heightened. CTS retains one, perhaps
two, tools to perform this gatekeeping function. First, the federalizing
reach of the Exchange Act or the Williams Act is available to ensure
basal shareholder transfer/control rights; state products of the process
can be subjected to minimal substantive standards. Second, although not
an explicit part of the CTS blueprint, the commerce clause's broad
prohibitions against protectionism can be revived to ensure transactional
416. Just as in the contract impairment cases, where the Court judges state legislation on the
basis of whether it had a public or private impetus, such an analysis could well guide the commerce
clause analysis.
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justice; the Court did not foreswear reviewing the political economy
of state antitakeover statutes.417 Both tools can and should be used con-
sistently with CTS's commitment to a process in which no federalism
player receives or must assume a definitive role. In particular, CTS
wisely stanches the federalization implicit in MITE and that which
would have become inevitable were the internal affairs doctrine not
constitutionalized.
In the end, CTS situates the Supreme Court as a catalyst in the corpo-
rate federalism balance, neither a reagent, searching for the ideal balance,
nor a reactant, participating actively in the results. It is a vital role. The
takeover stakes are too great for the Court not to keep the game honest.
417. See, DeBow & Lee, Understanding (and Misunderstanding) Public Choice: A Response to
Farber & Frickey, 66 TEx. L. REv. 993, 1010 (summarizing the debate between those who advocate
an expanded role for the courts in reviewing rent-bestowing governmental action under a rights-
based theory and those who emphasize the constitutional limits to the judicial function and the
limited judicial capacity for substantive evaluation of economic legislation). Compare Epstein, Judi-
cial Review: Reckoning on Two Kinds of Error, 4 CATO J. 711, 715-16 (1985); Siegan, Rehabilitating
Lochner, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 453, 454 (1985), with Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and
Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGo L. Rlv. 823, 830 (1986); Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Af-
fairs, 4 CATO J. 703, 705 (1985).
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